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  The deregulation of energy markets around the world, including power markets has changed the way 
operating assets in these markets are managed. Independent power asset owners and even utilities 
operating in these markets no longer operate their assets based on the cost of service approach that 
prevailed under regulation. Just as in other competitive markets, the objectives of asset owners in 
power markets revolve around maximizing profit for their shareholders. To this end, financial 
valuation of physical assets in power markets should incorporate different strategies that are used by 
asset operators to maximize profit. A lot of observed strategies in power markets are driven by a 
number of factors, the key among which are: 
 
• asset operators are no longer obligated to supply service or manage their assets in certain 
prescribed ways, rather they have rights to operate, within applicable market rules, using 
techniques that maximize their profits,  
• revenues are driven by uncertain market factors, including power price, cost and/or 
availability of fuel stock and technical uncertainties, and 
• power assets have physical operating and equipment constraints and limits.  
 
Having flexibilties (“options”) to optimize their assets (inline with shareholders’ objectives), rational 
asset managers react strategically to gradual arrival of information1, given applicable equipment 
constraints, by revising previous decisions in such a way that only optimal (or near optimal) decisions 
are implemented. As a result, the appropriate approach to valuing power assets in competitive 
markets must account for managerial flexibilities or “real options” in the presence of uncertainties 
and technical constraints.  
 
The focus of this work is to develop a robust valuation framework for physical power assets operating 
in competitive markets such as peaking or mid-merit thermal power plants and baseload power plants. 
The goal is to develop a modeling framework that can be adapted to different energy assets with 
different types of operating flexibilities and technical constraints and which can be employed for 
various purposes such as capital budgeting, business planning, risk management and strategic bidding 
                                                     
1 i.e. information on uncertain market and technical value drivers 
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planning among others. The valuation framework must also be able to capture the reality of power 
market rules and opportunities, as well as technical constraints of different assets.  
 
The modeling framework developed conceptualizes operating flexibilities of power assets as 
“switching options’ whereby the asset operator decides at every decision point whether to switch 
from one operating mode to another mutually exclusive mode, within the limits of the equipment 
constraints of the asset. As a current decision to switch operating modes (in the face of current 
realization of relevant uncertainty factors) may affect future operating flexibilities of the asset and 
hence cash flows2, a dynamic optimization framework is employed. The developed framework 
accounts for the uncertain nature of key value drivers by representing them with appropriate 
stochastic processes. Specifically, the framework developed conceptualizes the operation of a power 
asset as a multi-stage decision making problem where the operator has to make a decision at every 
stage to alter operating mode given currently available information about key value drivers. The 
problem is then solved dynamically by decomposing it into a series of two-stage sub-problems 
according to Bellman’s optimality principle. The solution algorithm employed is the Least Squares 
Monte Carlo (LSM) method.  
 
The developed valuation framework was adapted for a gas-fired thermal power plant, a peaking 
hydroelectric power plant and a baseload power plant. This work built on previously published real 
options valuation methodologies for gas-fired thermal power plants by factoring in uncertainty from 
gas supply/consumption imbalance which is usually faced by gas-fired power generators. This source 
of uncertainty which has yet to be addressed in the literature, in the context of real options valuation, 
arises because of mismatch between natural gas and electricity wholesale markets. Natural gas 
markets in North America operate on a day-ahead basis while power plants are dispatched in real 
time. Inability of a power generator to match its gas supply and consumption in real time, leading to 
unauthorized gas over-run or under-run, attracts penalty charges from the gas supplier to the extent 
that the generator can not manage the imbalance through other means. A savvy gas-fired power plant 
operator will factor in the potential costs of gas imbalance into its operating strategies resulting in 
optimal operating decisions that may be different from when gas-imbalance is not considered. By 
considering an illustrative power plant operating in Ontario, we show effects of gas-imbalance on 
                                                     
2 i.e. cash flows are path dependent  
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dispatch strategies on a daily cycling operation basis and the resulting impact on net revenue. Results 
show that a gas-fired power plant is over-valued by ignoring the impacts of gas imbalance on 
valuation.  
 
Similarly, we employ the developed valuation framework to value a peaking hydroelectric power 
plant. This application also builds on previous real options valuation work for peaking hydroelectric 
power plants by considering their operations in a joint energy and ancillary services market. 
Specifically, the valuation model is developed to capture the value of a peaking power plant whose 
owner has the flexibility to participate in a joint operating reserve market and an energy market, 
which is currently the case in the Ontario wholesale power market. The model factors in water inflow 
uncertainty into the reservoir forebay of a hydroelectric facility and also considers uncertain energy 
and operating reserve prices. The switching options considered include (i) a joint energy and 
operating reserve bid (ii) an energy only bid and (iii) a do nothing (idle) strategy. Being an energy 
limited power plant, by doing nothing at a decision interval, the power asset operator is able to time-
shift scarce water for use at a future period when market situations are expected to be better. An 
illustrative example considered shows the impact of the different value drivers on the plant’s value 
and dispatch strategies. Results show that by ignoring the flexibility of the asset owner to participate 
in an operating reserve market, a peaking hydroelectric power plant is undervalued.  
 
Finally, the developed valuation framework was employed to optimize life-cycle management 
decisions of a baseload power plant, such as a nuclear power plant. The applicability of real-options 
framework to the operations of baseload power plants has not attracted much attention in the literature 
given their inflexibility with respect to short-term operation. However, owners of baseload power 
plants, such as nuclear plants, have the right to optimize scheduling and spending of life cycle 
management projects such as preventative maintenance and equipment inspection. Given uncertainty 
of long-term value drivers, including power prices, equipment performance and the relationship 
between current life cycle spending and future equipment degradation, optimization is carried out 
with the objective of minimizing overall life-cycle related costs. These life-cycle costs include (i) lost 
revenue during planned and unplanned outages (ii) potential costs of future equipment degradation 
due to inadequate preventative maintenance and (iii) the direct costs of implementing the life-cycle 
projects. The switching options in this context include the option to shutdown the power plant in 
order to execute a given preventative maintenance and inspection project and the option to keep the 
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option “alive” by choosing to delay a planned life-cycle activity. Results of an illustrative example 
analyzed show that the flexibility of the asset owner to delay spending or to suspend it entirely affects 
the asset’s value accordingly and should be factored into valuation.  
 
Applications can be found for the developed framework and models in different areas important to 
firms operating in competitive energy markets. These areas include capital budgeting, trading, risk 
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The business of generating, transmitting and distributing power has undergone significant 
transformation in recent years due to electricity sector liberalization. In its simplest form, power 
sector liberalization has resulted in unbundling of government owned utilities that have traditionally 
monopolized electricity generation, transmission and distribution. In advanced liberalization schemes, 
electricity products such as energy, generation capacity and transmission rights are traded in 
competitive wholesale and retail markets as commodities. Given that most power markets are still 
considered as emerging, new challenges and opportunities are constantly evolving.  
Several authors have attempted to catalogue the historical development of power sector 
liberalization schemes and some of the emerging challenges. Good examples of books on this subject 
include Weron [1], Bhattacharya et al. [2] and Shahidehpour et al. [3]. Power sector liberalization is 
believed to have been pioneered by Chile in 1982 but electricity trading through a wholesale market 
scheme was first introduced in England and Wales. The creation of the Nordic power pool, which 
originally included Norway but later extended to include Finland, Sweden and Denmark followed 
after the creation of the England and Wales electricity pool. The earliest markets in North America 
were created in the north east United States (i.e. New England Power Pool, Pennsylvania-New Jersey-
Maryland (PJM) and New York Power Pool) in the late 1990s. Alberta, California, Texas and Ontario 
later followed.  
Figure 1 shows the different bulk power system jurisdictions across North America. Four major 
interconnections are evident; the Eastern Interconnection, Electricity Reliability Council of Texas 
(ERCOT) Interconnection, Western Interconnection and Quebec Interconnection. The North America 
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) has the responsibility to ensure and improve the reliability 
and security of North America’s bulk power system including the development of reliability 
standards. Members of NERC include eight regional reliability councils as shown in Figure 13.  
                                                     
3 MRO- Midwest Reliability Organization; WECC – Western Electricity Reliability Council; SPP- Southwest 
Power Pool Inc.; RFC – Reliability First Corporation (RFC); SERC – SERC Reliability Corporation; ERCOT – 
Electric Reliability Council of Texas; NPCC- Northeast Power Coordinating Council; FRCC – Florida 
Reliability Coordinating Council. 
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Across the bulk power system and interconnections, there are several independent power markets (i.e. 
power pools), power exchanges and trading hubs. In most market jurisdictions, electricity products 
are traded internally and across inter-tie transmission lines connecting multiple jurisdictions.  
Different types of market structure and design exists (Bhattacharya et al. [2]) but most of them 
have key commonalities. Typically, a jurisdiction consists of a power pool operated by an 
independent government-formed agency known as the Independent System Operator (ISO). 
Participants in a power pool include Independent Power Producers (IPPs), government-owned 
utilities, wholesale power consumers, power traders among others. The role of the ISO is to 
coordinate the market while ensuring power system reliability and integrity. In some liberalization 
schemes where power trading is done only through bilateral contracts (i.e. no power pools), the ISO’s 
role reduces to ensuring the reliability of the bulk power system. Where the ISO serves as the market 
coordinator, its objective is to maximize the social welfare of the entire market within the constraints 
of the system’s reliability.  
In the United States, there are estimated 2800 IPPs and over 3100 public utilities4. Unlike the 
independent system/market operator, the goal of the individual power market participant is to 
maximize wealth for its own shareholders by engaging in market-based transactions as well as 
bilateral trades as opportunities arise. This objective is what drives investment and strategic decisions 
by individual power market participant.  Problems related to strategic decision making have therefore 
become much more important to firms operating in power sectors. This is necessitated by the need to 
create, preserve and grow value.  
 
 
                                                     




Figure 1: North America Bulk Power Systems Interconnections5 
Given the uncertainties and opportunities that characterize competitive power market 
environments, several areas of strategic decision making have become key focal points for industry 
and academic studies. Some of these key areas include: 
• Short-term generation planning and scheduling e.g. bidding strategies, peaking decisions, 
startup and shutdown strategies etc. 
• Asset valuation i.e. pricing of derivative contracts, Power Purchase Agreements (PPA), 
Transmission Rights (TRs) etc 
• Portfolio planning and management i.e. optimization of multiple assets (physical and 
financial) to achieve desired risk-return objective. 
• Risk management e.g. physical and financial hedging strategies 
• Trading e.g. short and long-term trading strategies for energy, capacity, emissions, derivative 
instruments etc 
                                                     
5 Source: www.nerc.com 
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• Outage planning i.e. short and long term maintenance and fuelling outage planning  
Underlying these (and other) strategic decision making problems in competitive power markets is the 
need for market participants to develop various analytical capabilities requiring knowledge and 
understanding of theoretical fundamentals in different subject areas such as power engineering, 
decision sciences, financial mathematics, statistics and investment management among others.    
1.1.1 Economic Value Drivers in Power Markets 
Electricity, being un-storable in large economic quantities, exhibits highly volatile market prices in 
line with short-term demand and supply imbalances. This behavior is evident in Figure 2  which 
shows the time series of Hourly Ontario Electricity Prices (HOEP) for years 2003 to 20066.  In effect, 
prices of electricity in competitive markets behave much like securities prices in financial markets 
and prices of other commodities competitively traded. In this context, future spot prices are uncertain 
and they tend to reflect historical volatilities. In addition, as shown in Figure 2, electricity prices also 
tend to exhibit the phenomenon of “mean reversion” and “jumps”. The frequent jumps (or spikes) 
occurring over short intervals (typically over few hours) are sudden price excursions usually caused 
by the occurrence of supply shortfalls and the need to balance supply and demand in real time which 
results in dispatch of expensive power plants. Price mean reversion on the other hand, is common to 
most commodities (Schwartz [4]). When prices are high, supply tends to increase while demand 
decreases with the overall downward pressure effect on prices. When prices are low, the opposite 
takes place leading to upward price pressures. In the aggregate, prices tend to settle around long-term 
averages which can be seasonal in nature.  
Seasonality in long-term average prices of power tends to follow patterns of power consumption 
for space heating and for cooling.  Typically, demand is higher during winter and summer compared 
to the shoulder months. This implies that very cold winter years may witness generally higher power 
prices compared to the years when the winter is mild. There may also be seasonality to the locally 
available energy capacity in a market jurisdiction depending on the type of generation that dominates 
the local capacity. For instance, in a market that has mostly hydroelectric power plants, local energy 
capacity will tend to vary with changes in local precipitation patterns.    
There is also a daily pattern to electricity prices. Power consumption is lower during the night 
                                                     
6 Data source: www.theimo.com 
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leading to correspondingly lower prices; this period is referred to as “off-peak”. As the day breaks, 
power consumption increases and typically peaks after noon corresponding to higher power prices. 
The periods of relatively higher prices during the day are referred to as the “peak” and the “super-
peak” periods.   
Apart from electricity, there are other uncertain value drivers important to power market 
participants. Fossil fuel prices, for instance also exhibit significant volatility, especially prices of 
natural gas and residual oil used for firing thermal power plants. Coal and uranium that were 
historically known to have stable prices have also been showing significant short-term volatilities in 
recent months. Other than fuel prices, examples of other value drivers exhibiting significant 
uncertainties include precipitation (for hydroelectric plants), frequency of forced equipment outages 
(power plants, distribution and transmission lines) as well as foreign exchange rates.  
As in any market economy, the presence of uncertain economic value drivers constitutes both 
upside opportunities and downside risks to market participants. Savvy investment and operating 
strategies therefore take into consideration all available opportunities relevant to a power market 
participant (e.g. startups and shutdowns, planned outages, peaking etc) while considering also the 
impacts of downside exposures.  
When value drivers are uncertain and investors/asset operators have future flexibilities to revise their 
decisions, downside risk exposures can be hedged and additional values derived. This assertion is 
intuitive when one thinks of these future operating or investment flexibilities as “options” where the 
downside is only the cost of exercising the option i.e. the sunk cost of the initial decision (Trigeorgis 
and Schwartz [5], Dixit and Pindyck [6], Copeland and Antikarov [7], Amram and Kulatilaka [8]). 
However, unlike financial options, exercise and feasibilities of these “real options” are subject to 
physical asset constraints such as equipment limits. The careful combination of the physical 
characteristics of power assets with concepts borrowed from financial markets to analyze and value 
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1.2 Overall Thesis Objective 
In a broad sense, the main goal of the work described in this thesis is the development of a robust 
modeling framework for investment valuation of physical assets in competitive power markets given 
uncertainty in key value drivers and availability of future flexibilities to operators and investors. 
Specific examples are developed covering the major types of power generating plants with different 
operating flexibilities. Illustrative studies are then carried out and presented to demonstrate the 
applications of the developed mathematical models.  
1.3 Organization of Document 
The remainder of this document is organized in six chapters as follows: 
• Chapter 2 provides a general background on power markets and the different types of power 
generating plants. The Ontario wholesale electricity market is discussed as an illustrative 
example to shed light on power markets design and operations.   
• In Chapter 3 a broad literature survey is presented covering various topics relevant to power 
asset investment analysis.  
• In Chapter 4 we develop a real options analysis framework for valuing different types of 
power generating assets with flexibilities to switch between operating modes in response to 
resolution of underlying uncertainties.   
• In Chapter 5 we develop a specific example for gas-fired power plants. Unlike existing 
applications of real options analysis to gas-fired power plants, we consider the impact of gas 
supply imbalance uncertainty on operating decisions and hence the market valuation of the 
plant’s output energy.   
• Chapter 6 focuses on the application of the developed real options framework to the 
valuation of a hydroelectric power generating plant. We apply the framework to value a peaking 
hydroelectric facility where the operator has the flexibility to sell ancillary services competitively 
in a market in addition to energy.  
• Chapter 7 focuses on the application of the developed framework to a nuclear baseload 
power plant given that the owners have flexibilities regarding Life Cycle Management (LCM) 
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spending and timing of planned shutdowns.  
• In Chapter 8, we present some general conclusions and applications of the work. 





Introduction to Power Markets  
2.1 Operations of Power Markets 
There are different power market schemes currently in operation today. Most power markets operate 
as Power Pools. In addition to power pools, power products are also traded through bilateral 
arrangements (i.e. Over-the-Counter, OTC) between market participants or through organized 
exchanges. A power pool is operated by an Independent System Operator (ISO) 7 to ensure that 
economic value is maximized fairly for all market participants. The ISO also ensures open and equal 
access to the transmission network by all market participants and overall system reliability. In 
liberalization schemes where only bilateral trading is done, the ISO serves a technical role i.e. that of 
the power grid coordinator. Unlike Power Pools, Power Exchanges8 are usually formed via private 
sector initiative for trading power related contracts, most especially forwards.  To illustrate the 
operations of a power market, we discuss the Ontario wholesale electricity market in the next section.   
2.1.1 Ontario Wholesale Electricity Market 
In Ontario, the wholesale electricity market was created in May 2002 with the responsibility for 
market coordination held by the Independent Market Operator (IMO). The functions of the IMO 
relating to electricity market operation and short-term planning of Ontario’s electricity demand and 
resources were later transferred to a new organization called the Independent Electricity System 
Operator (IESO). Long term resource adequacy planning then became the responsibility of the 
Ontario Power Authority (OPA). The Ontario Energy Board (OEB) regulates the entire energy 
industry in Ontario and works with the Ministry of Energy to establish policies for both the power 
sector and the natural gas industry.  
                                                     
7 Examples of ISOs in  the North American eastern interconnection are: 
Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) 
Alberta Electricity System Operator (AESO) 
New York Electricity System Operator (NYISO) 
Midwest Independent Electricity System Operator (MISO) 
 
8 Examples of Power Exchanges include the Alberta Watt Exchange, the European Energy Exchange (EEX) and 
the UK Power Exchange (UKPX).  
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Currently, the Ontario wholesale electricity market administered by the IESO consists of real-time 
energy and operating reserve markets and a financial market for Transmission Rights (TRs). Other 
ancillary services besides operating reserve (i.e. voltage control, frequency regulation and black start 
services) are procured by the IESO from qualified market participants via bilateral contracts. Market 
participants are also able to engage in bilateral, over-the-counter trading activities with one another, 
within Ontario and with counterparties outside of the province across the interconnected network. The 
categories of market participants in Ontario as defined by the IESO9 are as follows: 
• Transmitters 
• Distributors 
• Dispatchable and non-dispatchable generators 
• Dispatchable and non-dispatchable loads 
• Wholesalers 
• Financial market participants 
• Retailers 
Wholesalers, retailers and financial market participants are those market participants that do not have 
physical facilities that are either connected to the IESO controlled grid or embedded in a distributor 
controlled network.  
In terms of physical infrastructure, the Ontario power system consists of one 500 kV and one 230 kV 
transmission networks in addition to a number of smaller 115 kV lines. For reliability and stability 
planning purposes, the entire system is divided into 10 internal transmission zones (based on 
congestion areas) as shown in Error! Reference source not found.10. Also depicted in the figure are 
the seven inter-tie connections Ontario has with external jurisdictions such as New York, Michigan, 
Quebec etc.  
Given the emerging nature of wholesale power trading, market rules and available market programs 
                                                     
9 Source: www.theimo.com 
10 The arrows in the figure are flow gates; the meanings of the acronyms are provided in Appendix A under list 
of acronyms.  
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are constantly evolving. For instance, a day-ahead market does not currently exist in Ontario but 
discussions are ongoing for its creation. In place of a day-ahead market, certain programs exist to help 
market participants plan the use of their resources day-ahead. Two examples of such programs are the 





Figure 3: A Schematic Idealization of Ontario’s Internal Zones, Internal Interfaces and 
External Connections11 (source: www.ieso.com) 
                                                     
11 The arrows show directions of power flows between the idealized zones; ssee Appendix A for the full 




To participate in the Ontario wholesale electricity market, dispatchable generators submit offers to 
the IESO for the hours they wish to operate, while dispatchable load entities (wholesale consumers) 
submit bids for the hours they wish to consume energy. A dispatchable generator can submit offers 
for both energy and operating reserve. Both offers and bids are submitted in price-quantity pairs using 
the formats specified by the IESO. All offers and bids are combined with non-dispatchable supply 
and the primary demand (i.e. non-dispatchable demand) to arrive at fair clearing prices for both 
energy and operating reserve. Market Clearing Prices (MCPs) and Operating Reserve (OR) prices are 
determined at every five minute intervals by the IESO by running an optimization software; the 
Dispatch System Optimizer (DSO). The DSO implements a marginal cost-based linear programming 
scheme that seeks to maximize economic benefits for all market participants. Economic value for all 
trades carried out at every interval across the market measures the difference between the value to 
consumers and costs to suppliers of the volume of energy and OR traded. Essentially, consumers bid 
the maximum price they are willing to pay for certain quantity of energy while suppliers offer the 
lowest price they are willing to receive for given energy quantities. Operating reserve requirements 
are specified by the IESO based on NERC requirements. To derive the demand and supply curve for 
an interval, the supply offers are stacked from lowest to highest price offers against the demand bids 
which are stacked from highest to lowest price bids. Non-dispatchable generators are allocated the 
minimum possible offer price while non-dispatchable loads are assigned the maximum possible bid 
price. The Market Clearing Price is the price that corresponds to the intersection of the supply and 
demand stacks. Due to their low marginal operating costs, baseload assets such nuclear and coal 
power plants are usually at the bottom of the supply stack while peaking assets (gas turbine and 
energy-limited hydro electric plants) are at the top. A single uniform price is calculated for the entire 
Ontario market but zonal prices are also calculated for the inter-tie zones to determine import and 
export prices. The extents to which zonal prices differ from the Ontario MCP is determined by 
congestion at the inter-tie zones. With regards to the pricing scheme used within Ontario, discussions 
are currently ongoing to change from the Uniform Marginal Pricing (UMP) scheme to a Location 
Marginal Pricing (LMP) scheme.  
The IESO runs the DSO in two modes and two time-frames: 
• Constrained and unconstrained modes 
• Predispatch and real-time.  
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The unconstrained mode of the DSO does not include the physical transmission system hence it 
ignores transmission line limits and losses within Ontario but it does consider the limits of the 
inter-tie zones. Dispatchable generators are compensated at MCP which is the resulting clearing 
price from the unconstrained DSO run in real-time. Non-dispatchable generators however, receive 
HOEP which is the hourly average of 5 minute MCPs. Large commercial consumers pay HOEP for 
energy consumed while residential and small power consumers pay government regulated tariffs. 
Real time market dispatch is derived from the constrained version of the DSO run in real-time 
which factors in the physical characteristics of the transmission networks. The intent of running the 
DSO in both the constrained and the unconstrained mode is to ensure that market participants are 
not penalized for non-optimal dispatch created by the physical need to respect the limitations of the 
transmission network as opposed to the theoretically optimal dispatch (under a uniform pricing 
scheme) created when offers and bids are considered without those limitations. To the extent that 
the dispatch schedule from the unconstrained optimization run is different from that of the 
constrained run, market participants receive credit payments called Congestion Management 
Settlement Credits (CMSC) as compensation for being constrained on or off as the case may be. 
Details of the Ontario wholesale electricity market rules are readily available in several market 
procedures published by the IESO on its web site12. 
2.1.2 Physical Assets in Power Markets 
.  The term “physical asset” in the context of power markets refer to power generating plants of 
different types, power transmission and distribution lines, gas transportation pipelines and gas storage 





2.1.2.1 Hydroelectric Plants 
Hydroelectric plants generate electric power by employing the kinetic energy of running water to 




drive turbines. There are three main types of hydroelectric schemes: 
(i)  run of the river 
(ii) diversion  
(iii) pumped storage 
Run of the river hydroelectric schemes work by locating turbines and generators either in a dam or 
alongside it such that the dam uses the flow of the river to create a hydrostatic head. A diversion 
scheme works by diverting water from a river or lake via canals or tunnels to a reservoir forebay. 
Water from the reservoir is passed through a penstock which slopes down into a power house, to 
generate electricity via one or more turbines and generators. The difference between a diversion 
scheme and a pumped storage scheme is that a pumped storage plant incorporates one or more 
reversible pump-turbine units (or separate pumps and turbines) in such a way that water can be 
pumped into a storage reservoir when prices of power are relatively low (usually off-peak at night) to 
be used later for electricity generation at periods when power prices are relatively higher. Since pump 
motors require electricity to operate, during the pumping mode, an operator of a pump storage power 
generating plant essentially acts as both a load and a supplier during pumping and generation 
respectively.    
Hydroelectric plants generally have low operating costs. Typically, there is no direct fuel cost for 
hydroelectric power plants but government authorities usually charge hydro operators water rental 
fees. In Ontario, water rental charge is known as the Guaranteed Rate Charge (GRC) which is a 
variable fee that corresponds to the volume of energy produced.   
In terms of technical capability, hydroelectric plants typically have fast ramping rates making them 
suitable for provision of ancillary services and for operations as peaking generators. Plants with large 
water storage capability have more operational flexibilities and are able to cycle water over long 
intervals compared to those with very minimal storage. Run of the river plants are operated as 
baseload given that water can not be stored for later use.  
Production volumes from hydroelectric plants are subject to seasonality, based on seasonal rainfall 
and snow melting patterns. The flexibility provided by reservoir storage is usually of more value 
during the dry summer months as opposed to the rainy spring and fall seasons (termed ‘freshet’ 
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periods)13. A large reservoir storage can be filled during the freshet seasons when precipitation is high 
and prices typically low. The same reservoir can then be strategically drawn down during summer 
when precipitation is low and prices are typically relatively high and more volatile.  
2.1.2.2 Fossil Power Plants 
Fossil power plants make use of chemical energy in fossil fuels to produce steam that is used to drive 
steam turbines. The common fossil fuels are coal, natural gas and heating oil. While most plants can 
burn only one type of fuel, others are designed with the flexibility to be able to burn more than one 
fuel e.g. natural gas and heating oil. The efficiency of a fossil plant is determined by its heat rate 
which measures its capability to convert fuel to power. The heat rate is one of the main factors that 
determine the operating costs of fossil plants. The total operating costs are also affected by the 
equipment constraints such as boiler heating and cooling constraints. The flexibility to operate a fossil 
plant in peaking and baseload mode or only in a peaking mode directly depends on operating costs. 
For instance, a gas-fired plant with high heat rate14 and hence high operating costs will typically be 
“out-of-the-money” during most hours of the day except during the periods of peak power prices. 
Since a rational operator will not intentionally operate the plant out-of-the-money (except for the 
purpose of capturing value at a later time), such a plant is only operated when power prices are 
relatively high.  
Another factor that plays an important role in the economics of fossil-fueled power plants is 
reliability of fuel supply. For instance, natural gas is usually supplied through transportation 
pipelines. As a result, easy access to flexible use of transportation services and possible gas storage 
facilities improves the economics of a gas-fired power plant. Similarly, transportation of coal to coal- 
burning power plants is often achieved via rail and sea; hence regional climate factors (such as winter 
effects on water transportation) make year round supply of coal to certain power plants, impossible.   
Other factors of importance to fossil-fueled power generation (especially coal-fired power plants) 
relates to pollution control. Costs of emission control depend on a number of technical and regulatory 
                                                     
13 During seasons of heavy rain, reservoirs are full and there maybe more water than the power plant 
can process resulting in spill of excess water flow.  
14 The heat rate of a gas-fired power plant determines the required natural gas consumption 
(measured in MMBtu of Giga Joule) per MWh of energy produced, hence high heat rate indicates low 
efficiency (e.g. observed in single cycle gas-fired power plants).  
 
 16 
factors such as the availability of pollution control technology (e.g. Sulphur dioxide scrubbers) 
including plant equipment technology, coal quality (high or low sulphur coal) and local/regional 
environmental policies.    
2.1.2.3 Nuclear Power Plants 
Nuclear power plants (NPP) make use of thermal energy produced by fission of nuclear materials to 
generate electricity. Due to the complexity of fission processes, nuclear power plants usually have 
long startup times making them suitable for baseload power generation only. Comparatively, 
operating costs of nuclear power generation are typically less compared to fossil-fueled power plants 
but their capital costs requirement can be prohibitively high. In addition to high capital costs, other 
costs related to long-term waste storage and plant decommission can significantly affect the 
economics of nuclear power plants. Costs of Life Cycle Management (LCM) for nuclear power plants 
can also be very significant. These costs include costs of equipment maintenance and inspection 
among others. Flexibilities to strategically allocate LCM spending and select shut-down periods in the 
presence of power price and materials costs uncertainties produce additional values for owners of 
NPP.   
2.1.2.4  Renewable Energy 
Recent environmental concerns are generating significant interests in the development of renewable 
energy technologies for power generation. However, the economics of most renewable energy 
sources make them unattractive for large scale power generation at least with the currently available 
technologies. To encourage investments in renewable energy power plants, special government 
programs are usually made available to investors, even within the context of competitive power 
markets. A good example of such special program is the Standard Offer Program (SOP) available in 
Ontario through the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) for investors interested in small-scale renewable 
power plants.   
2.1.2.5 Other Physical Assets 
Access to power transmission and distribution lines is vital to power market participants. From the 
perspective of an independent generator, financial value can be attached to firm and interruptible 
access on transmission lines (e.g. see www.miso.org), especially when such lines connect two trading 
hubs or zones. Short and long-term transmission rights are typically available for purchase in most 
markets, mostly through some sort of auction mechanism. The value of such rights depends on 
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whether they are firm or interruptible and on the locational price spreads between the two hubs or 
zones that they connect.  
Similarly, access to natural gas is a key economic factor for gas-fired plants. As a result, energy 
marketers trade around the volatility of natural gas prices as well as locational and calendar price 
spreads, whether for hedging purposes or for pure profit speculation. The values of gas storage 
facilities/services and gas transportation facilities/services are therefore important in power markets 
and can be determined by considering the dynamics of gas prices along with the physical 







3.1 Uncertainties, Risk and Opportunities in Competitive Energy Markets 
Under regulated power systems, vertically integrated utilities or local distribution companies charged 
regulated tariffs which were in line with the costs of providing services. Under such compensation 
schemes, rate payers directly bore the risks of capital investments in the electricity sector, hence 
returns from power investments were generally considered guaranteed. With the introduction of 
market-based pricing, cash flows are subject to increased uncertainties for which government 
guarantees are not provided15. This development has led to the growth of research in the areas of risk 
management and strategic asset optimization in power sectors.   
There are several sources of uncertainties investors are faced with in a competitive power market 
environment.  These can be classified broadly as follows (Eyedeland and Wolyniec [10], Kaminski 
[11], Ronn [12]):  
(i) technical or operational uncertainties 
(ii) market-based uncertainties  
(iii) regulatory uncertainties, and  
(iv) credit risk 
As pointed out by several authors, the impacts of uncertainties on investment performance include 
both upside opportunities and downside risks (see Schwartz and Trigeorgis [5], Dixit and Pindyck [6], 
Ronn [12]). This is true for power markets where capital investments and asset operations essentially 
involve optimizing risks and strategic opportunities to maximize value for shareholders.    
                                                     
15 Even in partially deregulated markets (such as Ontario) where Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and other 
forms of long-term regulated energy contracts are employed to guarantee earnings, return on investments are 
still usually tied to optimized operating strategies. 
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3.1.1 Sources of Uncertainties 
3.1.1.1 Technical and Operational Uncertainties 
Technical and operational uncertainties in power markets can vary from broad operational factors 
affecting entire portfolio of assets owned by firms to asset specific factors. As in the financial sector, 
operational risks are defined16 for the energy industry as those risks arising from failure of systems, 
processes and people. For instance, failure of equipment could lead to forced outages of power plants 
and power transmission lines. Such outages results in unplanned financial losses and cash flow 
uncertainty. Similarly, faulty processes in different operational areas (e.g. trading, forecasting, 
operational safety etc) and failure of people can lead to unintended outcomes resulting in investment 
losses. There are also other more readily quantifiable sources of technical uncertainties such as 
variability in precipitation (affecting production of hydroelectric facilities) and weather (affecting 
load demand).    
3.1.1.2 Market Based Uncertainties 
Market-based uncertainties arise from macroeconomic factors that are usually outside of the control 
of each individual market participant. Examples include (i) electricity and fuel prices (ii) interest rate 
and (iii) foreign exchange rates.    
3.1.1.3 Regulatory Uncertainties 
Given that power markets are still generally considered as “emerging”, significant uncertainties 
exist with regards to future policy directions and market interventions by government regulatory 
bodies. This category of uncertainties is especially important within the context of long-term 
investments in power markets. Specific areas include market design, environmental regulations, re-
regulation of power sectors and market rule changes among others.    
3.1.1.4 Others 
Credit risk refers to the risk that counterparty in a transaction will default on its obligation. 
Typically, the probability and magnitude of credit events depend on a number of factors including the 
counterparty’s credit rating and volume of transaction. In a power pool, there are usually many 
                                                     




participants, each contributing its own quota to potential credit events for the entire market. In 
Ontario, a credit risk prudential support system exists which requires each market participant on the 
demand side to contribute on an ongoing basis to a fund (based on market share and credit rating) that 
can be relied upon for partial hedging of credit default events.  
In order to quantify the impact of uncertainties on investments, the key starting point is to be able 
to quantify those uncertainties. To this effect, a number of well established financial models exist for 
modeling time series evolutions of market-based factors such as interest rates and foreign exchange 
(e.g. see Hull [13]) and probability of credit events. Similarly, many established methods exist in the 
engineering literature for modeling technical uncertainties such as equipment failure rates. Regulatory 
uncertainties are not as easily quantifiable but their impacts can sometimes be forecasted and factored 
into analysis (Larsen and Bunn [14]).  
3.2 Uncertainties and Value of Assets 
Valuation is the process of quantifying the price of an asset or an investment project. The purpose and 
reason for asset valuation are diverse. Typical examples include financial reporting, capital budgeting, 
strategic planning and risk management (Brealey and Myers [15]).   
There are a number of traditional methods for analyzing investment decisions. Among these, the Net 
Present Value (NPV) method is the most popular17. The basic premise of the conventional NPV 
method is to estimate future cash flows from an investment outlay (revenues and costs) and discount 
them to a common present time using a hurdle rate or a risk-adjusted rate of return. The convention is 
to determine the net difference between estimated discounted revenue and discounted cost such that if 
the net is greater than zero, the investment is considered viable (see Fraser et al. [16]). In the case of 
multiple investment opportunities, the alternative with the highest NPV is considered the most 
attractive.  
In industrial applications of NPV, questions do arise regarding how future cash flows and an 
appropriate discount rate should be determined and how risks should be accounted for. Early critics of 
NPV (e.g. Hayes and Garvin [17], Kester [18] and Hertz [19]) provided different points of view on 
why traditional NPV is deficient and proposed methods of improvements. Some suggested the use of 
simulation to enhance the static NPV while some suggested incorporating decision trees. As pointed 
                                                     
17 Other examples include the Pay Back Period (PBP) method and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) among others 
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out by Trigeorgis [20] and Dixit [21] and many others who have written on this subject, there are 
three characteristics of investments that if present together make the use of traditional NPV 
inadequate for capturing true investment value. These include: 
(i) Sunk costs - most investments have sunk costs, making decisions irreversible.  
(ii) Future uncertainty of value drivers - most investments are subject to economic and 
technical uncertainties and information arrives gradually to resolve the uncertainties.  
(iii) Non-disappearing investment opportunities - opportunities to invest do not always 
disappear if a decision is not taken immediately (i.e. decisions can be delayed), hence the 
investment question is not only if to invest but when to invest.  
When there are uncertainties and irreversibility, and the opportunities to invest do not disappear 
immediately, two situations arise: 
(i) it may be optimal to wait for new information arrival before investment decisions are 
made; 
(ii) flexibility may be available to change a previously selected strategy as new 
information arrives.  
In other words, in the presence of sunk costs, uncertain economic and technical factors and 
opportunities to wait, rational investors react strategically to gradual information arrival either by 
waiting to invest18 or by revising, as appropriate, previously chosen strategies. The premise of the 
traditional NPV however, is that investment decisions are made at the time of analysis (here and now 
approach), thereby leaving no room for future flexibility on the part of the decision maker as 
uncertainties become resolved in the future. 
Managerial flexibilities of these forms in the context of investments in physical assets are referred 
to as “real options”. “Options” in this sense refer to choices on the part of the investor or managers to 
either defer decision making or change strategies along the way. The term “real options” was first 
introduced by Myers [22] to describe investment flexibilities of firms. In his paper, he proposed that 
real assets of firms can be viewed as “call options”.   The term “real” was introduced to contrast these 
types of options with financial options which are simply referred to as options. Real options are non-
                                                     
18 This approach is the so called “wait and see” 
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traded (unlike financial options) but their values, like financial options can depend on traded 
underlying assets. Also, unlike financial options, their values can also depend on non-traded factors 
such as technical uncertainties. Like the owner of a financial options contract, the owner or manager 
of a physical asset with future managerial flexibilities (or optionalities) has certain rights that he/she 
is not obligated to exercise. The value associated with this flexible decision making forms the basis of 
real options valuation as opposed to traditional investment analysis methods.   
Early documentation of the applications of this type of thinking to investment valuation and 
strategy were provided by Myers [22], Mason and Merton [23], McDonald and Siegel [24], Brennan 
and Schwarz [25], Kulatilaka [26] among others. The idea is to value physical assets with embedded 
managerial flexibilities using techniques originally developed for financial options valuation. This 
method of thinking has now been extensively embraced by the academic corporate finance 
community, and it is also getting extensive attention among industry practitioners as a preferable 
alternative to traditional NPV (Schwartz and Trigeorgis [5]). 
 Different classes of real options have been defined in the literature as (Trigeorgis [27]) (i) 
abandonment option, (ii) switching option, (iii) deferral option, (iv) expansion option, etc. Several 
authors have attempted to define valuation frameworks and value these categories of real options and 
others. For example, Trigeorgis and Mason [28] examined the option to alter operating scale or 
capacity of an investment project. Kulatilaka and Trigeorgis [29] developed a framework to value the 
option to abandon a project for salvage. Ingersoll and Ross [30] examined waiting option in the 
presence of interest rate uncertainty. McDonald and Siegel [24] valued deferral option to temporarily 
shutdown and restart operations. Majd and Pindyck [32] developed a valuation framework for the 
deferral option in the context of construction projects.  
3.2.1 Real Options in Energy Markets 
The theory of real options provides an excellent framework for analyzing investments in physical 
energy assets. This realization has led to the development of different real options applications for 
power plants (Denton et al. [34], Thompson et al. [35], Tseng and Barz [36], Li et al., [37], and 
Leppard [38]), Transmission assets (Deng et al. [39] and Rosenberg et al. [40]) and gas storage 
facilities (Weston [41], Thompson et al. [42] and Maragos et al. [43]). Most of the value drivers in 
competitive power markets are uncertain. From the perspective of a power generator, values are 
derived through energy production and sales. In the presence of price uncertainties, the operator of a 
flexible power plant will switch operating strategies in response to power market fluctuations. If 
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technical operating constraints (such as switching costs) are ignored, such flexibilities can be 
conceptualized as simple call and put options on the spread between electricity and fuel. For instance, 
owning a gas-fired power plant can be considered “simplistically” as holding a long position in a 
series of financial ‘put options’ that are exercised only when the spot price of electricity is greater 
than the cost of natural gas. Under such a simplistic view, a rational asset manager, when faced with 
an option to generate below cost (i.e. negative spread19), or idle the plant, will choose to idle his plant 
and allow the option to expire unexercised.  
In reality, physical energy assets are characterized by multiple and interdependent real options. 
Among other things, the operator of a power plant has flexibilities with regards to (i) how to offer the 
plant’s output into the market, (ii) when to schedule inspection and maintenance outages, (iii) how 
much to spend on Life Cycle Management (LCM) and (iv) how to use emission credits. For example, 
the operator of an energy-limited hydroelectric plant has the option to strategically operate the plant 
by cycling its reservoir inventory. The reservoir can be drawn down to take advantage of immediate 
benefit from energy production (based on current market prices) or production can be deferred to later 
periods with the expectation that prices will be higher20. Also the owner may have the option to 
reserve some of its capacity for the provision of operating reserve to the market or offer all available 
capacity into the real–time energy market. This capacity reserve strategy can be thought of as selling 
(or “shorting”) call options to the system operator such that whether the system operator exercises its 
option or not (i.e. by activating the reserve or not), the generator gets to keep the premium it received. 
Also, the right amount of money to spend on plant maintenance and the time to shut down for 
maintenance are recurrent options that can affect future production costs and overall performance of a 
plant. Based on similar thinking, the decision to retire an aging plant or to make major capital 
additions to extend its useful life is a strategic option that depends on projected plant performance and 
market outlook.  
                                                     
19 The option with a payoff structure that depends on the difference between the values of two assets is known 
as ‘spread option’. The spread between the price of electricity and the price of the required fuel to generate it is 
referred to as ‘spark’ spread while the spread between crude oil price and refined petroleum products prices is 
referred to as ‘crack’ spread.   
20 This strategic flexibility is also available to the owner of a gas storage asset 
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3.3 Valuing Financial and Energy Derivatives 
3.3.1 Background on Derivative Instruments 
A derivative instrument is a financial contract whose value or payoff depends on the value of an 
underlying asset e.g. stocks, commodities etc (Hull [13]). Typically, financial derivative instruments 
are used for one or more of the following purposes (Hull [13], Clewlow and Strickland [44], 
Eyedeland and Wolyniec [10], Skantze and Illic [45]): 
• to reallocate risk exposures (i.e. hedging) 
• to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities 
• to speculate on future movements of market parameters for pure profit purposes.  
Forwards/futures, swaps and options are the major classes of derivative instruments. A forward 
contract is an agreement between two counterparties to buy or sell an asset at a future date for an 
agreed price. Futures are like forwards, except that they are standardized contracts traded on 
exchanges (such as the New York Mercantile Exchange, NYMEX). Swaps are contractual 
agreements that allow two parties to exchange streams of cash flows e.g. a fixed interest rate for a 
floating interest rate (i.e. interest rate swap). Options involve the payment of a premium by one party 
to another to acquire a right (but without obligation) to buy or sell an asset to or from each other.     
Historically, derivative instruments have been written on several types of underlying assets or 
market indices including stocks, bonds, weather, credit, foreign exchange and commodities among 
others. They are either traded over-the-counter (OTC) or on standardized exchanges. They may or 
may not include physical delivery of the underlying asset. 
Energy market participants require derivative instruments on different types of underlying assets 
especially for hedging purposes. Examples include credit, foreign exchange, interest rate and weather 
derivatives. The term “energy derivatives”, however is commonly used in the literature to refer to 
those derivative instruments whose payoff depends on energy prices (or price indices) only (Clewlow 
and Strickland [44]).    
The theoretical framework for valuing or pricing financial derivatives is based on the famous works 
of Black, Scholes and Merton (Black and Scholes [46], Merton [4]) on contingent claims analysis. 
The valuation framework is based on the premise that a claim on an asset (i.e. a derivative contract) is 
implicitly priced if the asset (i.e. the underlying) is traded. In their original work, Black and Scholes 
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[46] presented the value of a European call option and a European put option on the stocks of 
corporations by assuming that the price of stocks (i.e. the underlying asset) evolves  randomly 
according to a stochastic diffusion process called the Wiener process or the Geometric Brownian 
Motion (GBM). They argued that in the absence of arbitrage, today’s fair price of a derivative 
contract is equal to the expected value of the future payoffs of the derivative, discounted at the risk-
free interest rate. This conclusion was based on the assumption that the risk of a derivative contract 
could be hedged dynamically by continuously buying and selling the underlying asset.  Based on this 
dynamic hedging strategy and the assumed stochastic process for the price of the underlying asset, the 
price of the contingent claim was shown via Ito’s Lemma21 (see Hull [13] for the derivation) to satisfy 




















V σ     (3-1) 
where V is the value of the claim on an underlying asset whose price is S . The parameters t , σ  and 
r represent time, volatility of price return and the risk-free interest rate respectively. The evolution of 
S  according to the GBM process is determined based on the following stochastic differential 
equation: 
SdzSdtdS σµ +=        (3-2) 
Where µ is the drift which is equal to the risk free interest rate and dz is the increment of the Wiener 
process in the interval dt . By specifying appropriate boundary conditions, they were able to derive 
closed-form solutions to this PDE for European call and put options.  
 In general, all options whose payoff depends on the price of a single underlying asset and for which 
one can derive a closed form solution are generally referred to as “plain vanilla” options. All other 
options whose payoffs diverge from some of the basic assumptions of the Black-Scholes model are 
commonly referred to in the literature as exotic options. Examples include options (see Kaminski et 
al.[48]) with payoffs that depend on any of the following: 
(i) the trajectory (i.e. path) of the price of the underlying asset as well as the price itself (e.g. 
Asian Options, Lookback Options, and Barrier Options),  
                                                     
21 Ito’s Lemma allows the finding of the differential of a function of a particular type of stochastic processes. 
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(ii) multiple underlying assets (e.g. Spread Options and Basket Options),  
(iii) an underlying asset that is also an option (i.e. compound options).  
Deng et al. [39] were among the first to present a methodology for valuing electricity derivatives by 
replicating their payoffs with futures contracts.  They presented closed form expressions for the value 
of a range of derivatives, including spark spreads and locational spreads. Spread options are a general 
case of the exchange option22 first presented by Margrabe [49]. They are written to take advantage of 
price differential, either between two commodities (as in the case of spark spread and crack spread23) 
or the same commodity sold at different locations (i.e. locational spreads) or at different calendar 
times (i.e. calendar spreads).     
The swing option is another derivative instrument used for hedging commodity risks (Kaminski et al. 
[48]). By design, a swing option contract allows for multiple exercise rights during the life of the 
contracts. For instance, a swing contract on natural gas may allow the holder (e.g. a power generator) 
to deviate from taking a pre-agreed base volume of gas on more than one occasion (i.e. exercise 
periods) as requirement changes.  Jaillet et al [50], Dahlgren [51] and Dörr [52] are among several 
authors that have presented valuation techniques for swing contracts. For valuing different types of 
spread options in general, Carmona and Durrleman [53] compiled an excellent review of available 
techniques for valuing different types of spread options. The books of Clewlow and Strickland [44], 
Eyedeland and Wolyniec [10] are excellent resources on energy derivatives and their valuation 
techniques.      
3.4 Valuing Physical Assets   
Physical assets in energy markets refer to power generating plants of different types, transmission and 
distribution lines, gas transportation pipelines, gas storage reservoirs and all other physical assets that 
are operated in energy markets. The market value today of an energy asset like a power plant is a 
function of the future cash flows derived by operating the asset. Future cash flows in turn depend on a 
number of factors including (but not limited to) electricity prices, variable costs of operation and 
                                                     
22 The exchange or swap option is the option to exchange one asset for another or the option to select the better 
of two assets.  
23 Spark spread refers to the spread between electricity and natural gas prices while crack spread refers to the 
spread between crude oil and refined petroleum products.    
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maintenance, technical uncertainties and constraints as well as operating strategies. To determine 
future cash flows for an individual asset, the convention is to assume a perfectly competitive market 
where individual plant dispatch decisions do not have any noticeable impact on market prices (Ronn 
[12], Kaminski [11], Denton et al  [34], Thompson et al. [35], Tseng and Barz [36] etc ). 
3.4.1 Valuation of Gas-Fired Power Plants 
For an operator of a gas-fired power plant in a competitive power market, the desired objective is to 
maximize revenue by strategically operating the plant to capture value when the spread between 
power prices and gas prices (spark spread) are highest. Such an operator has the right to shut down 
the plant (by not offering to sell power) when the spread is unfavorable and start it up when favorable 
market conditions exist.  Hence, a plant that is able to ramp up quickly in response to price 
movements has more value compared to a similar plant with low ramp rates.  In reality, equipment 
constraints usually make it impractical to ramp up and down as often as price spread indication exists. 
One can interpret the impact of these constraints as adding to exercise costs for the flexibility options. 
This implies that switching decisions are inter-temporal in nature (i.e. current operating decisions 
affect the availability of future options). If one ignores these exercise costs, the spread option decision 
making at every period is independent, making the option values additive. Based on this approach, 
Deng et al. [39] proposed the following valuation formula for determining the value (V ) of a gas-









































     (3-3) 
where eS  and fS  are the prices of electricity ($/MWh) and fuel ($/MMBtu) respectively, HR is the 





 is referred to as the ‘market heat rate’ as compared to the ‘plant heat rate’ ( HR ) such that if the 
production process is thought of as a put option on the market heat rate with the strike price HR, the 
plant is only turned on when the market heat rate is greater than the plant’s heat rate and turned off 
otherwise. The shortcoming of this simple spark-spread model proposed by Deng et al. [39] is that it 
leads to higher value than expected in reality as power plants cannot be turned on and off as often as 
desired without due consideration for physical operating constraints. For instance, thermal power 
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plants have physical limitations that constrain them to remain in an operating state for a minimum 
time period before the mode of operation can be changed.   
To address this shortcoming, a number of authors have proposed more elaborate frameworks that 
incorporate the important operating constraints to different extents in the valuation problem. The 
inter-temporal nature of the decision making problem necessitates the use of a dynamic optimization 
technique in order to consider the impacts of current decisions on future decisions. For instance, 
Tseng and Barz [36] formulated the valuation problem as a multi-stage stochastic dynamic 
programming problem and solved it using a simulation based optimization technique. Similarly, 
Denton et al. [34] employed a trinomial lattice-tree backward induction technique. Thompson et al. 
[35] employed a continuous time framework and derived the value function as a partial integral 
differential equation (PIDE). The extent of operating constraints and power price characteristics 
incorporated by these different authors depend on the limitations of the numerical techniques 
employed. One key uncertainty factor that has not yet been considered in the literature however is the 
impact of operational differences between the gas market and electricity markets leading to gas 
supply/consumption imbalances for power generating plants. The occurrences of such imbalance on a 
frequent basis may result in additional costs and constraints that must be factored into valuation. By 
ignoring these costs and constraints, published models may result in over valuation.  This issue will 
be analyzed in this thesis.  
3.4.2 Valuation of Hydroelectric Plant 
There are different types of hydroelectric schemes with the main uncertainties under regulation being 
precipitation (rainfall) and load demand. A quick survey of existing literature on hydroelectric plants 
optimization show an array of methodologies including linear programming, integer programming 
and dynamic optimization techniques with the objective typically being to maximize energy 
production or minimize costs (e.g. Chao-An et al. [54] and Sherkat et al. [55]).  
Under market competition, the objective of the independent power asset owner is to maximize 
revenue. By applying options thinking, one can value a single hydroelectric scheme by considering 
the option of the asset operator to store water in a reservoir for future use with the expectation that 
market prices will be higher. Intuitively, the more flexibility there is to cycle water to capture market 
value, the more valuable a hydroelectric plant is. Based on this thinking, Thompson et al [42] and 
Doege et al [62] among others have developed real-options valuation models for valuing single 
(peaking type) hydroelectric plants operating in spot energy markets. While their frameworks capture 
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the option values of storage and cycling, there are additional flexibilities that were ignored. For 
instance, hydroelectric plants are highly suitable for the provision of ancillary services due to their 
fast ramping capability. In a market where a competitive ancillary services market exists (e.g. 
operating reserve market), a power generator will have the additional option of reserving some of its 
capacity for ancillary services. Such flexibility can be regarded as selling of call options to the 
Independent System Operator. Whether the system operator exercises the option to activate the 
reserve or not, the generator keeps the premium received and can make use of the reserved water at a 
later time. A strategic exercise of this type of option will increase the value of the plant and should be 
factored into economic evaluation of hydroelectric facilities.  This issue is also addressed in this 
thesis.  
3.4.3 Nuclear Power Plants Flexibilities 
Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) are typically baseload generating plants. Given their long startup and 
shutdown processes they are rarely shutdown except for period Life Cycle Management purposes 
which may include preventative maintenance and equipment inspection among others. The owner of a 
NPP therefore has the flexibility to strategically budget for LCM related activities. The amount of 
money spent on such activities is indirectly related to future plant performance and therefore may be a 
strong determinant of future cash flows.  After operating for its initial design life, a NPP like other 
power plants may also be refurbished and the operator may seek an extension of its operating license. 
The alternative is for the plant to be retired and put in a “safe storage” mode leading to eventual 
decommissioning.  The flexibility to choose plant life extension instead of safe storage and 
decommissioning is essentially a “deferral option” (Trigeorgis [27). By choosing to refurbish a plant 
and re-license it, the owner is essentially deferring safe storage and decommissioning to future dates.   
If one considers these flexibilities in the context of real options analysis, strategic decisions (including 
timing and spending decisions) around life cycle management and plant life extension can be 
assigned some values. For instance, if one assumes that the expectation of long-term market 
performance and future plant performance are the main drivers for these decision making problems, it 
is possible to optimize a plant’s operating strategy such that the present value of future cash flows can 
be maximized. Three recent publications from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
provide excellent discussions on several of the important issues regarding life cycle management and 
risk management for nuclear power plants (IAEA [56], IAEA [57], IAEA [58]). Pindyck [59] 
presented a real options analysis framework for investment decision making  with regards to the 
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construction of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) given high uncertainty in construction costs.  
3.5 Optimizing Asset Portfolios and Quantifying Risks 
Unlike typical trading portfolios in equity markets, portfolios of power market participants typically 
include the following types of positions: 
(i) financial-only positions (typically for hedging purposes)  
(ii) asset-backed financial contracts i.e. contracts requiring physical asset delivery such as Power 
Purchase Agreements (PPAs), bilateral supply contracts etc 
(iii) physical assets such as power generation plants and gas storage facilities.  
The portfolio optimization problem in competitive electricity markets is therefore one of strategically 
dispatching power generation assets while taking appropriate positions in the financial markets such 
that total revenue is maximized subject to acceptable financial risk level. Typically, the suitable 
appropriate approach to risk hedging depends on the particular risk and availability of hedging 
instruments. Some risks exposure can be hedged using financial derivative contracts24 while others 
may only be hedged through the use of traditional insurance instruments. Modeling this problem in a 
consistent and robust fashion can be very challenging as recognized by various authors (Kleindorfer 
and Lide [60], Leppard [38], Clewlow and Strickland [44], Denton et al. [34], Doege [62]).  
The common and the simplest approach to this portfolio optimization problem involves performing a 
single period (or a strip of single periods) optimization with the objective of selecting optimal weights 
of the different assets such that the value of the portfolio is maximized subject to a specified risk 
preference constraint.  Doege et al. [62] used this type of approach to value a portfolio of a nuclear 
power plant and a pump storage hydroelectric facility. Theoretically, single period optimization 
results can be stacked to capture multi-period effects but the dynamic nature of the decision making 
will not be captured.  A more advanced approach than single period linear optimization was presented 
by Sen et al. [61] to optimize dispatch and hedging decisions of a large power asset portfolio in a 
competitive market. The approach is based on a multi-stage stochastic integer programming 
framework that combines recursive optimization of power plant’s dispatch in a spot market with a 
forward-moving scenario analysis of hedging decisions via decision trees. It does not, however, 
                                                     
24 A derivative instrument by definition is a financial contract whose value depends on the value(s) or prices of 
other, more basic underlying market variables (Hull [13]).   
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consider the inter dependence between various hedging strategies. Another important factor to 
consider with portfolio optimization problems is the validity of the assumption of perfect competition 
where the activities of independent portfolio owners do not affect the behavior of the rest of the 
market and hence market prices. It is not uncommon to have markets with a dominant player (usually 
a large utility) along with a number of much smaller participants. When relative portfolio sizes are 
such that perfect competition can not be assumed, the concept of strategic games (simultaneous and 
sequential) may be required to solve portfolio optimization problems of this nature. Recently, a new 
concept called “option games” is being explored in the literature for combining real options analysis 
with game theory (Dias and Teixeira [63]).  
3.5.1 Incorporating Risk Measures  
A number of methods for measuring and reporting energy portfolio risks have been suggested by 
different authors. The common methods include Earnings at Risk (EaR) and Value at Risk (VaR). 
VaR is suitable for portfolios of purely financial assets (i.e. trading portfolios) and is defined as the 
maximum loss that a portfolio can sustain over a specified period of time at a given confidence level.    
The applications of VaR in energy markets have attracted a lot of discussions e.g. see Senor [64], 
Kleindorfer and Lide [60], Dahlgren et al. [68] and Ojanen et al. [67[67], Clewlow and Strickland 
[44]).  The common approaches for calculating portfolio VaR include variance-covariance method, 
historical simulation, and Monte Carlo technique (Dahlgren et al [51]). Being a single period risk 
measure, one of the main challenges of using VaR has to do with incorporating VaR constraints into 
multi-period optimization modeling framework.   
Cashflow or earnings based risk measures which have also been used traditionally in financial 
markets (see Artzner et al. [70]) have been proposed as being more appropriate for energy firms with 
physical power generating plants as opposed to pure financial instruments. These include ‘Earnings at 
Risk’ (EaR), ‘Profit-at-Risk (PaR)’ and ‘Cash flow-at-Risk (CFaR)’. Clewlow and Strickland [44] 
proposed a heuristic approach that uses EaR to assess energy portfolio risks. The approach involves 
simulating the total cashflows of the portfolio in a period of interest using asset specific techniques 
for individual assets. The cashflows are then aggregated into desired time intervals such that the net 
earnings distribution of the portfolio can be assessed at different intervals of time to understand the 
relative merits of the various assets in the portfolio. If the distribution of earnings to risk ratio is not 
satisfactory, the operating strategies can be adjusted and the hedging decisions revised.  Leppard [38] 
had also suggested a similar approach based on VaR measure where a so called Technical VaR can be 
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defined for each key driving factor and used for stress testing on the portfolio’s value.  
3.6 Modeling Market Prices and Other Uncertainties 
Investment analyses in energy markets require modeling of market prices of power and fuel as well as 
other uncertainty factors such as load and precipitation. In general, the same models that are used for 
market prices can be adapted for other type of uncertainties. In the following subsection, we describe 
the common modeling approach in the literature from the perspective of market prices.  
One can classify the common modeling methods as follows: 
(i) quantitative models  
(ii) statistical models 
(iii) fundamental models and 
(iv) hybrid models and others 
3.6.1 Quantitative Models  
Quantitative models for electricity and volatile fuel prices were inspired by finance methods for 
modeling the dynamics of stock prices. These models rely on stochastic processes to describe the 
evolution of prices (and other uncertain market drivers) by assuming that they evolve randomly. A 
stochastic process can be defined in continuous time or in discrete time frames depending on which is 
suitable for the particular problem being addressed.  
The basic stochastic process for asset pricing in finance is the pure diffusion process or the Geometric 
Brownian Motion (GBM) process. The Geometric Brownian Motion process is a solution to the 
following stochastic differential equation: 
tttt dzSdtSdS σα +=        (3-4) 
where the drift α  and volatility σ  are constants. This equation models the change in the random 
variable x at time t  over an infinitesimally short time increment dt . The variable z is the standard 
Brownian Motion (or the Wiener process), hence tdz is the increment of the Wiener process
25 at 
                                                     
25 The Wiener process of a random variable tz is defined mathematically as the set { }0, ≥tzt where the 
increments in tz  are stationary and independent (i.e. Markov) and ),0(~ tNzt .  
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time t . More general forms of this process include time varying drift and volatility (3-5) and 
stochastic drift and volatility (3-6). When either one of the parameters α and σ  are themselves 
stochastic, the model is said to be a multi-factor model.  
                                      tttt dzStdtStdx )()( σα +=       (3-5) 
tttttt dzSxtdtSxtdx ),(),( σα +=     (3-6) 
If S in equation 3-4 is the spot price of a stock, α  is the constant growth parameter (i.e. the drift) 
and σ  is the constant volatility of the stock’s return26, then the price increment dS of the stock at an 






t σα +=        (3-7) 
The first term on the right hand side (RHS) of 3-7 captures the deterministic trend in the evolution of 
the stock price while the second term captures the uncertainty in the evolution. The price S  is log-
normally distributed.  In a risk-neutral world, the drift α  becomes the risk-free interest rate r. If the 





t σδ +−=        (3-8) 
Given the current price of the asset at t , the price tF  of a forward contract on the stock asset can be 
derived based on a no-arbitrage argument since in the absence of arbitrage, the stock will earn the risk 
free rate between t  and T . Hence,  
)( tTr
tt eSF
−=        (3-9)   
where T is the contract maturity and tS  is the integral of equation 3-8. For a dividend paying stock 
where δ  is the dividend rate, the forward price is modified by deducting the dividend rate from the 
risk free rate.    
                                                     
26 Volatility of a stock is a measure of the uncertainty of the stock’s return, typically on an annual basis. It is 
measured as the standard deviation of the log of the returns provided by the stock.  
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For commodities (such as gas and oil), it has been shown that the price dynamics do not obey the pure 
diffusion process (Schwartz [4]). This is because prices in commodities markets tend to revert to 
long-term averages, a phenomenon known as “mean reversion”. Essentially when prices are high, 
supply pressures and low demand tend to push them down with the opposite effects occurring when 
prices are low.  
Instead of the pure diffusion process, the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process is used to model the 
dynamics of commodity prices (Dixit and Pindyck [6], Schwartz [4]).  The arithmetic OU process is 
the solution to the following stochastic differential equation where tx  follows a normal probability 
distribution: 
( ) ttt dzdtxxdx ση +−=       (3-10) 
where the drift α is now ( )txx −η . The drift term is positive when txx >  and negative vice-versa. 
As a result, the process reverts back to a long-term mean of x  at the rate η  called the mean reversion 
rate or the speed of adjustment.  
In the absence of arbitrage, the forward price on a non-perishable commodity is not only a function of 
the risk free rate (or cost of financing the purchase) as in equation 3-9, but also the cost of storing it 
otherwise known as the cost-of-carry  and the convenience yield (Eyedeland and Wolyniec [10]). The 
term “convenience yield” is used to represent the direction of the supply and demand fundamentals of 
a commodities market and it represents the term δ in equation 3-9. If consumers are worried about 
future supply of a commodity, the convenience yield is low and the forward curve is upward sloping 
(since δ>r ); the curve is then said to be in “contago”. However, with an immediate supply crunch, 
the convenience yield is high and the forward curve becomes downward sloping, the phenomenon 
called “backwardation”.  
Unlike other commodities, electricity can not be purchased and stored in large quantities to the extent 
that inventories can be used to absorb supply/demand shocks. As a result, the concept of convenience 
yield does not directly apply to electricity. Also, a realistic model of electricity price must be able to 
capture the frequent spikes observed in electricity prices which lead to fat tails in price distribution.  
To this effect, Clewlow and Strickland [44] proposed that a jump component be incorporated into the 
Schwartz [5] or the Dixit and Pindyck [6] model of commodity prices by incorporating another 
stochastic term (assumed to follow a Poison process) in the mean-reverting model. The ensuing 
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model, referred to as the Mean Reversion-Jump Diffusion (MRJD) model can be written as follows:  
dqdzdtxxdx tt κση ++−= )(      (3-12) 
where dq is the increment of a Poisson process. The Poisson process here models discrete jumps of 
random log size κ.  If dq equals 1, there is an occurrence of a jump event and vice-versa. If we define 
φ  as the intensity of the Poisson counter, then dq equals 1 with probability φdt or 0 with probability 
1-φdt. The log jump size κ follows a normal distribution i.e.: 
( )2,~ γκκ N            (3-13) 
where γ  is the standard deviation (i.e. jump volatility) of the log jump size and κ  is the mean log 
jump size. The forward price of electricity can be derived by finding the expected value of the spot 
price at maturity (e.g. see Cartea and Figueroa [72]).     
3.6.2 Fundamental Models 
An alternative approach to modeling power prices is to consider the fundamental market drivers that 
determine price movements in the short and long time frames. This approach models price evolution 
by modeling the fundamental relationships between the key underlying factors that determine market 
equilibrium prices in the short and long term. These key market fundamental factors include (i) load 
demand (ii) weather (iii) fuel prices (iv) planned new build and planned plant retirement (v) forced 
and planned outages (vi) imports and exports of energy, (vi) transmission network parameters (vii) 
operating costs (viii) market rules etc. By considering the fundamental relationships between these 
key factors, market supply and demand curves can be derived as functions of time and solved to 
determine prices at equilibrium point.   
The time evolution of the different fundamental factors is typically modeled using parametric 
methods. For instance, one can model load demand by capturing the relationship between load and 
weather. Similarly, one can combine available data (or models) of generators’ marginal costs, 
capacity availability (which depends on such factors as precipitation, planned and forced outages etc) 
and offer strategies to model the system supply curve. Similar approach can be used to model imports 
and exports into and out of the target market. An example of this modeling approach is discussed in 
Li and Chiu [73].  
The major shortcoming of fundamental models is their reliance on data that are often not available 
 
 36 
publicly e.g. marginal costs data and planned outages of generators which makes them proprietary in 
nature. A firm developing such a price model will typically rely on their best judgment of other 
market participants’ offer strategy and proprietary information. Also, fundamental models do not 
typically capture price spikes. This is because price spikes are usually caused by sudden and 
temporary supply and demand imbalances; hence a model that relies on short to long-term behaviors 
of market fundamental factors will not be able to capture them.  
3.6.3 Statistical Models 
Like quantitative models, statistical models are also data driven and represent prices as functions of 
different parametric factors. However, the main premise of this class of models is to identify patterns 
and relationships from historical market data using time-series autoregression regression techniques 
(Weron [1], Zareipour [9]) such as the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH). The 
procedure usually involves identifying the model structure and variables and fitting the data to the 
desired model. The book of Weron [1] provides and excellent introduction to common statistical 
approaches for forecasting power prices and other market parameters such as load demand. The 
shortcoming of this type of models in the reliance on historical market data which does not 
necessarily represent future changes in market fundamentals.     
3.6.4 Hybrid Models 
Hybrid models, by their name seek to combine the different aspects of quantitative, statistical and 
fundamental models. For instance, Li and Chiu [37] proposed a so called ‘time decomposition’ 
approach that relates electricity price dynamics based on stochastic processes to information arrival 
on market fundamentals. Davison et al. [74] also developed such a hybrid approach to modeling 
electricity prices. The premise of hybrid models is to combine the advantages of quantitative models 
which are based on stochastic processes with fundamental models. Derivative pricing techniques are 
based on quantitative models which assume that prices evolve randomly according to one or more 
stochastic processes. However, where reliable forward or futures prices are not readily available, 
quantitative models rely only on historical data for calibration and so may not capture future changes 
in market fundamentals.  
3.7 Numerical Methods 
For valuation problems for which analytical solutions can not be derived easily, a number of 
numerical techniques exist for solving them. One can broadly classify these techniques as follows: 
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• Finite difference method  
• Lattice or tree methods i.e. binomial trees and trinomial trees  
• Monte Carlo simulation (i.e. simulation-based optimization) 
The finite difference method was first applied to solve derivative pricing problems by Brennan and 
Schwartz ([75],[76],[77]). The idea behind the finite difference approach is to approximate the value 
of a contingent claim as defined by the parabolic Black-Scholes PDE or its extensions (see equation 
3-1) using the following steps: 
• the state variables are discretized as desired   
• The PDEs (first and second derivatives) are approximated using finite difference, 
transforming them into difference equations.  
• The difference equations are solved iteratively, starting from the specified final 
value conditions.  
While this approach can be computationally efficient (in terms of speed), it is highly limited in the 
number of underlying stochastic factors that can be considered or the number of uncertainties 
modeled without introducing great complexity (Barraquand and Martineau [80]). This limitation 
makes finite difference methods impractical for valuing assets with complex optionalities having 
multiple stochastic underlying variables. In addition, the complexity of the stochastic differential 
equations (e.g. when multi-factor variables are considered or a discontinuous jump process is 
involved) affects the practicality of implementation of finite difference approaches (Tsekrekos et al. 
[81], Sabour and Poulin [82]). For these reasons, it is difficult to implement a finite difference 
technique without having to make broad simplifying assumptions to the valuation model in order to 
manage complexity.   
The lattice or tree approach was first introduced to option pricing by Cox et al [84]). It has been 
argued in the literature (Kamrad and Ritchken [85]) that the methodology is a special case of the 
finite difference method; hence it suffers the same limitations as finite difference. Particularly, the 
number of lattice nodes required for valuation grows geometrically with the number of specified time 
steps and underlying stochastic factors. However, it has the advantage of ease of implementation 
which makes it the most popular option pricing approach.   
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Monte Carlo simulation was first introduced by Boyle [86] for valuing European options. It works by 
directly simulating the time evolution of the underlying stochastic drivers of the asset using random 
number generation techniques. Several paths are simulated for each stochastic factor and the option 
payoff is computed for each simulated path. The value of the option is computed as the average of the 
values obtained from the different price paths.  
Monte Carlo simulation was originally applied for valuing European options only. However, a 
number of simulation-based algorithms have recently appeared in the literature for valuing options 
with early exercise potentials and for solving dynamic programming problems (Glasserman [87]). 
The flexibility provided by simulation based approaches for options or real options valuation which 
makes it possible to avoid excessive modeling simplification is its main attraction. Since Monte Carlo 
methods directly simulate the stochastic processes of the underlying variables, it is not necessary to 
first transform those stochastic processes into a PDE.  
The main shortcoming of Monte Carlo simulation is its relatively slow computational speed compared 
to finite difference and a nodal tree approaches. However, there are a number of techniques that have 
been developed over the years to improve computational speed and accuracy of Monte Carlo 
methods, including variance reduction techniques and control-variate approach among others (Hull 
[13], Glasserman [87]). In addition, given the significant reduction in costs of computing that has 
been achieved over the last decade, many practitioners are harnessing the power of parallel computing 
to further enhance computational speeds. 
3.8 Contributions of Research Work 
To analyze investments in competitive power markets, the value of flexible managerial decision 
making with regards to plant operations and capital budgeting must be considered and quantified. 
Real options analysis provides the appropriate framework for capturing and quantifying the values of 
such flexibilities. The particular approach depends on the context or purpose of analysis. For instance, 
if one is interested in the economic viability of new power plant construction project, the values of the 
following key managerial options may be relevant: 
(i) option to defer construction (wait and see option) 
(ii) option to abandon the project all together  
(iii) option to scale up or scale down capacity as information regarding market and technical 
uncertainties arrives.  
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(iv) option to build the power plant capacity in modules (i.e. building smaller units in stages)  
However, if one is interested in determining the value of energy output of a power plant for the 
purpose of negotiating a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) or one is interested in business planning 
for an operating asset, the relevant managerial options to value are related to operating flexibilities. 
For example the operator of a hydroelectric facility with a storage reservoir has the option to 
strategically cycle the reservoir to peak and/or super-peak the plant and maximize revenue. 
Depending on storage size, he may also be able to time-shift water across months and seasons. These 
flexibilities increases the value of a plant  
With regards to operating flexibilities, current applications of real options theory to power assets tend 
to be limited to peaking power plants in terms of their flexibility to ramp up and down in response to 
market price movements. The tendency to focus on peaking plants seem to arise from the belief that 
real options valuation method applies only where the underlying uncertainties are driven by market 
traded factors only such as electricity and gas prices. However, as pointed out by a number of authors, 
technical uncertainties also drive optionalities (Schwartz and Trigeorgis [5]).  For instance, the value 
of investments in baseload and mid-merit power plants are driven by life cycle management activities 
such as preventative maintenance, equipment inspection and refueling. Flexibilities around these 
activities are managerial optionalities that must be considered in valuing outputs of baseload and mid-
merit power plants.  
Similarly, published applications of real options to power assets tend to be limited with respect to the 
types of optionalities and uncertainties considered in valuation. The implication is that some of the 
developed applications do not fully reflect the reality of power markets environments. For instance, 
most of the existing real options applications to power plants only consider the asset operator’s option 
to optimize the plant’s energy output in an energy-only market. In reality, however, owners of 
qualified power plants may have the option to participate in an ancillary services market. This type of 
opportunity is available in Ontario where a joint energy and operating reserve market exists. Also, the 
owner of a power plant may have the opportunity to optimize the plant’s output across two market 
jurisdictions with different market rules. Neglecting the values of such options may lead to 
undervaluation of a power plant’s output. 
Lastly, there is also a tendency in the literature to always attempt to adapt power plants valuation 
problems to the popular option valuation technique of contingent claims analysis which uses finite 
difference techniques to solve Black-Scholes type Partial Different Equation (PDE) that describes the 
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value of the contingent claim (in this case the value of the power asset).  One reason for this approach 
is the desire to derive either analytical solutions or to use techniques with great computational speed 
(alternative methods usually involve simulation which until recently were only applicable for valuing 
European type options). The disadvantage with this approach is that the process of fitting valuation 
problems to a modeling technique typically involves over simplification that are not necessarily 
consistent with the true reality of power market environments.  As pointed out by Longstaff and 
Schwartz [78] and several others, finite difference and nodal tree techniques are only convenient for 
solving option pricing problems with one to two state variables in one or two dimensions.  
The focus of this work is to develop applications of real options valuation techniques for different 
power assets based on a general modeling framework. We extend previous work in this area with the 
intent of capturing the values of commonly available managerial flexibilities for both baseload and 
peaking power assets while taking into consideration the realities of competitive power markets and 
equipment/operating constraints. Illustrative studies are developed and solved using the recently 
developed Least Squares Monte Carlo technique for solving American-type options (Longstaff and 
Schwartz [78]).    
Specifically, a general modeling framework is developed in Chapter 4. The framework is then applied 
to value three different power plant types operating in a competitive market environment using the 
Ontario wholesale electricity market as a backdrop. In chapter 5 we present a model to value gas-fired 
power plants in the presence of gas supply/consumption imbalance uncertainties. The costs and 
operating constraints posed by the imbalance between real time electricity markets and day-ahead gas 
markets have so far been ignored in gas plants valuation problems. In chapter 6, we present a 
valuation model that considers the operation of a peaking asset in a joint energy and operating reserve 
market. Similarly, in chapter 7 we develop a model for analyzing nuclear power plants given that the 
owners of such plants have the right to optimize life cycle management spending in response to cost 
or power price uncertainties. This includes the flexibilities of the owners with regards to scheduling 
maintenance and inspection outages and specific maintenance projects to undertake. 
The general framework developed can be applied to value other assets such as gas storage facilities, 





Proposed Valuation Framework 
4.1 Real Options Valuation Framework  
A general framework for valuing switching flexibilities in manufacturing systems was proposed by 
Kulatilaka and Trigeorgis [29] (based on early published works of Kulatilaka [26], Triantis and 
Hodder [79] among others) whereby future cash flows from such plant systems depend on the ability 
of the operators to switch between operating modes as uncertainties are resolved. The premise of the 
framework is that plant owners or operators observe the evolution of the underlying drivers of cash 
flow and then make the choice to switch from one operating mode to another whenever it is economic 
to do so. An example is a manufacturing system with two alternative input feed stocks whose prices 
are uncorrelated.  
The same reasoning applies to power assets in general. For example, the owner of a peaking power 
plant can switch between “on” and “off” modes (i.e. startup and shutdown) in response to market 
price movements within the technical limitations of the plants. Similarly, the owner of a baseload 
power plant such as a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) has the flexibility to temporarily shutdown 
operations for equipment inspection and/or maintenance. In the same manner, flexibility exists with 
regards to how to use the inventory of a gas storage facility or a hydroelectric reservoir or when to 
flow power over a transmission line for which a firm transmission right exists. By building on this 
concept of “switching options” values, one can analyze investments in different power assets by 
treating different operating modes as alternatives.  
Following Kulatilaka and Trigeorgis [29], consider a power asset whose revenue fluctuates only 
with power prices. Assume that at every time period, price S can either increase or decrease 
according to a binomial tree (Cox, Ross and Rubinstein [84]) as shown in Figure 4 for three decision  
periods.  The binomial tree assumes that the price S  can only move up or down at every time step by 
a constant factor27. If the operator of the power asset does not have any flexibility to switch operating 
                                                     
27 The representation in Figure 4 is such that an upward movement is represented by a + sign while a downward 
movement is represented by a – sign. Hence two consecutive upward price movements are represented by ++ 
such that the price at that period will be
++S . The subscript of the price variable shown in Figure 4  represents 
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mode, future cash flows only depend on the evolution of the market price (i.e. linear derivative). If we 
define net cash flows (or payoffs) at each period as ( ) ikB ζ , where i  is the decision period, k is the 
operating mode and ζ is the price state i.e. +, -, ++, -- and +-/-+, then the possible net cash flows at 
each of the three decision periods are as shown in Figure 5 . By discounting the expected cash flows 
at each period back to the present, the value V of this asset is obtained as the present value )(kPV  of 
the discounted cash flows. In a complete market28, these cash flows will earn the same rate of return 
as other cash flows (or securities) in the market which is the so-called “risk-free rate”. Hence the 
present value depends only on the possible states of nature of the single underlying price (given that 
the operating mode k is fixed) and the risk-free rate.  
If two alternative operating modes are available to the operator, say 1k  and 2k  then that operator 
has the flexibility (or real option) to switch from one mode to the other when it makes economic 
sense to do so. At each decision period (assuming that the option is available at every decision node), 
the operator will consider whether to switch operating modes with the objective of maximizing value 
such that if there is no benefit to switching modes, the current operating mode will be continued. 
Hence at every node of the binomial tree, the objective is to maximize the following nodal option 
value function (see Figure 6).  
( ) ( )( )0,12max kBkBValue Option Nodal ii ζζ −=       (4-1)         
or   ( ) ( )( )0,21max kBkBValue Option Nodal ii ζζ −=   (4-2) 
That is, if there is no incentive to switch, the operator continues at the current mode.  
In the absence of irreversible switching costs, Kulatilaka and Trigeorgis [29] argued that the 
switching flexibility at each time period is a European type option expiring at that time. Hence, the 
Real Option Value ( iROV ) for the entire time period is the sum of the discounted
29 expected values 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the node such that 2
++S  will refer to the price in period 2 if a state ++ occurs. 
28 A market is said to be complete if it is possible to replicate the cash flows of all contingent claims by being 
able to instantaneously bet on any future state of the market.  
29 Again, under a complete market assumption, arbitrage is precluded which implies that the payoffs should be 
discounted at the risk-free rate of return. Under this assumption, the probabilities of the up and down 




of all in-the-money European options available in the time period.  
This implies that the total real option value is the sum of the individual real option value at each 
decision node i.e. 
∑=
i
iROVROV         (4-3) 
Therefore, the value of the asset in the presence of the flexibility to switch from operating mode 1k  
to 2k  then becomes: 
( ) ROVkPVPV += 1        (4-4) 
Where ROV is the option value to switch from 1k  to 2k . If we could switch back from 2k  to 1k , 
equation 4-4 will also be true in that case.  This implies that: 
( )1kPVPV ≥ or )2(kPV        (4-5) 
i.e. the present value of the system output when switching is considered is at least equal to the present 
value when operation is carried out only in one mode.  
In the presence of non-zero irreversible switching costs, the option additivity rule in equation 4-3 
breaks down due to the so called “hysteris effect” (Dixit [21], Kulatilaka and Trigeorgis [29]). This is 
because the option values at the different decision nodes are no longer independent.  With switching 
costs, exercise of the switching option at one decision period may affect available set of switching 
options at subsequent periods as well as cost of switching leading to compound style options. This 
implies that optimal operating policy may support waiting to exercise switching as opposed to 
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Figure 6: Option Decision Making at Every State of Nature  
To apply this framework to a realistic physical asset such as a power plant, besides the price states 
(and other states of the world that occur independent of the asset operator’s decision making 
strategies), the physical state of the asset and operating constraints must also be considered. To 
illustrate this point, assume operating modes 1k  and 2k  represent ramp up and ramp down 
respectively. Also consider a third operating mode 3k  which represents an idle decision (i.e. do 
nothing). If we assume that the physical state of the asset at any point in time can be defined by three 
discrete states U , M and D representing “On” at maximum capacity (i.e. Up state), “On” at mid-
capacity (i.e. Mid state) and “Off” (i.e. Down state) respectively, the decision making problem can be 
analyzed by examining the available flexibilities in conjunction with possible state transitions 
between three physical states and the asset’s operating constraints. Three key characteristics of the 
problem can be identified as follows (based on Figure 7): 
(i) The same set of switching options is not necessarily available at all decision periods. For 
example, if the asset is at the physical state U it is already at maximum capacity; hence the 
option to ramp-up to a higher capacity is not available.  The same is true for the state D 
where the option to ramp-down to a lower capacity is not available.  
(ii) A choice of mode 2k  at the physical asset state U will transition the asset to the state M by 
the next decision period. Choosing 2k  at state M will transition the asset to state D while 
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choosing 1k  will transition to state U.  
(iii) There may be operating constraints that will prevent an option from being feasible at a 
decision period. For instance, thermal power plants usually have requirements for minimum 
shutdown period and up-time period. This implies that the plant may be required to remain at 
state D for more than a single decision period and at state U for more than a single decision 
period.  
Conceptually, one can imagine the presence of operating constraints and different physical asset 
states as contributing to switching costs resulting in the decision making at each period being 
dependent on the discounted expected value of the benefits from subsequent periods (this is the 
phenomenon referred to as “hysterisis” by Dixit [21]).  The implication is that future cash flows are 
non-linear30 functions of the underlying state variables. Therefore, one cannot value this type of asset 
using a forward-looking approach unless the optimal operating strategy has already been pre-
determined. This is why a dynamic optimization method is necessary as already pointed out by many 
authors e.g. Dixit [21], and Kulatilaka and Trigeorgis [29]. Also, since the future evolution of the key 
value drivers are stochastic in nature; a stochastic optimization method is required for valuing power 
assets with switching options.  
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Figure 7: Decision Options with State Transitions 
 
The other important distinction is with regards to the discount rate. Under a complete market 
assumption, in order to preclude arbitrage, future payoffs from any derivative (or claim) on a traded 
underlying asset must be discounted at the risk-free rate and the asset price future evolution modeled 
under the risk-neutral probability measure. This assumption is premised on the possibility of being 
able to replicate the cash flows of any derivative instrument, making it possible to continuously hedge 
any risk exposure of the derivate asset  e.g. by continuously trading in the underlying asset  as shown 
by Black and Scholes [46]. However, given that markets such as that of electricity cannot often be 
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argued to conform to the complete market assumption31 and that uncertainties driving real options on 
physical assets are not necessary derived from tradable cash flows, the assumption of risk-neutral 
valuation is often difficult to justify for real options problems.      
A number of approaches have been suggested in the literature for dealing with the issue of discount 
rate in real options valuation (e.g. see Schwartz and Trigeorgis [5], Li and Chiu [37]). These include:  
(i)  Assume that the payoffs can be perfectly replicated with traded instruments e.g. by using 
futures contracts for electricity and gas. 
(ii) The concept of investor utility function can be applied to incorporate the risk aversion of the 
asset owner.  
(iii) The concept of hurdle rate or risk-adjusted discount rate (such as the Weighted Average Cost 
Capital (WACC) or a discount rate derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM) can also be 
used.  
 The question of which of these alternatives is the most appropriate for real-options valuation is a 
major subject of debate among researchers in the real options field. However from the perspective of 
industry practioners, a risk-adjusted discount rate such as the WACC or a project specific hurdle rate 
is easily obtainable. While any one of the foregoing approaches can potentially be used within the 
context of the framework proposed here, for the purpose of this thesis we assume that an exogenously 
specified risk-adjusted discount rate is available. Even though it is still possible to employ risk-neutral 
valuation with a risk-adjusted discount rate if one can calculate the so called “market price of risk” 
(i.e. risk premium) for the derivative under valuation, for the purpose of this thesis, we use “real 
simulation” (as opposed to risk-neutralized simulation) of underlying stochastic processes and 
discount using an assumed risk-adjusted discount rate.  
In summary, consider the operation of a physical power asset as a multi-stage decision making 
problem where at every decision stage, the operator has to make a decision to alter operating mode or 
remain at the current mode. If we assume that there is a finite set K of such mutually exclusive 
alternatives, one can make use of Bellman’s optimality condition to determine the value of the asset. 
                                                     
31 For example, most electricity markets are not completely deregulated and there may be significant illiquidity 
of financial instruments. Even if it is possible to hedge financial risks, physical risks may remain which can not 
be completely hedged away.  
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If an option k K∈  is selected at every stage ( t ), the operating profit (or the benefit) ( )kBt at stage t  
is a function of the states of the world at t  and the operating option selected at t . The current period 
benefit ( )kBτ  is known at time τ  but future benefits are unknown.  The objective of the asset 
operator at time period τ  is to maximize the following value function: 




















max)(     (4-6) 
where τς represents the known state of the world at time t, τ−T  is the valuation period, τ  is the 












        where  Tt ,.....,τ=    (4-7) 
and r  is the risk-free32 interest rate or the risk-adjusted rate of return as discussed earlier.  
According to the Bellman’s equation, the expected value function for each alternative can be 
expressed as follows: 
[ ]ttttttttt VEdkBkV ςςςς ςς )(),(),( 11 ++×+=      for  1−≤ Tt   (4-8) 
and                         )(),( ,
ςς ςς TTTTTT kBkV =         (4-9) 
where Kkt ,.....,1=
ς  
i.e. at each decision point, other than the final period, the operator maximizes the sum of the current 
benefit and the discounted expected future benefits, conditional on the current states of nature. For 
instance, if 2 mutually exclusive operating modes are available, the objective at each decision point is 
to find the alternative that maximizes the following and select it as the operating mode: 
[ ]ttttttt VEdBV ςςςς )()()( 11,1,1 ++×+=       (4-8a) 
[ ]ttttttt VEdBV ςςςς )()()( 11,2,2 ++×+=       (4-8b) 
                                                     
32 In practice, the yield on a short-dated government bond e.g. US Treasury bill is used as a proxy for the risk-
free interest rate.   
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At the final periodT , as stated in equation 4-9, V  equals the intrinsic benefit at T which can easily 
be calculated from the knowledge of ( )ςς TT kB , , hence the option that maximizes V at that time is 
known. Therefore, one can start solving the alternative specific value functions and find the optimal 
decision at each decision time, starting at T  and stepping back (i.e. recursively) until the current time 
is reached. Once the set of optimal decisions are determined for every decision node, equation 4-6 can 
then be applied to value the asset.  
In order to determine the value of the current benefit term at each decision node and to know which 
mode k (or operator control action) is feasible at t  in state ς , one has to model the dynamics of the 
physical asset and the underlying state variables (aggregated as ς ). Hence one has to know the 
possible state transitions given the constraints of the physical asset. The physical states of the assets 
for instance can mean possible output levels, storage levels or thermal states of a boiler (depending on 
the asset being modeled) which are typically subject to equipment or operating constraints. The states 
of nature of the underlying factors can refer to possible values of electricity prices or gas prices.  
4.2 Numerical Solution – The Least Squares Monte Carlo Method 
The set of equation depicted in 4-8 (for all available alternatives) has to be solved at every decision 
node to determine the optimal option at every node subject to all applicable constraints and 
conditional on currently available information regarding the states of nature. The physical constraints 
determine what option is available at each node.  
The difficulty in solving equation 4-8 for each alternative arises from the conditional expectation term 
(i.e. continuation value) which is unknown at time t. One approach (among others) to this problem is 
to determine the state transition probabilities from the simulated paths of the underlying variables and 
to use the simulated probabilities to approximate the continuation value as proposed by Barraquand 
and Martineau [80].  
Another simple approach proposed by Longstaff and Schwarz [78] involves directly approximating 
the conditional expectation function by regressing it onto a set of simple basis functions. That is, if 
[ ]tE ς⋅  represents the conditional expectation value at time t, Longstaff and Schwartz [78] proposed 






btt ΨaVE ςς ∑
=
+ ≈       (4-10) 
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where bψ  ( Nb ,....,1= ) is a set of simple basis functions and N is finite. The parameter ab 
( Nb ,....,1= ) represents constant coefficients. This approach has been referred to as the Least 
Squares Monte Carlo (LSM) in the literature.  
The idea of the LSM is that the coefficients ba  ( Nb ,....,1= ) can be estimated using least-squares 
regression based on observation points from the simulated paths of the underlying variables. The 
concept of approximating the conditional expectation function by a linear combination of simple basis 
functions is based on the theory of Hilbert spaces in the sense that any function in a vector space can 
be approximated by a linear combination of bases for the vector space whereby the approximated 
value approaches the true value as ∞→N .    
Longstaff and Schwartz [78] originally applied this approach to price American options. However, a 
number of authors have extended the methodology to solve real options problems and multi-stage 
stochastic optimization problems in general (e.g. Tsekrekos et al. [81], Sabour and Poulin [82]).  
The procedure starts at the final stage T where the optimal decision is easily calculated. In our 
context, one would calculate equation 4-9 for each of the feasible alternatives at every discrete state 
of the asset. This calculation is repeated for each simulated price path (or simulated paths of the 
aggregate state of the market). Hence for a simulated path, one can determine the optimal alternative 
at every state of the asset as the alternative with the maximum value function. One can then step back 
in time (one stage) to 1−T , again to determine the optimal decision for each simulated path at every 
state of the asset. For example, if we consider two mutually exclusive alternatives as in equations 4-
8a and 4-8b where t is now 1−T , the optimal alternative at 1−T  is the one that yields the higher 
value among the two equations for each price path and each state of the asset. To achieve this, we use 
equation 4-10 to calculate the second term on the right-hand side of equations 4-8a and 4-8b. 





 and determine the coefficients ),..,1( Nbab =  by 
least-squares regression using the optimal values at T as the sample outcomes of the dependent 
variable and the simulated prices at 1−T  as the sample outcomes of the independent variable. Once 
the regression coefficients are calculated, equation 4-10 can now be calculated for each alternative 
(i.e. equations 4-8a and 4-8b in this case), for each simulated price path and each state of the asset. 
The process is repeated until stage 1 is reached by which time all the optimal decisions would have 
been obtained. To determine the value of the plant, a forward-moving procedure can then be used to 
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calculate equation 4-6 since the values of all optimal benefits can now be calculated across the 
valuation period.   
A number of authors have examined the robustness of the LSM methodology and compared it to 
other available numerical methods (e.g. Moreno and Navas [88], Stentoft [89] and Clement et al. 
[90]). Focusing on the two key approximations of the algorithm (i.e. replacing the conditional 
expectation by projections on a finite set of basis functions and using simulation and least squares 
regression to compute the value function), Clement et al. [90] have been able to prove that the LSM 
algorithm always converges under general conditions.    
Moreno and Navas [88] as well as Stentoft [89] focused more on applications of the algorithm. 
Stentoft’s work showed that LSM is more computationally efficient and more robust than existing 
pricing techniques when there are multiple underlying stochastic factors. On their part, Moreno and 
Navas[88] showed that the technique is quite robust with respect to the choice of basis functions and 
works effectively with simple polynomials. By applying the technique to price different financial 
options, they found out that different polynomials produce similar results and similar option prices 
were obtained for polynomial degrees between 3 and 20. Above degree 20, they reported the 
occurrences of numerical instability in the least-squares regressions calculations.   
4.3 Proposed Valuation Framework 
We propose a broad framework that makes use of simulation-based optimization for valuing physical 
assets in competitive energy markets with complex embedded optionalities. The key steps of the 
framework are as follows: 
(i) Derive a value function for the asset to be valued, as a function of available & relevant 
choice variables, underlying state variables, valuation time-frame, appropriate discount 
rate and relevant costs. The control variables reflect the choices (i.e. options) embedded 
in the operation of the asset from the perspective of the independent operator. The 
applicable state variables reflect all relevant uncertain underlying factors that affect the 
value of the asset. Broadly speaking, one can classify applicable state variables as (i) the 
states of the market and (ii) the states of the physical asset under valuation. The states of 
the market refer to possible occurrences of market-based factors such as power prices 
and fuel prices. Similarly, the states of the physical asset refer to possible occurrences of 
operating states such as output level or storage level.  
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(ii) Specify all constraints, the operating dynamics of the asset and the dynamics of the state 
variables. The operating dynamics of an asset depend on the particular type of asset e.g. 
the engineering parameters and relationships that govern the operation of a gas-fired 
plant are different from that of a hydroelectric plant. The dynamics of state variables 
refer to possible state transitions of the variables. For variables that model the states of 
the market, one can specify stochastic differential equations that can be calibrated and 
used to directly simulate the time evolution and probability distributions of the market 
parameters. For the variables used to represent the states of the asset, transition equations 
or rules which are functions of control variables and operating constraints can be 
formulated.     
(iii) Once the value functions and all applicable variables are formulated, different paths of 
the market variables are simulated using forward-looking simulation techniques. This 
step involves discretizing the time state according to the solution granularity desired. 
The simulated scenarios of the key variables can also be taken as input, for instance in 
cases where a fundamental model has been used to derive forecasts of future spot prices. 
(iv) To determine optimal control (i.e. operating) strategies, a simulation-based backward 
induction technique such as the Least Squares Monte Carlo (LSM) can then be applied.  
(v) With the optimal operating strategy determined for each simulation path, the probability 
distribution of the asset value can then be determined easily as functions of the operating 
strategies and the simulated market parameters.   
   
4.4 Simulating Stochastic Underlying Value Drivers 
The process of using any simulation based methodology for options valuation involves simulating the 
underlying stochastic drivers of the asset. For power assets, there can be a number of uncertain value 
drivers depending on the asset type and the markets involved. For example, for a hydro electric 
facility, one would have to model the future inflow of water into the plant’s forebay and also model 
market prices e.g. electricity price. Similarly, for a gas-fired thermal plant, the future evolution of gas 
price has to be modeled.  
For derivatives pricing, the quantitative analysis models described in Section 3.6.1 are used. The idea 
is that an uncertain value driver can be represented as a random variable which evolves according to a 
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Markov process. To value an asset for which the random variable is an underlying parameter using a 
simulation-based approach, the future evolution of the variable has to be simulated using a forward-
looking approach. The first step is to discretize the stochastic differential equations (as specified in 
Section 3.6.1) and then simulate several paths to obtain a probability distribution of the variable at 
each decision time. The appropriate stochastic process or combination of processes to employ for an 
exogenous state variable like water flow, electricity price or gas price depends on the observed nature 
of the variable as discussed earlier. For instance, to model the spot price of electricity, a mean- 
reverting jump-diffusion model is required. However, a mean reversion model is usually sufficient to 
capture the dynamics of water flow into a reservoir forebay and also the spot price of gas as neither 
typically exhibits (frequent) jumps. Depending on the level of complexity desired, one can also use 
single factor or multi-factor models as appropriate.   
4.4.1 Simulating Mean Reversion Model 
Consider an arithmetic Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process,  
( ) ttt dzdtxxdx ση +−=        (4-11) 
where x follows a normal distribution, x is the long-term mean of x  and dz is the increment of the 
Wiener process. As described by Dixit and Pindyck [6], an exact discrete-time version of this process 











∆−∆− −+−+=∆+      (4-12) 
where ε  is an independent standard normal random variable and the other parameters are as defined 
in Section 3.6.1. This discrete-time format as shown by Dixit and Pindyck [6] is the “stationary 
autoregressive process” of order 1. Other methods of discretization have been used in the literature 
such as Euler’s method (Clewlow and Strickland [44]) but they have been shown to introduce 
discretization errors (see Dias [91]).  
The parameter x  in equation 4-12 can assume a negative value but for our application, this is 
undesirable33. To avoid this undesirable behaviour of the OU process, we define S as the long-term 
                                                     
33 Electricity spot prices are sometimes negative during Excess Baseload Generation (EBG) situations but this is 
not a frequent occurrence.  
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mean value of the exogenous state variable required for our application and derive it as follows 
following Dias [91].  
As shown by Dias [91], if we define, 
( )xS exp=         (4-13) 
and  
[ ] ( ){ }tt exextSE ηη −− −+= 1)0(exp)(        (4-14) 










2σtxtS        (4-15) 
for a variable )(tS that follows a log-normal distribution and )(tx that follows a normal distribution 
where 2σ is the variance of )(tx , then )(tS can be simulated directly using the following expression 
(Dias, M [91]): 























ttt eeeSetSttS  (4-16) 
Several paths of the “real” process of the random variable can be simulated using equation 4-16 
starting from an initial value at time 0=t .  
4.4.2 Simulating Mean Reverting-Jump Diffusion Model 
The mean-reverting jump-diffusion model is a combination of the mean reversion model with a 
discrete jump Poisson process. As shown by Clewlow and Strickland [44], if U is a uniform random 
variable [0,1], then the discrete jump process as specified in Section 3.6.1 can be simulated as 
follows: 
( ) ( )tU sss ∆>⋅′+ φεγκ         (4-17) 
where the parameters are as defined in Section 3.6.1 and ε ′  is an independent standard normal 
random variable, independent from ε  since the Poisson process is independent from the increment of 
the Wiener process. If tU s∆> φ  is true, a jump occurs with a mean jump size of sκ . 
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Hence, to simulate independent paths of the “real process” of the random variable using JDMR 
model, we combine equations 4-16 and 4-17 as follows: 
 

























          (4-18) 
To simulate a risk-neutral process, one has to factor in excess return of the asset above the risk free 
rate (i.e. risk premium) by deducting it from the drift term.   
4.4.3 Model Calibration 
In order to determine the parameters of either the mean reversion model or the mean-reverting jump-
diffusion model, the models have to be calibrated to available data. Typically, available historical data 
and current marker data are used to estimate the relevant parameters for each model. There are 
different schools of thought regarding the extent of historical data to use for model calibration. One 
approach is to go as far back in history as the future period for which the simulation applies, 
weighting each historical occurrence equally.  One can also weigh more recent data higher than older 
information to appropriately reflect recent changes in market dynamics.  
For a mean reversion model, the parameters to be estimated are the rate of mean reversion, historical 
volatility and the long-term average. One simple approach is the one described by Clewlow and 
Strickland [44]. If we imagine the time series data as consisting of two components, a deterministic 
trend and a random component, one can simultaneously determine the volatility, the long-term mean 
and the speed of mean reversion.  Consider equation 4-11, if we ignore the random component, it 
becomes: 
( )dtxxdx tt −=η         (4-19) 








        (4-20) 
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 over tx  to obtain η  and x as regression coefficients. The 
standard deviation of the residual should be due to the random component and hence it is the 
volatility.  
More specifically, the first step in the calibration process is to determine the logarithm of the 
variables and then calculate 1lnln −− tt SS  (i.e. the returns, tx∆ ). If we compare equation 4-20 to a 






= , then a−=η and 
a
bx −= .  
The speed of mean reversion can be described conceptually as the half-life of a volatility shock to the 
long-term mean. Volatility introduces randomness around the long-term mean and the half-life is the 
time it takes for half the random shock to dissipate away. Mathematically, it can be shown that (see 
Clewlow and Strickland [44]) if 2/1t represents the half-life of a mean reversion process with a speed 
of mean reversion η (expressed in terms of % per time period) then: 
η
)2ln(
2/1 =t          (4-19) 
For instance, if we are simulating for time intervals of 1 year and η is 1, then 69.02/1 =t which 
implies that it will only take in 0.69 years for half of a volatility shock to dissipate away. 
For a random variable with jump components e.g. electricity, the entire dataset can not be used 
directly as stated above. One approach to estimating both the mean reversion parameters and the jump 
parameters is to use the recursive filtering approach proposed by Clewlow and Strickland [44]. The 
filtering approach recursively separates the jump components of the data from the diffusion 
components such that the jump parameters and the parameters of the mean reverting diffusion process 
can be estimated separately. This is achieved by arbitrarily determining a threshold level of the log 
returns beyond which the returns are considered as jumps. For instance, one can set this threshold as 
three times the standard deviation of the entire data such that returns that are larger than this at any 
time step are considered as jumps. The idea is to separate those portions of the entire data from the 
rest and repeat the procedure with the remaining data using three times the standard deviation of the 
remaining data as a new threshold. The procedure is repeated in this way until a convergence is 
achieved. Given the total number of jump components that are removed from the entire dataset, one 
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can adjust it based on the granularity of the data to obtain the jump frequency sφ . The standard 
deviation and the mean of the log of the separated jump data yields sγ  and sκ  respectively. The 
diffusion portion of the data (i.e. after excluding the jumps) is then used to obtain the long term mean 
reversion level ( sµ ), volatility ( sσ ) and the speed of mean reversion (η ) as described earlier.  
Also, the framework of simulation allows the parameters to be estimated as functions of time. For 
instance, electricity prices not only exhibit seasonality but vary between off-peak and on-peak on a 
daily basis. In order to capture the different variations, one can separate the data set based on “off” 
and “on” peak hours. The parameter determination can then be carried out on a monthly basis for both 









Valuation of Gas Fired Power Plants with Gas Imbalance 
Uncertainty 
A gas-fired thermal power plant converts the chemical energy stored in natural gas to electrical 
energy via thermal and mechanical processes (Kehlhofer, R. et al [65]). There are two broad 
categories, simple cycle plants and combined cycle plants. Simple cycle gas turbine generators have 
low thermal efficiency and are typically used for peaking. They require lower capital costs relative to 
combined cycle plants but higher operating costs. Combined cycle plants, however, are able to 
operate at higher efficiency by combining gas and steam turbines into the same thermal cycle. This is 
possible with the use of heat recovery steam generators (HRSG) which use exhaust gas heat from gas 
turbines to generate steam. Given their higher efficiencies, combined cycle plants are suitable for both 
baseload and peaking operations 
The economics of thermal power plants are influenced by a number of uncertain factors and 
engineering constraints. The key ones are: 
• Commodity prices (electricity, gas or heating oil) 
• Operating constraints and equipment limitations 
• Equipment outages  
• Gas supply 
Future cash flows from operating a thermal plant depend on these key factors and available operating 
flexibilities. In the context of real options, these flexibilities include start-up and shut-down options; 
how often to start-up and shutdown the plant, the specific timing of these actions and the optimal 
output level per time among others. The availability of these options forms the basis of the challenges 
faced by the operator with regards to optimizing the market value of the plant. The objective is to 
operate the power plant in such a way that it is at a maximum output capacity when the spread 
between power prices and fuel costs (i.e. spark spread) is high and positive. If the operator has a fore-
knowledge of these periods, he will simply offer to startup the plants correspondingly and shutdown 
at other times. However, it is often the case that both power and fuel prices are uncertain making 
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optimal operating decisions unknown ahead of time.  
Other than electricity and gas prices, the ability to capitalize on the flexibility of the plant is directly 
impacted by the plant’s operating constraints and equipment limitations.  For example, a unit with 
high ramp rate can be started up quickly when the spark spread is expected to be high and shutdown 
before the spread becomes negative. However, with a unit that ramps up relatively slowly, the plant 
may have to be started and operated at a loss to ensure that it is available later to capture expected 
high spread. A high ramp rate also makes a power plant suitable for the provision of ancillary services 
such as operating reserve and frequency regulation via automatic generation control (AGC).  
Since net revenues depend on production volumes, frequency of forced outages is also important to 
the economics of power plants. Naturally, frequency of unplanned plant outages tends to correlate 
with equipment conditions and maintenance history of the plant. Equipment failures set in through 
wear and tear which makes it an important issue for operators of ageing power plants. A proper long-
term analysis of a thermal plant should factor in the correlation between potential for forced outages 
and aggressive ramping decisions leading to excessive equipment wear and tear.   
The location of a gas-fired thermal plant within the gas supply system (i.e. storage, transmission, and 
distribution) can have a significant impact on the overall costs of fuel, including costs associated with 
supply and reliability management (Devin, K [92], Bopp et al. [93], Chen and Baldick [ 94]). For 
instance, a power plant located far away from storage facilities and away from upstream gas 
transmission pipelines may have to procure more upstream transportation and load balancing services 
compared to a plant that is strategically located. Furthermore, ready access to a variety of electricity 
and gas markets trading opportunities improves the overall economics of gas-fired power plants.  
Existing real options analysis applications to gas-fired power generation assets ignore potential costs 
and constraints associated with gas supply/consumption (e.g. Thompson et al [35], Tseng and Barz 
[36], Denton et al. [34]). Gas supply/consumption imbalances occur because of the timing differences 
between gas nominations (based on the gas industry operations and rules) and gas consumption for 
power generation (based on electricity market rules). Without carefully incorporating variable costs 
and operating constraints associated with this uncertainty factor, a gas fired power plant may be 
significantly over-valued. 
5.1 Interplay between Electricity and Gas Markets 
Both natural gas and electricity markets play important roles in the operation of gas-fired power 
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plants. To operate as planned, gas-fired power plants require reliable supply of natural gas, typically 
through a Local Distribution Company (LDC). Reliable supply of natural gas in this context implies 
that a power plant is able to receive gas at desired flow rates from its gas supplier when it requires it.  
In North America, the natural gas industry operates on a day-ahead basis in compliance with North 
American Energy Standards Board (NAESB) rules34. Day-ahead operation is considered necessary 
since most industrial natural gas consumers start up and shutdown their processes at similar time each 
day making overall gas consumption patterns readily predictable. Daily gas consumptions being 
predictable and to a good extent controllable, makes it easy for industrial gas consumers to order 
appropriate volume of natural gas day ahead and for transmission pipelines operators, storage 
operators and local distribution utilities (LDC) to plan for the delivery and receipt of required gas 
volumes on their respective systems. Due to this predictability, variations (hourly, daily or seasonally) 
between real-time and day-ahead scheduled volumes tend to be minor for industrial gas consumers. 
On the other hand, gas consumption patterns of electricity generators in competitive markets are not 
readily predictable.  
Typically, the desired flow rates vary during the course of the day and from one day to another, 
depending on the states of nature in the electricity market. This is because power generators are 
dispatched in real time by a system or market operator, in increments of short intervals subject to their 
offers into the market. Typically, significant uncertainty exists with regards to the exact timing and 
volume of dispatch (i.e. real time) irrespective of a generator’s specific energy offer into the market. 
In power markets, there are a number of reasons for dispatch uncertainties, the principal one being 
unplanned changes in real-time supply and demand curves mostly due to sudden forced outages of 
participating power plants, load entities and/or transmission lines. These unplanned changes create 
uncertainty in dispatch timing and output level for marginal generators. For instance, a generator 
expecting to be dispatched ‘on’ based on previous forecast of market conditions (supply and demand) 
may end up being instructed to remain shut down. Similarly, a plant expecting to run for only a short 
                                                     
34 NAESB has two firm day-ahead gas nomination windows during which natural gas can be nominated for 
next day consumption by industrial gas consumers and power plants operators based on Eastern standard time: 
• Timely window: 13:00 deadline on gas day (i.e. a day-ahead of consumption day) 





period may be constrained to remain on for system reliability purposes. In order to be able to predict 
its real-time gas consumption, a power generator must therefore be able to accurately forecast real-
time power prices and market operations, a day-ahead when gas nominations are processed. Since this 
is not always achievable, imbalances are bound to occur between real-time gas supply and gas 
consumption. In addition to these system induced uncertainties, the capability of a generator to 
accurately forecast short-term price movements irrespective of system related outages also has a 
significant impact on its ability to plan for future operation.  
The plant operator can only wait until the last firm window day-ahead to make decisions about 
volume of gas to purchase for the next day of power plant operation. That decision has to be made 
based on his expectation of real-time production during the next operating day. As an illustration for 
the Ontario power market, if the IESO pre-dispatch price forecast is relied upon by a power generator 
to order gas day-ahead, that operator will have to base gas purchases on the 1st predispatch prices 
published by the IESO. Figure 8 shows a comparison of the first predispatch price set for August 09, 
2006 with the actual HOEP for the same day. As indicated in Figure 9, HOEP was generally below 
the predispatch prices for that day by as much as $32 CAD in one of the hours. Figure 10 shows the 
differences between predispatch and HOEP since wholesale power market opening in Ontario. As 
indicated by the figure, estimates of prices in predispatch hours tend to be higher than actual prices.  
From perspective of the gas supplier or distributor, the importance of gas supply/consumption 
imbalance is the physical impact it has on its pipelines and the need to either get rid of excess gas or 
make up for unplanned gas supply. In technical terms, volume of unused gas that is left in a gas 
distributor’s pipeline “packs” the pipeline by increasing system pressure. Similarly, gas over-run 
“drafts” the distributor’s pipeline by reducing system pressure. If required to get rid of unused gas (in 
case of an under-run by generator) or to make up for over-run gas volume, the Local Distribution 
Company (LDC) will penalize the power generator thereby adding to the overall costs of gas supply. 
For instance, the gas distributor may compel a power generator that has an over run to pay for the 
unscheduled gas at a predetermined premium based on the current spot price of gas. Naturally, 
depending on how significant these penalty charges are a power generator will consider them when 
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Figure 9: Differences between HOEP and 1st Pre-dispatch Prices for a Representative Market 























Figure 10: Differences between HOEP and 1st Pre-dispatch since Wholesale Power Market 
Opening in Ontario.  
 
In some cases, gas suppliers offer services that power generators can purchase to manage their gas 
volume risks. Examples of such services include “load balancing” services and “high deliverability 
storage”. A load balancing service works like a virtual storage that allows a power generator to 
withdraw and inject gas as required (within the constraint of the service) to manage real-time over run 
or under run and avoid heavy penalty charges. The gas supplier is able to offer such service by 
making use of additional capacity in its pipeline network to temporarily store gas. On the other hand, 
high deliverability storage services require allocation of storage space in a physical storage facility 
typically located close to a gas market hub such as “Dawn” hub in Sarnia, Ontario and “Henry” hub 
in Louisiana. For a power generator, the decision to select one service over another depends on a 
number of factors, including costs (fixed and variable) and limitations (e.g. capacity, withdrawal 
limit, injection limit etc). 
For illustrative purposes, consider a power generator with a day-ahead nomination of 48,000 MMBtu 
to be used for generation the next day. With a basic transportation contract (i.e. with no-intra day 
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nomination window) the gas supplier may, for instance, supply equal volumes of gas per hour 
throughout the course of the day (i.e. 2000 MMBtu/hr), irrespective of the daily load shape desired by 
the generator. As a result, if the generator’s consumption in any hour is less or greater than 2000 
mmBTU, an hourly imbalance results. Sometimes, imbalances are tracked on a daily basis, meaning 
that penalty only results when there is a net cumulative imbalance volume at the end of the day. With 
a load balancing service or high deliverability storage used in conjunction with transportation services 
that allow frequent and multiple intra-day gas nominations, the generator is able to inject or withdraw 
gas to adjust its day-ahead order. With one or more of these services, only imbalance volumes that 
can not be accommodated within their limits attract penalty charges.   
In some power market jurisdictions, day-ahead35 electricity markets (DAM) exist in addition to 
real-time markets. In other markets such as Ontario where a day-ahead market does not currently 
exists, there are day-ahead unit commitment programs in place (e.g. the day ahead commitment 
process (DACP) and the Spare Generator Online program, SGOL36) to help generators properly plan 
for real-time operation by providing guarantees for startup and minimum runtime costs. However, a 
“gas day” (as defined by the 24 hour period between the starts of daily gas delivery) is not consistent 
with “electricity day” (i.e. hour 0 to 24). As a result, even though the existence of a DAM improves 
the planning process for power generators with regards to day-ahead gas purchases, risk of 
imbalances still exists in real time. Similarly, the design of Ontario DACP only protects generators 
and power importers as it relates to costs of startup and operation at the minimum generation level (by 
providing them startup related cost recovery guarantee), it does not eliminate gas volume imbalance 
risks for gas-fired generators.   
Hence, the specific impacts of the costs associated with gas consumption/imbalance risks on the 
economics of a gas-fired generator depend on a number of factors: 
• The existence or lack thereof of a day-ahead market for electricity or a day-ahead 
unit commitment program.  
                                                     
35 Day-ahead electricity markets are used to commit generators, importers and exporters a day-ahead of the 
dispatch day with the actual dispatch taking place in real time. Some market jurisdictions (e.g. MISO) operate 
both a day-ahead market and a real time market. However, others like Ontario (currently) operates only a real-
time market 
36 See www.theimo.com 
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• The frequency at which volume imbalances are determined (hourly or daily) 
• The availability, costs and constraints of gas imbalance risk hedging vehicles, such 
as load balancing, high deliverability storage and transportation services with 
multiple and frequent intra-day gas nomination windows.    
From the perspective of real options analysis, the operator of a gas-fired thermal plant not only 
reacts to changes in price spread between electricity and gas to maximize revenue but also has to 
continually adjust operations in reaction to occurrences of imbalances. Once the uncertainty about 
real-time electricity prices and plant dispatch are revealed, the plant operator may have to adjust 
future energy offers with the intent of maximizing revenue not only by targeting periods of high 
spread between electricity and gas prices but also by reducing costs associated with gas imbalance 
penalties.   
5.2 Operating Constraints 
Mechanical characteristics of power plants contribute to operating costs by constraining possible 
operating actions at certain states of the plants. Hence, prior to making any operating decision, the 
operator of a plant must consider both immediate and future costs (including lost opportunities) 
associated with changing the current operating state.   
For financial analytical purposes, the important operating costs and constraints are highlighted as 
follows (Thompson et al [35], Denton et al [34], Tseng and Barz [36], Kehlhofer et al [65]): 
• Minimum generation level – the minimum output level at which a plant can begin to 
inject power into the electricity grid. This output level is dictated by the thermodynamics 
of the plant’s operation and can be sensitive to prevailing ambient conditions.   
• Maximum operating capacity – the maximum output level at which a stable operation can 
be achieved. It depends on the capacity and efficiency of the turbines.  
• Heat Rate – the efficiency at which heat energy of fuel is converted to electrical energy 
by a gas-fired plant. Expressed in MMBtu/MWh, it determines the unit volume of fuel 
required to produce a unit MWh of energy. The higher the heat rate at a particular power 
level, the less efficient the plant is. Heat rate also exhibits seasonal variation due to 
sensitivity of thermal plants performance to ambient air temperature conditions.   
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• Start-up time – the time required to bring a plant from a shutdown state to the minimum 
generation level. It depends on the initial temperature state of the plant’s boiler. A unit 
that is being started after the boiler has become completely cold will require more time 
before power output can be obtained.  
• Shutdown time – the time required to bring a plant from an operating state at or above the 
minimum generation level to a shutdown state.  
• Minimum run time – this is the minimum time required for a plant to operate at or above 
its minimum generation level before it can be shut down. This requirement is dictated by 
the need to reduce thermal and mechanical stresses on plant equipments due to cycling 
operation.  
• Minimum down time – similar to minimum run time, this is the time that has to be 
satisfied before a plant that is originally in a shut down state can be started up.  This 
requirement is necessary to minimize equipment wear and tear and probability of 
component failure due to thermal stresses.  
• Ramp rate- the output level of a plant can only be changed at certain rates depending on 
the current output level.  
• Start-up cost – the cost associated with bringing a plant from a shutdown state to the 
point at which energy can be injected into the power grid (i.e. the minimum generation 
level). Startup cost has a variable component (associated with fuel requirement and price 
of gas) and a fixed component (e.g. labour costs, estimated costs of equipment wear and 
tear etc). It is a function of the temperature state of the boiler at the time of startup as it 
takes longer and costs more to startup from a cold boiler state compared to when starting 
up when the boiler is still considered warm or hot.     
• Shut-down cost- the cost associated with shutting down a plant from an operating state at 
or above the minimum generation level, to zero power.  
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5.3 Modeling Framework 
For an independent power plant owner, the decision to operate37 or shutdown a flexible gas-fired 
power plant in real time depends on the immediate benefit of the decision as well as expected future 
benefit consequent to the decision. Given that future benefits are unknown ahead of time, operating 
decisions at each instant of time has to be taken based only on the currently available information 
about the state of the plant and the states of the relevant commodities markets (i.e. electricity and gas 
markets). Immediate operating decisions will affect the operating states that are feasible in the near 
future, as some of the key operating constraints have to be satisfied across operating time intervals. 
As a result, one can model the operating decisions of a flexible power plant as a continuous or 
discrete time dynamic decision making problem where the objective is to maximize expected value of 
future cash flows subject to all relevant constraints.  
The valuation framework presented and discussed in section 4.1 is applied here to value a gas-fired 
thermal power plant with gas imbalance uncertainty. Consider the operation of a thermal power plant 
in which a control action ςtk is taken at discrete times t , given the information (ς ) available at t  and 
the set of mutually exclusive control actions that are feasible at t  as determined by applicable 
operating constraints. If we assume that a control action is taken at each time t  from a feasible set 
after market prices (i.e. price of electricity and price of gas) are revealed, the objective of the plant 





















,,,max ,,     (5-1) 
i.e. the objective of the plant operator is to maximize the current expected value ( τV ) of future cash 
flows ( tB ) given the set of all currently available information
38
τς at time τ=t .  
                                                     
37 In competitive markets power plants are dispatched by the Independent System Operator. To ensure that its 
plant is dispatched at a particular hour, a market participant will offer to generate below the expected market 
price for that hour since all generators with accepted offer receive the market price. Hence for the purpose of 
valuation, independent power plants are modelled as price takers. For simplicity, we also assume that the 
capacity of the plant being valued is small enough such that its operating decisions do not have any effect on 
market price.   




( )ttgtett qSSkB ,,, ,,ς  is the benefit derived at time t  by taking a control action39 k at that time. The 
parameters tgtet SSq ,, ,, are the power output (MW), unit price of power ($/MW-time) and unit cost of 












        (5-2) 
where r is the discount rate.  
The set of benefits ( )ttgtett qSSkB ,,, ,,ς  captures the spread between revenues obtained at dispatch 
times t when a power level q is injected into the electricity grid, and the corresponding variable cost 
of producing the power.  
Before defining the benefit parameter tB , we examine the state variables that define the physical plant 
asset. For now we ignore any impact of gas supply/consumption imbalance uncertainty on the 
valuation.  
To represent the physical state of the plant, we consider two state variables as follows: 
(i) When a control action is taken, the output generation level of the plant is either changed or 
held constant. In reality, energy output is offered into power markets at discrete output 
levels; hence a state variable is needed to represent all possible discrete output outputs.  
(ii) The flexibility to change operating states directly depends on equipment constraints. For 
instance, after a plant has been shutdown, it has to remain in that state for a while before it 
can be restarted in order to minimize thermal stresses on the plant’s equipment. Similarly, 
there is a minimum up-time requirement. In addition, the time it takes to startup a plant 
from a shutdown state depends on the initial thermal state of the plant’s boiler. If the boiler 
has become completely cold, it will take longer to warm it up (before power can be raised) 
compare to a situation where the plant is to be started back up when the boiler is still warm.  
Hence a second state variable is needed to represent the thermal state of the power plant’s 
boiler, whether the plant is shutdown or running.  
                                                     
39 By definition, a control action leads to an operating mode, so one can either model the control actions or the 




Output Levels (MW) 
To model the plant’s feasible output levels at operating intervals t , we define a set Z that comprises 
all feasible output levels tz of the plant. Since a negative power output level is never feasible, then 
{ }max,.....,0 qZzt ≡∈   (MW)       (5-3) 
where maxq represents the maximum power output level of the plant and minq . It should be noted that 
below minq , output power is not injected into the electricity grid but rather used to achieve what is 
called a no-load spin of the turbines and synchronize the power plant to the electricity grid.  At 0=t , 
0zzt = (initial condition). 
Variable startup time, Minimum run time, Minimum down time 
For a thermal power plant, variable start-up time, minimum run time and minimum down time 
requirements are related to the thermal state of the plant’s boiler. To avoid unnecessary complexity, 
following Tseng and Barz [36], we model these requirements with a single state variable. Instead of 
attempting to model the boiler temperature directly, one can model these constraints by tracking the 
elements of a set Y of all time states ty  between the time intervals ct−  and Rt , where ct is the time 
it takes for a plant boiler to become completely cold after it has been shutdown and Rt  is the 
minimum run time requirement of the plant. Mathematically,  
{ }Rct ttYy ,......,−≡∈   0≠y        (5-4) 
Furthermore, if we define a set onY to track the state of the boiler when the plant is running and 
offY to track its state when the plant is shutdown, then the following is true: 
YYY offon ⊂,           (5-5) 
For modeling purposes, when the unit is running, we are only concerned with the states of the boiler 
between the time the plant reaches its minimum operating level and the time it satisfies its minimum 
run time requirement. Hence, we can define onY  as the following set: 
{ }Ron tY ,,.........1=          (5-6) 
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Similarly, when the unit is shutdown, we are only concerned with the states of the boiler between the 
time the plant reaches zero power and the time at which the boiler becomes completely cold. Since 
the ‘on’ state starts at interval 1, we can represent the “off” state with an interval that starts at -140 
such that the set offY  can be defined as: 
{ }1,,......... −−= coff tY         (5-7) 
In addition, if we define wt  and Ht as the times from shutdown that it takes for the boiler to cool 
down to a ‘warm’ state and a ‘hot’ state respectively, then both wt  and Ht lie within the set 
offY . 
Hence41,  
{ }1,..,....,,..., −−= Hwcoff tttY         (5-8) 
For simplicity of modeling, we can combine the sets offY  and onY  such that, 
YYYy offont ∈∪∈          (5-9) 
where the sign of ty indicates whether the plant is running (i.e. set 
onY is applicable) or shutdown (i.e. 
set offY is applicable) and its magnitude indicates its position in the onY and offY sets.  At 0=t , 
0yyt =  (initial condition) represents the initial state of the plant boiler at start of valuation.  
Control Actions and Operating Benefits 
Having specified the relevant state variables, the feasible set tK of control actions can then be 
defined.  If we define the entire control set K (including all control sets tK ) as containing three 
actions42, then one can represent these actions by three arbitrary integers as follows: 
-1 ⇒  ramp down 
                                                     
40 Hence Yy ∉= 0 as in equation 5-4.  
41 For all practical purposes, operators of thermal power plants are concerned with startups from three 
shutdown states defined as ‘cold’, ‘warm’ and ‘hot’ states of the boiler.  




0  ⇒   continue to operate at the same power level (idle at the same level) 
1 ⇒    ramp up to a higher power level (ramp up) 
Then, 
{ }1,0,1−=K            (5-10) 
Also, we can assume that the energy produced in an interval t∆ is the arithmetic average of the power 
levels at the start and end of the interval. Then for each control action, the benefit tB can be defined 
as follows:  
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   (5-11) 
where AHR ,  SAHR  and OM are “average heat rate”, “startup average heat rate” and “variable 
operations and maintenance costs” respectively. The first expression in equation (5-11) implies that 
when the plant output is at least at the minimum generation level, the net cash flow is the difference 
between revenue derived by injecting electricity into the power grid during the interval t∆  (at a MW 
level given by the average output during the interval) and the cost of the energy injected (i.e. cost of 
natural gas and operations & maintenance cost). However, as indicated by the second expression, if 
the output level is less than the minimum generation level but greater than zero power, electricity is 
not injected into the grid and so there is no derived revenue from the power market even though fuel 
is consumed. The cost of this fuel, which is the fuel required to startup the power plant from a 
shutdown state to its minimum generation level and synchronize it to the grid, constitutes the variable 
startup cost. The variable operations and maintenance costs can include items such as labour costs, 
maintenance costs (to capture plant degradation) and other costs as deemed fit by a generator. It is 
possible to define a functional form for this cost but there is no commonly acceptable function, hence 
we focus only on the average heat rate and startup costs which are necessary to capture fuel related 
costs. The third expression indicates that at zero power, when the plant is completely shut down, there 
is neither revenue nor cost.  
The average heat rate AHR, measures the average fuel consumption per unit of energy required to 
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maintain a set output level of the power plant. To model AHR, the starting point is the power plant’s 
input-output curve which is derived by engineers from performance tests. The curve is derived by 
measuring required fuel consumption for various levels of plant outputs and fitting the results to a 
function. Since the input-output curve relates fuel consumption to power production, it implicitly 
captures the efficiency of the power plant in converting fuel to power. It is customary to approximate 
this input-output relationship with a polynomial function (typically a convex quadratic function) as 
follows (see Klein [66] for a detailed discussion on heat rates): 
2
tt czbzaH ++=   ( minqzt ≥ )      (5-12) 
where H  is the thermal energy consumed in MMBtu/h to produce power at level tz (MW) and the 
terms ba, and c are correlation coefficients. The coefficient a (the intercept) represents a base fuel 
requirement irrespective of level of power output. 
The average heat rate at a given output level tz is derived by dividing the input-output curve 





aAHR ++=  ( minqzt ≥ )        (5-13) 
For the purpose of our modeling, the output level during an interval t∆ is taken as the mid-point of 
the output at the start of the interval and the output at the end, hence we calculate the average heat 
rate at )(5.0 1++ tt zz as indicated in equation 5-11.  
To model the startup cost, which is a function the power plant’s boiler thermal state at startup, we 
make use of a startup average heat rate curve as follows: 
too zcbSAHR +=  ( min0 qzt ≤< )       (5-14) 
which is calibrated to ensure continuity of fuel requirement at the minimum generation level. 
Obviously when the power plant is shutdown, there is no fuel requirement.  To capture different 
startup costs for different shutdown states (i.e. cold, warm or hot), we assume different intermediate 
ramp levels in-between zero power and the minimum generation level such that when the power plant 
is starting up from a hot shutdown state for instance, it will bypass some intermediate ramp levels 
thereby reaching the minimum generation level faster than when starting up from a cold boiler state.  
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As discussed earlier, startup and dispatch decisions for a thermal power plant do not only depend on 
market variables but also on the operating constraints of the plant. As a result, at every decision point, 
the available actions ( tK ) depend on the current thermal state of the plant’s boiler (indicated by ty ) 
and the current output level ( tz ). This set of feasible control actions is a sub-set of the entire control 
set available to the plant operator. These relationships are defined by equation (5-15) as follows, 
where the integers 1, 0 and -1 are as defined in equation 5-10.  
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The five expressions in equation (5-15) imply the following respectively43: 
(i) The only option available is to ramp-up when the plant is already started up but the 
power level is still below the minimum generation level44.  
(ii) The operator can ramp-up or leave the plant at the current output state when (a) the 
output level is above the minimum generation level but the minimum run-time constraint 
has not yet been satisfied or (b) the plant is shutdown and the minimum shutdown 
constraint is already satisfied.  
(iii) When the power plant is shut down and the minimum downtime constraint is not yet 
satisfied, the only alternative available to the operator is to leave the plant in its current 
state i.e. remain shutdown.   
(iv) All three options are available when the minimum run time requirement has been 
satisfied and the plant is operating at or greater than its minimum generation level.   
                                                     
43 It should be noted that an expanded or reduced set of operating constraints can be specified depending on the 
particular application.  
44 This is an imposed constraint that can be relaxed depending on the particular application. However, it makes 
intuitive sense that once a decision to start up has been made, it should not be reversed until the minimum 
output level is reached since the start-up costs cannot be recovered until the minimum output level is attained.  
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(v) The operator can only ramp down or leave the plant at its current state when the plant is 
operating at its maximum operating capacity. In the case of ramp down,   the minimum 
run time requirement must also have been satisfied.  
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where uβ  and dβ  are the ramp-up rate and ramp-down rate respectively. The ramp rate (whether up 





. If ramp-up rate 
and ramp-down rate are equal, uβ = dβ . It is also possible to model uβ  and dβ  as functions of tz  
implying that ramp rate varies with the output level of the power plant. The implication of equation 5-
17 is that the elements of set Z are separated by ),min( du ββ and either uβ  is an integer multiple of 
dβ  or dβ  is an integer multiple of uβ .  
5.3.1 Incorporating Gas Supply/Imbalance Uncertainty 
Gas supply/consumption imbalance arises because of the time delay between gas purchases and real 
time gas consumption. Since power plants are dispatched in real time, actual gas consumption takes 
place in real time depending on when a plant is dispatched and the output level of dispatch. 
Depending on the specific plant and the markets (power and gas) in which it operates, a number of 
gas management related scenarios are possible as follows: 
Gas Nomination 
• Gas nomination takes place at the natural gas day-ahead nomination window only (e.g. the 
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NAESB timely nomination window). The total volume ordered for the next “gas day” is divided 
into 24 equal amounts and flowed to the consumer hourly during consumption day. 
• Gas nomination takes place at the day-ahead nomination window and at additional intra day 
windows (gas suppliers may offer intra-day gas nomination windows at additional cost to help the 
consumer reduce its imbalance uncertainty by having the ability to adjust gas nominations intra-
day as more dispatch information becomes available).   
 
Volume Imbalance 
• Gas supply/consumption imbalance is tracked hourly  
• Cumulative gas supply/consumption imbalance is tracked daily  
Load Balancing and Storage 
• There is no load balancing service or storage, all supply over run or under run attracts market-
indexed45 penalty charges from gas supplier 
• Hourly or daily supply over run or under run is first applied to a load balancing service or a 
storage service. Imbalance volumes generated beyond the capacity of load balancing or storage 
attracts market-indexed penalty charges from supplier.  
In addition to the foregoing scenarios, specifics of gas transportation contracts, load balancing 
services and storage services are usually different from one supplier to another. For example, the 
types of constraints on the use of a load balancing account may vary from one supplier to another. 
These can be in terms of the number of allowable nominations into or out of the load balancing 
account and the maximum allowable imbalance volume.  The specific requirements serve as 
constraints on the use of gas balancing service or storage. Also, cost structures for these services can 
differ. In some cases, most of the cost is fixed whether the service is used or not while in other cases, 
the services are priced at market value determined through open season bidding.  
Let ng be the gas flow rate (MMBtu/hr) supplied to the plant in real time such that if the rate is 
constant at c ,    
                                                     
45 i.e. penalty charges are calculated based on gas market prices at the time of imbalance 
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ctgn =)(  for 1=t  to T         (5-18) 
The rate of gas consumption by the plant at t  ( bg ) is a function of the output plant level at t  ( tz ) i.e. 
)( tbb zgg =           (5-19) 
The rate of supply-consumption imbalance I  at time t  can therefore be stated as: 
)()()( tbn zgtgtI −=          (5-20) 
It then follows that the imbalance volume ( VI ) over an interval t∆ is: 
ttIIV ∆= )(           (5-21) 






)()(         (5-22) 
To model a gas load balancing service or a gas storage service, the parameters (constraints) of interest 
include the following: 
• The capacity allocated to the service e.g. (i) a maximum positive imbalance volume and a 
minimum negative imbalance volume for a load balancing service (ii) a maximum storage 
capacity for a storage account. Typically, for the purpose of gas imbalance management, one will 
attempt to use a storage account by swinging the volume around a mid-point. In which case, if we 
define the mid-point capacity as zero, the range of storage allowed will be bounded by a 
maximum positive capacity and a minimum negative capacity just like a load balancing account. 
If we define the maximum positive capacity as maxR  and the minimum negative capacity as 
maxR− , the total volume capacity of a storage account or a load balancing account is then max2R . 
• The maximum volume that can be nominated into or out of a load balancing account or a 
storage account at a single time (also referred to as injectability and withdrawability respectively).  
If we define injectability and withdrawability limits as ing  and outg , the dynamics of a storage 
















t       if IItgRR
 I       if ItgRR
R    (5-23) 
where tR is the inventory of the load balancing or storage account at time t  and VI >0 indicates that 
gas is being injected into the account (hence , VI <0 indicates that gas is being withdrawn).  
The method of calculating the cost of volume imbalance varies, depending on a particular gas supply 
contract and if load balancing or storage46 is available or not.  For instance, if a power generator does 
not have access to a load balancing service or gas storage; then all imbalance volumes generated 
attract penalty charges which are usually indexed to gas price (i.e. linked to published gas prices) at a 
predetermined hub. Under such a scenario, penalty can be charged on imbalance volumes generated 
at each supply interval or on a cumulative volume at the end of the supply period (e.g. end of gas 
day). If a load balancing or storage is available, only volumes that can not be accommodated within 
service attract penalty charges. There may also be variable costs to using such a load balancing or 
storage service, e.g. a variable carrying cost charge for gas volume in the account and a variable cost 
for using the service. 
Assuming that the plant operator is penalized for a fraction α  of the unit price of gas whenever an 
imbalance is created (either by having to sell excess gas to the supplier at47 gS)1( α−  or by paying 
for short fall at gS)1( α+ , the cost of imbalance CI then becomes
48: 
VgC ISI ××= α         (5-24) 
with a load balancing service or storage account in place, the penalty charge for imbalance volume 
created is: 
                                                     
46 For economic dispatch purpose, only the variable costs of storage or load balancing are relevant. 
47 It is also possible that the penalty charge is indexed to gas price at a different hub than the hub of purchase in 
order to enable the gas supplier to maximize the amount of unit penalty charged to the generator.  
48 For instance, if %30=α , excess gas used will be purchased from the LDC at 130% of market price and 
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  (5-25) 
If the account is tracked on a cumulative basis, VI in equation (5-25) will be replaced by VIC  as in 
equation 5-22. Equation 5-25 assumes that usage of gas load balancing service or gas storage does not 
require any variable operating costs. If this is the case, these variable operating costs must be added to 
this equation which will have the effect of reducing the potential benefit of load balancing. 
For dispatch decision making, the cost of imbalance CI  has to be incorporated into equation 5-11.  
5.3.2 Model Summary 
The developed model is summarized in this section.  
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where the feasible set of decision actions tK  at time t  is determined by the plant’s operating 
constraints i.e. 
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The benefit term tB , which incorporates the variable cost of gas supply/consumption imbalance, is 
then defined as follows: 
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   (5-26) 
As defined in equation (5-11), tB  is a function of revenue derived from energy sale and variable 
operating costs where variable operating costs include (i) costs of fuel consumed which is a function 
of the average heat rate (ii) variable operations and maintenance cost ( )OM , and (iii) gas 
supply/consumption imbalance cost ( CI ).  





aAHR ++=    ( minqzt ≥ )    (5-13) 
where a ,b and c are coefficients of the power plant’s input-output polynomial. The startup average 
heat rate is used to model variable startup costs based on a startup input-output curve defined as 
follows: 
too zcbSAHR +=     ( min0 qzt ≤< )      (5-14) 
where the coefficients ob  and oc  are calibrated to ensure continuity of fuel requirement at the 
minimum generation level, minq . 
The cost structure of gas supply/consumption imbalance varies between gas supply contracts and it 
depends on whether a load service or storage service is available for managing generated imbalance. 
Without load balancing service or storage, CI  is modeled as follows (assuming imbalance is tracked 
at every period t ): 
VgC ISI ××= α          (5-24) 
where α  is the penalty factor and gS is the price of gas. The imbalance volume VI is defined as the 
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difference between real-time gas supply ( ng ) and consumption ( bg ) volumes
49:  
)()()( tbn zgtgtI −=         (5-19) 
With load balancing service or a storage service, the cost of imbalance is modeled as follows: 
( )
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    (5-24) 
assuming that the load balancing service or storage service does not require variable operating costs 
of its own. tR  is the storage or load balancing inventory at time t  and maxR is the capacity.  














t       if IItgRR
 I       if ItgRR
R    (5-23) 
 
To model market prices of gas, we use the discrete-time form of the mean reverting model as 
presented in Section 4.4.1, i.e.  























ttt eeeSetSttS   (4-16) 
It should be noted that all the parameters of equation 4-16 are defined for gas prices. Since gas is 
assumed to be purchased on a day-ahead basis, gas prices are modeled on a daily granularity. Hence  
for intra-day decisions, gas price is taken to be the same throughout the 24-hour operating period.   
Similarly, we use the discrete-form of the mean-reverting jump-diffusion model as presented in 
Section 4.4.2 to simulate several paths of electricity prices, i.e. 
                                                     
49 The rate of gas supply (i.e. gas nomination) is taken as input into the model while gas consumption is 
determined intrinsically as a function of the output state. For instance, gas nomination can be determined from 
the knowledge of published pre-dispatch prices which generally represents the market’s forecast of near term 
spot prices.  
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The parameters of this equation (4-18) are defined for electricity prices and will be different from 
those of equation 4-16 when calibrated.  
Since a joint probability distribution of gas and electricity prices has to be simulated (at every time 
step), correlations between the prices must be factored into the simulation. If we simulate different 
paths for electricity prices based on a standard normal random variable ε  as indicated in equation 4-
18, gas prices must be simulated with an adjusted version of equation 4-16 as follows: 


































where ε ′′ is a standard normal random variable independent from ε  and ρ  is the correlation 
coefficient between gas and electricity prices. If the prices of the two commodities are assumed to be 
perfectly correlated in the same direction (i.e. 1+=ρ ), the last term of equation 5-25 disappears and 
the equation becomes 4-16.  
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5.4 Illustrative Example 
Consider a hypothetical, but realistic gas thermal power plant50. Let the input-output characteristics of 
the plant be given as shown in Figure 11 and the startup input-output curve be as shown in Figure 12. 
The key operating characteristics/constraints and valuation parameters are indicated in Table 151. The 
plant’s startup profiles from three shutdown states (cold, warm and hot) and the assumed rampdown 
profile are as shown in Figure 13.  We analyze daily dispatch strategies of the plant under different 
scenarios and compute market-based net revenues of the output energy.  
Scenario 1 (No gas imbalance): The plant’s output is valued without any consideration for gas 
imbalance uncertainties.  The effect of seasonality in power prices and gas prices is examined under 
this scenario.  
Scenario 2 (gas imbalance; no storage or load balancing): Daily dispatch strategy of the plant is 
modeled with consideration given to hourly gas volume imbalance. A penalty charge equal to 50%52 
of the spot gas price is assumed to apply whenever an imbalance is created between supplied gas and 
consumed gas volumes. We examine different hourly gas nomination volumes which are assumed 
constant throughout the day.  
Case 3 (gas imbalance with load balance service): Daily dispatch strategy of the plant is modeled 
considering potential penalty charges from hourly imbalance given that a load balancing service is 
available as a hedge for imbalance risk. We consider a load balancing account with two different 
capacities ( 000,10±  & 000,20±  MMBtu) and injection/withdrawal limits of 2000 MMBtu/hr.  
The scenarios and the sub-cases are described in Table 2.  
 
                                                     
50 The characteristic and valuation parameters chosen are representative of a realistic gas thermal power plant 
even though the problem is only illustrative.  
51 For the purpose of this illustration, we ignore variable operating and maintenance cost and also since 
computation is done for a 24-hour time frame, we ignore discount rate.  
52 The example of 50% penalty charge for gas consumption imbalance is taken from an actual gas supply 
contract in Ontario.  
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Figure 11: Input-Output Curve  
Startup Input-Output Curve (No net power output)
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Figure 13: Start-up Profiles from three Shutdown States53  
                                                     
53 The curves indicate that the plant can start-up from a hot shutdown state to the maximum capacity in 3 hours; 
from a warm state in 4 hours and from a cold state in 6 hours. Shutdown from maximum capacity is possible in 




Table 1: Operating Constraints and Costs Data 
Parameter Value  Unit 
Minimum Generation Level (base 
point) 120 MW 
Maximum Generation Level (capacity) 460 MW 
Minimum Run Time 3 hr 
Minimum Down Time 2 hr 
Valuation Parameters 
Initial Plant Output 0 MW 
Initial Down Time 4 hr 
Initial Load Balancing Account Level 0 MMBtu 
Start-up Cost Coefficients 
bo 1.5731  MMBtu/MWh 
co 0.0355  MMBtu/MWh2 
Cost Coefficients - Above Minimum Geneneration Level 
a 314.86  MMBtu 
b 1.9603  MMBtu/MWh 
c 0.0104  MMBtu/MWh2 
Load Balancing Service 
Maximum Withdrawal Rate 2000 MMBtu/hr 








Table 2: Scenario and Case Description  
SCENARIO CASE # DESCRIPTION 
Scenario 1 Case 1a 
No gas imbalance consideration, 
Season=Summer  
  Case 1b 
No gas imbalance consideration, 
Season=Winter 
Scenario 2 Case 2a 
Hourly Gas imbalance consideration, 
Season=Summer, Hourly Day-ahead gas 
purchase=0 MMBtu 
  Case 2b 
Hourly Gas imbalance consideration, 
Season=Summer, Hourly Day-ahead gas 
purchase=1000 MMBtu 
  Case 2c 
Hourly Gas imbalance consideration, 
Season=Summer, Hourly Day-ahead gas 
purchase=2000 MMBtu 
 Case 2d 
Hourly Gas imbalance consideration, 
Season=Summer, Hourly Day-ahead gas 
purchase=2500 MMBtu 
  Case 2e 
Hourly Gas imbalance consideration, 
Season=Summer, Hourly Day-ahead gas 
purchase=3000 MMBtu 
Scenario 3 Case 3a 
Hourly Gas imbalance consideration, 
Season=Summer, Hourly Day-ahead gas 
purchase=0 MMBtu, Load Balance 
Account capacity=+/- 5,000 MMBtu 
  Case 3b 
Hourly Gas imbalance consideration, 
Season=Summer, Hourly Day-ahead gas 
purchase=0 MMBtu, Load Balance 
Account capacity=+/- 10,000 MMBtu 
 Case 3b 
Hourly Gas imbalance consideration, 
Season=Summer, Hourly Day-ahead gas 
purchase=0 MMBtu, Load Balance 








5.4.1 Market Data Calibration 
The parameters of the mean-reverting jump diffusion model for modeling time-varying probability 
distribution of power prices are calibrated as discussed in chapter 4 using the 2006 HOEP data from 
the IESO. Similarly, the parameters of the mean-reverting model for modeling gas prices are 
calibrated using 2006 day-ahead gas price data at Dawn Hub. The 2006 HOEP data is presented in 
Figure 14 showing the range of prices observed including a few very significant jumps. A single day 
price data showing intra-day price variation is presented in Figure 15 showing off-peak and on-peak 
hours with moderate price spikes. To calibrate the power price model, the data is divided into 4 
seasons as shown in Table 3 and into peak-off peak hours where peak hours cover 8 AM to 11 PM 
and off-peak hours cover 12 AM to 7 AM. The diffusion components of the data are separated from 
the jump components based on a criterion of 3 times standard deviation (as explained in section 
4.4.3). The parameters of the model are then derived for on-peak and off-peak hours, for the different 
seasons (see Table 4 ).  1000 samples of simulated paths of HOEP are shown in Figure 16 and Figure 
17 based on summer and winter 2006 data respectively. Figure 18 and Figure 19 show single 
simulation paths for 24 hour periods.  The simulated price paths show on/off peak variations and price 
spikes as expected.  
Table 5 shows the calibrated mean-reverting model parameters based on 2006 day-ahead gas price 
data (daily) at dawn Hub (see Figure 20). Figure 21 and Figure 22 show samples of simulated gas 
prices over 90 day periods based on winter and summer 2006 data respectively.  
5.4.2 Sanity Checks 
Coding implementations of the mathematical models developed for the purpose of this thesis 
(including the models discussed in chapters 6 and 7) were done in MATLAB. To ensure that the 
models were accurately implemented as intended, a number of sanity checks were carried out as 
appropriate.  A big part of software coding quality assurance process involves knowing intuitively the 
characteristics of the results that one expects under certain assumptions. For instance, one can turn-off 
volatility and or jumps and examine the ensuing results of the simulation. Similarly, one can turn-off 
mean-reversion and observe the effect on the probability distributions of the simulated variables.  
These types of sanity checks were performed for all the coding implementation that was done for the 






















Figure 14: 2006 Hourly Ontario Electricity Price Data  



























Table 3: Description of Seasons54  
Month Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov. Dec




Table 4: Calibrated Electricity Price Model Parameters (Log Parameters) 
  Calibrated Model Parameters – Hourly Data 
  On-Peak Off-Peak 
  Jump Diffusion Jump Diffusion 
κ  -0.072 x  3.909 κ  -0.415 x  3.530
γ  0.296 σ  0.253 γ  0.790 σ  0.288
Winter 
 φ  0.004  η  0.250  φ  0.001  η  0.185
κ  0.616 x  3.883 κ  -0.104 x  3.303
γ  0.504 σ  0.282 γ  0.303 σ  0.373
Spring 
 φ  0.003  η  0.317  φ  0.007  η  0.347
κ  -0.218 x  3.904 κ  0.022 x  3.304
γ  0.346 σ  0.228 γ  0.304 σ  0.324
Summer 
 φ  0.001  η  0.157  φ  0.008  η  0.280
κ  0.374 x  3.859 κ  -0.219 x  3.394
γ  0.166 σ  0.251 γ  0.252 σ  0.283
Fall 




                                                     




Figure 16: Sample Simulated Paths of Electricity Prices over a 5 Day Period Based on 




Figure 17: Sample Simulated Paths of Electricity Prices over 5 Day Period Based on 














Table 5: Calibrated Gas Price Model Parameters (Log Parameters – Daily Data) 
 
  Winter Spring  Summer Fall 
Parameter         
x  1.75 1.86 1.51 2.09
η  0.03 0.09 0.02 0.10






































Figure 23: A Single Sample of Simulated Gas Prices over a 90-day Period Based on Summer 





Figure 24: A Single Sample of Simulated Gas Prices over a 90-day Period Based on Summer 
2006 Data (Sample 1) 
 
5.4.3 Valuation Results  
When the developed valuation modeled is solved numerically as described earlier, the outcome 
includes probability distributions of both the set of optimal operating decisions and the corresponding 
present value over the time horizon. In the short-term, the resulting optimal operating decisions can 
be used to offer the plant’s output energy into the wholesale market. In order to achieve that, one 
would re-run the model as new information about market uncertainties arrive. For medium to long-
term planning purposes or for contractual asset valuation purposes (e.g. PPA, forward sales etc), the 
model can be run over the corresponding time frame considering long-term fundamental effects on 
prices (such as seasonality).  
For the particular illustrative example presented here, we analyze the results over a 24-hour operating 
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period (i.e. one day cycling operation). For the base case (case 1a) which does not take into account 
the possibility of occurrence of gas imbalances and their effects on dispatch strategies, Figure 25 and 
Figure 26 show sample paths of resulting dispatch strategies.  As expected, the power plant is started 
up during the off-peak hours in order to ensure that it is up and running at the minimum generation 
level, ready to be ramped up at the start of on-peak period. Since gas imbalance costs are not 
considered, dispatch decisions are only influenced by the spread between electricity and gas prices 
given the modeled operating constraints. Since there is no intra-day gas price variation, if we plot 
output production against power price, the dispatch should follow power price variation. This 
expected behaviour is shown in the samples of calculated dispatch strategies shown in Figure 27 to 
Figure 30.  
With potential gas imbalance costs taken into consideration, hourly operating decisions will not only 
depend on the spread between power and gas prices (given operating constraints) but also on potential 
penalty costs from pre-purchased gas. For instance, as shown in Figure 31, for the case where gas was 
not ordered at all, day-ahead (case 2a), the operator will rely on the available gas in its load balancing 
service account (or storage) as the plant is being dispatched until the available capacity is used up. 
Figure 33 and Figure 34 compare operating decisions for the same simulation paths under scenario 1 
(no imbalance, case 1a), scenario 2 (hourly imbalance, case 2a) and scenario 3 (hourly imbalance 
with load balancing account, case 3a) for the case where no gas was ordered day ahead. As indicated, 
optimal operating decision changes from one scenario to another. With potential gas imbalance 
penalties, for the situation when the operator did not order any gas ahead of time, the cost of 
imbalance will be factored into the spark spread before the plant is offered into the market. As 
indicated in the figures, for the case where gas was not ordered day ahead, it is likely that the plant 
will be dispatched at less output since the potential imbalance penalty will make the spark spread 
negative in some hours where it will otherwise be positive. When a hedging instrument like a load 
balancing account is available, the impact of imbalance is less as the operator is able to rely on the 
load balancing account depending on how much capacity is available.  
In the context of a daily plant cycling operation, the following are considered true: 
• The plant operator will start up the power plant and will incur necessary startup costs as long 
as the total net market revenue for the entire 24 hour period is positive.  
• When gas imbalance cost is not considered, the plant operator will choose to idle the power 
plant in the shutdown state when the cumulative net market revenue for the 24 hour period is 
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negative or zero.  
• If the plant operator did not order any gas day-ahead, it will also choose to idle the power 
plant in the shutdown state when the cumulative net market revenue for the 24 hour period is 
negative or zero. This is because, if gas was not ordered day-ahead, imbalance penalties can 
not result unless the operator chooses to operate thereby drafting the pipeline of the gas 
supplier.  
• If a non-zero volume of gas was ordered day-ahead, the maximum possible loss for the plant 
operator for the 24-hour period is the penalty factor multiplied by the volume of gas ordered. 
As a result, instead of zero net market revenue being the floor value for the day, the operator 
will operate the power plant if the cumulative 24-hour net revenue is greater than the 
maximum possible loss.  
• If a non-zero volume of gas was ordered day-ahead, the plant operator may be forced to 
operate at certain hours when its spark spread is negative just to mitigate penalty charges that 
will result if the pre-ordered gas was not used.  
• With a load balancing service or gas storage available, the maximum daily loss will be 
determined by the available capacity of load balancing or storage. 
In Table 6 we compare the calculated values of daily plant output across the three different scenarios.  
When gas imbalance penalties are not factored into the valuation, under the real options valuation 
assumption, it is not possible for the plant operator to lose money on any given day since it will 
simply choose not to offer energy into the market when market conditions are not favourable. 
However with gas imbalance penalties being relevant, daily net market revenues will depend on how 
accurately the plant operator is able to predict dispatch day-ahead. For days when gas is ordered day-
ahead, it is possible for the operator to record a net loss, with its loss being capped by its maximum 
possible gas imbalance penalty for that day (based on volume of gas ordered). However for days 
when gas was not ordered day ahead, the operator will only offer the plant into the market when the 
cost of producing energy, including the cost of drafting its gas LDC pipeline, is less than potential 
market revenue which implies that under the real options valuation approach, the plant operator can 
not lose money on such days. For the particular power plant considered in this illustration, the 
financial impacts of imbalance penalties are shown in Table 6 on an expected value basis. As 
indicated in the table, net revenue depends on volume of gas-ordered, availability of load balancing 
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and capacity of the load balancing account.    
In conclusion, the uncertainty surrounding gas imbalance affects the plant’s operator’s flexibility to 
switch between operating modes. By not factoring these effects into valuation, the value of flexibility 
of the power plant is over-stated and the resulting optimal operating strategies from the valuation 
model may not actually maximize total net earnings.  
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Figure 33: Comparison of Dispatch Strategies with No Imbalance, Hourly Imbalance and 
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Figure 34: Comparison of Dispatch Strategies with No Imbalance, Hourly Imbalance and 















Table 6: Statistical Comparison of the three cases  
  
Nominated 
Gas (MMBtu) Mean 
5th 
Percentile Minimum Maximum 
Scenario 1 
Case 1a N/A 
 
$130,626 
 $      
23,920   $             -    
 $     
478,519  
Case 1b N/A 
 $  
87,499  
 $      
11,046   $               -  
 $     
373,938  
Scenario 2 
Case 2a 0 
 $  
53,971   $               -  $               -  
 $     
323,316  
Case 2b 1000 
 $  
82,883  
 $        
2,786  
 $     
(26,309) 
 $     
382,999  
Case 2c 2000 
 $  
87,658  
 $     
(13,998) 
 $     
(54,673) 
 $     
414,464  
Case 2d 2500 
 $  
90,961  
 $     
(24,286) 
 $     
(74,560) 
 $     
431,439  
Case2e 3000 
 $  
74,809  
 $     
(48,997) 
 $    
(101,362) 
 $     
439,508  
Case 2f 4000 
 $  
44,899  
 $     
(91,840) 
 $    
(150,187) 







(MMBtu)         
Scenario 3 
Case3a ±10000 
 $  
76,620  
 $        
8,637   $               -  
 $     
341,775  
Case 3b ±20000 
 
$103,239 
 $      
17,983  
 $        
320.5  





5.5 Chapter Conclusions and Applications 
The model developed in this section and the results of the illustrative case study can be valuable to a 
merchant energy producer in several ways. Here we summarize potential applications and discuss the 
contributions of this work with regards to the valuation of gas-fired power generators.  
Given that power markets and power trading are still generally evolving, it is important that a 
valuation model be robust and adaptable. The modeling framework developed and presented in this 
work meets these criteria as it considers all the key value drivers of a gas-fired power generator and 
can be adapted to fit various power market rules. Even though fairly standard stochastic processes 
were employed in modeling the stochastic underlying value drivers, the framework can easily be used 
with other more complex stochastic processes and even forecast price scenarios from fundamental 
price forecasting software. To the best knowledge of the author, this is the first time in an academic 
literature that the issue of gas imbalance risk has been considered in the context of gas-fired power 
plant valuation.  
From an applications perspective, here are a few examples of potential application areas for a 
merchant gas-fired power generator where this modeling framework and the type of analysis 
presented can find usefulness: 
1. Quantification of the impact of a power market design on the economics of a gas-fired 
power plant. The type of analysis presented in this thesis can be carried out to quantify how 
gas imbalance risk impacts on the valuation of gas-fired power plants in different markets, 
e.g. a real time power market versus a day-ahead power market. It is expected that the 
availability of a day ahead power market can reduce the impact of the disconnect between 
the natural gas market and real time power market. This result can be demonstrated by 
analyzing a gas-fired power plant under the two different markets timelines (i.e. day ahead 
versus real time).  
2. Earnings at risk analysis for a gas-fired power plant. Merchant energy firms use the 
concept of earnings at risk to measure the variability of expected earnings from market-
based operations. Given that the framework developed in this work is based on a Monte-
Carlo algorithm, one can easily calculate the “earnings at risk” metric over a desired time 
frame from the probability distribution of values resulting from the model. A simple way to 
do this is by performing a percentile ranking of the resulting values and subtracting the 5th 
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percentile value (as an example of worst case earning) from the expected value, to show 
potential deviation from expected earning.  
3. Structuring of a long-term Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) deal. As a simple illustration, 
let us consider a PPA structuring arrangement for the hypothetical power plant example 
considered here based only on the results presented earlier in Table 6. For the purpose of 
this simple illustration, assume that the parameters of the model as calibrated are valid for 
the entire PPA period. If the merchant producer does not factor in potential gas imbalance 
risk into its valuation calculation, based on the results of scenario 1, it will expect a profit 
margin55 of ~$12/MWh on average for every single hour of the day in the summer56. 
However in reality, considering the potential for gas imbalance penalties, the expected 
profit margin will range between $4/MWh and $8/MWh for every hour of the day in the 
summer. Having a short notice gas balancing account improves the situation and brings the 
expected daily average profit margin closer to the no-imbalance scenario. Given this kind 
of information that gas imbalance risk can reduce expected profit margin from $12/MWh 
to as low as $4/MWh, the merchant energy producer should be looking to demand for risk 
premiums from the PPA counterparty to cover its potential risk exposure.  
4. Value of short-notice gas balancing account or storage. A gas-fired power generator may 
want to examine the advantage of having a hedging vehicle like a gas storage account for 
reducing the risks of imbalance penalties and also determine the appropriate capacity and 
how much it should pay for such services. For instance, for the illustrative case considered 
in this thesis, doubling the size of the short notice gas balancing account increases expected 
profit margin by 35% (based on case 3b versus 3a). Also, from the point of view of value 
of hedging, the $4/MWh profit margin scenario (see item 2) increases to $7/MWh with a 
±10,000 MMBtu capacity and $9.4/MWh with a ±20,000 MMBtu capacity.    
5. Optimal market operations planning. An asset optimization tool is usually required to 
determine the optimal market operation given available information on expected market 
                                                     
55 That is revenue net natural gas and gas related start-up costs 
56 Note that profit margin per hour is different during the actual hours of operation. This illustration is based on 
daily margin divided by total possible energy production in a day assuming the plant is operated at full capacity 
(i.e. 460 MW) for every single hour of the day (i.e. for 24 hours).  
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prices and other value drivers. Dispatch results produced from a valuation model such as 







Valuation of Hydroelectric Power Plants with Ancillary Services 
Options 
6.1 Introduction 
6.1.1 Hydroelectric Schemes 
There are three main types of hydroelectric schemes. These include: (i) run of the river, (ii) diversion 
and (iii) pumped storage. The first scheme involves locating one or more turbine(s) and generator(s) 
either in a dam or alongside it such that the dam uses the flow of the river to create a hydrostatic head. 
The diversion scheme works by diverting water from a dammed river or lake via canals or tunnels to 
a reservoir. Water from the reservoir forebay is then passed through a penstock (which slopes down 
into a power house) to generate electricity via one or more turbines and generators. The difference 
between this scheme and pumped storage scheme is that a pumped storage plant incorporates two 
reservoirs and one or more reversible pump-turbine units (or separate pumps and turbines as the case 
may be) in such a way that power can be purchased from the spot market during low price periods to 
pump water from the ground level reservoir into the raised storage reservoir for subsequent use (for 
power generation) during peak price period. Run of the river hydroelectric plants operate as baseload 
assets since water can not be stored for later use. With a reservoir, the other two schemes allow water 
to be stored and cycled over time, the possible length of cycling being a function of storage size.  
6.1.2 Operations Strategies 
Optimization of energy output from hydroelectric schemes has been extensively studied under 
regulated power systems. A number of such studies appeared in water resources, power systems and 
decision sciences literature (e.g. Pereira et al. [95], Georgakakos et al. [96]). Such studies mostly 
focus on scheduling hydroelectric reservoirs in hydrothermal systems with the objective of 
minimizing costs or maximize energy to satisfy load demand. Tariffs were fixed and known and 
operating flexibilities were limited as the goal was usually to meet demand.  
In competitive markets however, the individual hydroelectric asset could be optimized to maximize 
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revenue. Two key uncertainties affect cash flows in such situations; power price and water inflow.  
With a reservoir available for temporary water storage, the operator is able to change operating modes 
in response to market price movement by making use of his ability to store water. Variability of water 
inflow from upstream river into the plant affects how much energy can be produced. For example see 
Figure 35 which shows water inflow variability into a hydroelectric power plant in Ontario. Prior to 
start of rainfall season (otherwise known as the freshet seasons) it makes intuitive sense to have the 
reservoir empty in anticipation of significant increase in water inflow. During the freshet season 
itself, the production flexibility that comes with storage is greatly reduced as the plant is typically 
running at full capacity and even possibly spilling water. However, during the dry season, the 
















) Spring  Freshet
Fall  Freshet
 
Figure 35: Time-Series of Water Inflow into a Hydroelectric Reservoir in Ontario57 
                                                     
57 source: www.opg.com 
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The actions of the operator are governed by his current view of the underlying uncertainty factors 
(water inflow and power prices) and his available operating flexibilities. As uncertainties are 
resolved, the operator has the flexibility to change operating mode by making use of available storage 
space to temporarily store water (i.e. time-shifting of water or reservoir cycling). For instance, during 
off-peak hours when prices are low, the power plant units can be shutdown to build up the reservoir 
inventory which is then used during peak price hours to maximize production. Depending on the 
reservoir size, multi-day or seasonal time-shifting of water may also be possible. Intuitively, the more 
flexibility a hydroelectric asset has with regards to storage capability, the more should be its value. 
A number of recent articles have focused on valuing hydroelectric assets by considering the value of 
the flexibility of the operator to time-shift water by switching operating modes and using the plant’s 
reservoir storage capability (e.g. Thompson et al. [35] and Doege et al. [62]). The objective of the 
asset owner in this case (i.e. under competition) is to maximize revenue using strategies that do not 
necessarily maximize production or minimize power system costs.  This is the main difference 
between hydroelectric asset operations under regulated power systems and deregulated power 
markets.   
A common flexibility that has been ignored in the existing applications of real options methodology 
for valuing hydroelectric assets is the option of the asset operator to provide ancillary services to the 
wholesale power market. For instance, hydroelectric power plants are suitable for providing 
Operating Reserve (OR) capacities given their capability to ramp up and down very quickly. The ISO 
will pay a premium to market participants that offer a portion of their production capacities as reserve 
to cover their opportunity costs of reserving capacity (Deb [97] and Hirst [98], Jacobs et al [99]). 
Depending on the actual events during the course of a market day, reserve may or may not be 
required but the generator gets to keep the premium received. One can think of this process as selling 
of call options to the ISO whereby the ISO has the right (but is not obligated) to call the reserve for 
which it has already paid a premium.     
Clearly, operators of hydroelectric assets derive additional value by making use of the flexibility to 
provide ancillary services. Therefore by ignoring such flexibility, a hydroelectric asset with storage 
capability may be under valued. In a power market scheme where operating reserves are procured by 
the market operator through a competitive auction much like energy, future operating reserve 
premiums are uncertain, much like energy prices.  Hence the number of uncertainty factors to be 
considered in the valuation of hydroelectric assets will increase considering that energy prices and 
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water inflow into reservoirs are also uncertain. In the following section, we discuss the operating 
reserve market in the Ontario wholesale power market which is operated jointly with the energy 
market, as an example.   
6.2 Ontario Joint Real-Time Energy and Operating Reserves Market 
In the IESO administered wholesale electricity market, supply offers and demand bids for energy and 
operating reserve are submitted by dispatchable market participants at the same time. These bids can 
be revised up to two hours prior to the dispatch hour without restrictions by the IESO. In addition, 
with special permission, the quantity of bids can be further revised 10 minutes before the actual 
dispatch hour.  
The IESO offers three classes of operating reserve products to provide a market-based approach for 
expeditiously replacing any lost supply of planned energy (caused by unplanned generation or 
transmission outages) for a short period of time until supply from regular energy dispatch can be 
restored. The three operating reserve classes administered are as follows: 
(i) 10 minute spinning reserve (synchronized reserve) 
(ii) 10 minute non-spinning reserve and 
(iii) 30 minute non-spinning reserve  
The IESO determines appropriate premiums (called OR prices) for each class of operating reserve 
using the same approach that is used to determine Market Clearing Prices (MCPs) for energy. MCPs 
and dispatch instructions for energy are determined simultaneously along with the clearing prices and 
dispatch instructions for the three classes of operating reserves. All accepted offers for operating 
reserve are settled at the determined premium rate for the class of operating reserve competed for 
irrespective of whether or not the reserve capacity is later called.  All activated reserves are then 
further settled at the market clearing price. Since unplanned outages are random in nature, the 
probability that a reserve will be called is uncertain and not controlled by any market player.   
Figure 36 compares the premiums paid for the three classes of operating reserve in 2004. As 
expected, OR prices are typically much less than energy prices as the plant operator can always use 
the reserve water for later production (compare to Figure 2). Also, the category of operating reserve 
that attracts the highest premiums is the 10-minute spinning reserve.  
All dispatchable generators participating in the energy market also have the option to offer any of the 
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three operating reserve classes. In order to be eligible to offer 10-minute spinning reserve, the 
generator must be synchronized to the grid, ready to ramp up power to the required capacity in no 
more than 10 minutes. As the name implies, for the non-spinning reserve, the reserve capacity does 
not have to be already synchronized to the grid but the plant must be able to synchronize and ramp up 



















10 Minute Spinning 10 Minute Non-Spinning 30 Minute Non-Spinning  
Figure 36 : Daily Average Operating Reserve Premiums in Ontario 2004 
 
6.3 Model Development 
If we consider the operation of a hydroelectric power plant with a water storage capability as 
consisting of three modes as follows58: (i) all output offered into the spot energy market, (ii) potential 
output energy is split between energy and operating reserve59, and  (iii) the plant is shutdown, then the 
                                                     
58 The valuation framework developed in this work is amenable to different definitions of operating modes. For 
example, one can use ramp-up, ramp-down and idle or any combination and number of relevant operating 
modes.  
59 Ideally this mode can refer to operating reserve output only. However in this case the Ontario wholesale 
market is used as a basis – a market rule requires generators to offer at least as much energy as operating 
reserve in any particular period.  Hence going by this rule, it is not possible for a dispatchable generator to bid 
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operation of the plant can be thought of as a multi-stage dynamic decision making problem where the 
asset operator decides60 at every stage (e.g. hourly or daily) whether to exercise the switch from the 
current mode to another available mode. If the payoff from exercising this switching option is “out of 
the money” the exchange is not made and the option is left to expire.  
Based on the framework developed earlier in Chapter 4, we define a set K whose elements are the 
three available operating/output modes. The revenue )( 1kB  from output mode 1k  at every stage can 
be defined as follows: 
)( )()( 1 tStHkB e×=        (6-1) 
where H is the total amount of potential energy available for release from the plant at the decision 
time t, and eS  is the spot price of energy at time t.   
Similarly, the revenue )( 2kB  from mode 2 can be defined as follows: 
( ) ( ) )()()(1)()(1)()()( 2 ttStHtStHtStHkB eore γξξξ ××−+×−+×=   (6-2) 
where orS  is the premium for the specific class of operating reserve, ξ is the fraction of the total 
available energy that is offered into the energy market at time t (hence the fraction that is reserved is 
1-ξ ) and γ  is the probability of reserve activation.  For the shutdown mode, no output is produced, 
hence revenue is zero i.e. 
0)( 3 =kB         (6-3) 
One can also define net revenues for the three modes considering water rental charges and other 
variable operating costs if they are considered material enough.  
Since the action of the ISO with regards to activation of operating reserve is uncertain, it constitutes 
an uncertainty factor for the asset operator. A simple approach to account for this uncertainty is to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
all of its capacity into a reserve market.  
60 In order to ensure that bids are always accepted, price takers tend to bid much less than projected market 
price at the hour of interest. For instance, operators of baseload power plants often offer output close to zero 
price in order to avoid the risk of being asked to shutdown against their will. A price setter on the other hand 
uses bidding strategies that will make its plant the marginal plant but it also runs the risk of not being called up 
by the market operator. It is also possible for the market operator to reject offers due to transmission line 
outages or congestion.   
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define a random variable )(tγ  taking binary integer values. This variable is used to represent the 
action of the market operator such that 1)( =tγ  indicates that the reserve capacity is called up by the 
market operator61 at time t  and 0)( =tγ  indicates that the reserve is not called. We define this 







dt  u(t) if         0




γ t      (6-4) 
where u is a uniform random variable used as a proxy to capture the random nature of reserve 
capacity activation by the market operator. The parameter ϕ  is the frequency of reserve activation 
(an estimate can potentially be determined from historical market data).   
The other exogenous uncertainty variables driving the decision making process are (i) market price of 
energy (ii) premium rate for the specific class of operating reserve and (iii) rate of water inflow into 
the reservoir. Since the asset operator does not have a perfect foresight of these factors, the problem 
can only be solved recursively.  
Specifically, the three operating modes defined for this problem are as follows62: 
• Mode 1 - offer all available output into the energy market i.e. receive immediate 
revenue. 
• Mode 2 – offer ξ H(t) amount of output for energy and the remainder, (1-ξ )H(t)  
for operating reserve. This implies that immediate revenue at stage t corresponding 
to ξ H(t)  amount of energy at the current energy price and (1-ξ )H(t)  amount of 
reserve at the premium rate. If the reserve is activated by the market operator 
(depending on the random outcome of the parameter γ (t)), an additional revenue 
                                                     
61 We assume for simplicity that total accepted reserve capacity bid is called whenever the reserve is activated 
by the market operator. Another parameter can potentially be specified to capture the additional uncertainty 
regarding how much reserved capacity is activated each time the market operator decides to activate the reserve.  
62 For this problem, ramp rates or ramp constraints do not have to be explicitly modelled as hydroelectric plants 




corresponding to (1-ξ )H(t)  at the current energy price is also received.  
• Idle the plant (at a shutdown state) – if higher market prices are expected in the 
near future, depending on the size of available storage, it may be optimal to idle the 
plant at the current time and build up the reservoir to maximize production later 
during the periods of higher prices.  
Hence, as detailed in Chapter 4, if k represents the operating decision at time t from the available set 
K , then neglecting variable operations and maintenance costs, the value of the plant’s output is given 






















),,(max ,,,    (6-5) 
where B is the revenue received at stage t conditional on the decision taken at that stage i.e. B is 
defined as in (6-1), (6-2) or (6-3) depending on the option selected at each decision stage t. Each time 
the operator observes the relevant states of nature and makes an appropriate choice among the three 












        (6-6) 
where r is the appropriate discount rate and τ  is the current time. τς is the set of all currently 
(i.e. τ=t ) available information. From this point, to avoid cumbersome notation, we write tk ς  as 
tk , teS ,  as eS  and torS , as orS . The constraints for the multi-stage decision problem are given by the 
following equations of motion for hydroelectric plant operation: 
( ))()()( tQtFtR −=∆        (6-7) 
maxmin )( RtRR ≤≤        (6-8) 
max)(0 QtQ ≤≤         (6-9) 
 where R(t) is the amount of water in the reservoir at stage t, )(tR∆ is the change in the reservoir 
water inventory at the end of stage t, Rmin is the minimum lower limit of the reservoir and Rmax is the 
reservoir water capacity or maximum allowable inventory. Q(t) is the amount of water withdrawn 
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from the reservoir during stage t and F(t) is the amount of water added to the reservoir via inflow 
(determined by precipitation) and flow from upstream rivers and lakes.  
The state of the reservoir is defined as the volume63 of water available in it at stage t. The state 
transition depends on the control action taken at t (which determines the water withdrawal amount - 
)(tQ ) and the random water addition into the reservoir (F(t)) as represented by the mass balance 
relationship in (6-7).  
The second constraint (6-8) represents allowable limits on the amount of water in the reservoir at 
every decision stage. Technically, the upper limit represents the capacity of the reservoir and the 
lower limit represents the minimum inventory below which the turbines may not be operated. It is 
also possible, that both the upper and lower reservoir limits are determined by environmental and 
water use regulations for the specific body of water on which the hydroelectric scheme is located.  
The maximum amount of water withdrawn per stage given by the third constraint (6-9) represents the 
capacity of the turbine/penstock.  
For small to medium scale hydroelectric plants, operation and maintenance costs have negligible 
impacts on dispatch decision making on the part of asset owners because avoidable costs in the short-
term are usually insignificant.  
The solution of this model, conditional on a set of initial conditions will yield a set of optimal 
operating decisions (dependent on the state of the world at each time step) which can then be used to 
estimate the value of the plant.  
In the next subsections, we model the dynamics of the available energy for release from the reservoir 
and also the spot energy price and operating reserve premium. 
6.4 Dynamics of Hydroelectric Plant Optimization 
The instantaneous power ( WP ) produced by a hydroelectric plant at time t can be represented as 
                                                     
63 For the purpose of this thesis, we have assumed a rectangular reservoir so that one can determine the amount 
of water in the reservoir either by specifying it as volume or by specifying the dimensions of the reservoir. In 
real application, hydroelectric reservoirs are not of standard geometry so operators usually create a chart or 




( ) ( ) ( )( )hqη hq tρg h(tPw ××=)        (6-10) 
where 
ρ  is the density of water (kg/m3) 
g  is the acceleration due to gravity (m/s2) 
h  is the variable vertical height of the reservoir water surface (m) - it is the addition of the variable 
water head in the reservoir and the vertical elevation of the penstock inlet.  
q  is the instantaneous rate of water withdrawal (m3/s) - it depends non-linearly on the total available 
water head according to 6-12.  
η is the efficiency of the turbine – it depends non-linearly on the volume flow rate q. It is the ratio of 
the actual energy produced per time to the theoretical potential energy present in the reservoir.  
Below, we shall also need the symbol f which is the instantaneous inflow of water into the reservoir 
(m3/s) – it depends on precipitation. 
To determine the relationship between the instantaneous water withdrawal rate q and the total 
available head h, assume that the surface of the reservoir and the outlet of the turbine are both opened 








2 tghtvtv ρρρ =−                       (6-11) 
where ν1 is the velocity of water at the reservoir surface and ν2 is the flow velocity at the turbine 
outlet.     
Since the surface area of reservoir is much larger than the penstock cross-sectional area,  
ν2 >> ν1 such that if the cross-sectional area of the penstock is a, then )(tq = 2av   can be calculated 
as: 
                                                     
64 The problem of draining a volume of water from a reservoir with variable inflow is a classical problem in 
fluid mechanics; several standard fluid mechanics textbooks can be consulted for details. 
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)(2)( tghatq =          (6-12) 
The instantaneous amount of water w( t ) available in the reservoir at time t  can be determined from 
(assuming vertical sides for the reservoir):  
( )Ahthtw o−= )()(           (6-13) 
where A is the surface area of the reservoir and ho is the vertical elevation of the reservoir bottom 
from the tail water65.  The relationship between the instantaneous change in the amount of water in 
the reservoir dw( t ), the instantaneous water withdrawal rate  q( t ) and the instantaneous inflow of 
water f( t )  is given by: 
( )dttqtfdw )()( −=         (6-14) 
Hence, the amount of water accumulated in the reservoir between two instantaneous times 1t and 2t  










)()(        (6-15) 
If we assume that t∆  represents a discrete stage t and that f and q are constant over that stage, then 
the amount of water withdrawn and the amount of water added (via inflow) per stage is given by: 
tqtQ ∆=)(          (6-16) 
and      tftF ∆=)(           (6-17) 
Hence, the change in the reservoir water inventory during a stage t is given by 6-7. This implies that if 
W1 is the reservoir water inventory at the end of a stage 1, then at the end of the subsequent stage 
(stage 2), the reservoir water inventory (W2) is determined by: 
)()(12 tQtFWW −+=        (6-18) 
Similarly, the amount of potential energy H(t) available for release from the hydroelectric reservoir at 
stage t is given by: 
                                                     
65 We assume that the tail water elevation is constant 
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tPtH W∆=)(          (6-19) 
If WP  is assumed constant during a stage.  
6.5 Model Summary 
The model as described in the foregoing sections is summarized in this section.  



































       (6-6) 
Subject to the following constraints: 
( ))()()( tQtFtW −=∆       (6-7) 
maxmin )( WtWW ≤≤        (6-8) 
max)(0 QtQ ≤≤        (6-9) 
where ( )ttortet fSSkB ,,, ,,ς  is either 1B , 2B or 3B  depending on the optimal mode at stage t.    The 
expressions for 1B , 2B  and 3B  are given as follows: 
)(S )(1 ttHB e×=        (6-1) 
( ) ( ) )()()(1)()(1)()(2 ttStHtStHtStHB eore γξξξ ××−+×−+×=                (6-2) 
03 =B         (6-3) 
3B  is the immediate value derived by idling the plant at stage t ( at a shutdown state), hence it is zero.  
H(t) is the amount of energy (MWh) available for release at stage t. It is given by 
ttPtH W ∆= )()(        (6-19) 
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where WP is the power generated by the plant; it is assumed constant during a stage but it changes 
from stage to stage depending on the amount of water in the reservoir at each stage and the amount of 
water withdrawn. That is,  
( ))()()()( tqtqh
A













tWgatq )(2)(      (6-21) 
The parameter γ (t) in equation 6-2 is a binary integer used to represent the uncertain action of the 
market operator with regards to its call option on the reserve capacity of the power plant. We model 







dt  u(t) if         0




γ t      (6-4) 
where u is a uniform random variable (i.e. assuming equal probability of reserve activation at all 
intervals)66  
There are three exogenous state variables that have to be modeled; water inflow into the reservoir 
forebay, energy prices and operating reserve premiums.  Both energy and operating reserve prices 
exhibit mean reversion and jump diffusion, hence they are modeled with equation 4-18 presented in 
Section 4.4.1. Water inflow is modeled with the discrete form of the mean reversion model, i.e. 
equation 4-16.  
Hence, replacing S in equation 4-16 with F  where the rest of the parameters are as defined in 
Section 4.4.1, the discrete-form stochastic equation for modeling the evolution of water inflow into 
reservoir forebay is: 























ttt eeeFetFttF   (6-22) 
                                                     
66 In reality there may be higher probability of reserve activation at some periods (e.g. seasons) than at others. 
For instance, reserve activation is likely to occur during peak summer demands than on a spring day.  
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A joint probability distribution of energy and operating reserve prices has to be simulated (at every 
time step), correlations between the prices must be factored into the simulation. If we simulate 
different paths for energy prices based on a standard normal random variable ε  as indicated in 
equation 4-18, operating reserve prices must be simulated with an adjusted version of equation 4-16. 
Hence, the evolution of energy price is modeled using the following expression: 





























Whereby, the evolution of operating reserve prices is modeled as follows: 






































where ε ′′ is a standard normal random variable independent from ε . If the prices of the two 
commodities are assumed to be perfectly correlated in the same direction (i.e. 1+=ρ ), the last term 
of equation 6-25 disappears.  
6.6 Hypothetical Hydroelectric Plant Example 
The following sections apply the developed model to a hypothetical but realistic example of a 
hydroelectric plant operating in the IESO administered market in Ontario.  
6.6.1 Problem Data and Definition 
Consider a hydroelectric plant with the characteristics listed in Table 7. Based on the stated flow rate 
at maximum capacity and the stated reservoir size, a full reservoir can be drained in about 12 hours if 
operated at maximum capacity with no water inflow i.e. 
Reservoir inventory at full capacity = m 0.001)-(4  m10 9.10 26 ××   
Turbine flow rate at maximum capacity =  s/m 0541 3  
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Minimum number of days to drain reservoir at maximum capacity = 
2436001054




Hence, another way to describe the storage capacity of the plant is in terms flow i.e. ~0.5 cms days 
where “cms” refers to sm /3 .  
We value the plant’s output and determine optimal operating strategies using the scenarios presented 
in Table 8. Scenario 1 focuses on 24 hour cycling operation based on an energy only offer into the 
power market. Results of this scenario will enable us to illustrate the operator’s flexibility to time-
shift water from off-peak price hours to on-peak hours (i.e. peaking operation) within the same day. 
Cases 1a and 1b cover two different seasons, summer and spring. The purpose of running the scenario 
for summer and spring seasons is to capture the effect of significant water inflow differences between 
the two seasons as shown in Figure 35. In scenario 2, we examine 5-day67 weekly cycling operation, 
also based on energy offers only (cases 2a and 2b cover two seasons of interest). This scenario 
illustrates the flexibility to time-shift water inter-day. Scenario 3 is designed to show the impact of a 












                                                     
67 Monday to Friday; weekends are considered off-peak in Ontario. Each week day has 16 hours of on-peak 
and 8 hours of off-peak (i.e. 8 AM-11 PM – on-peak, 11-7 AM- off-peak).  
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Table 7: Hypothetical Hydroelectric Power Plant 
Parameter  Value Unit 
Forebay /Reservoir  
Surface Area 10.9 ×106 2m  
Elevation of Reservoir from Tail 
Water (assumed constant) - ho 
20 m  
Maximum reservoir height  4 m  
Minimum reservoir level 0.001 m  
Penstock  
Cross-sectional Area (a)  44 2m  
Turbine  
Turbine flow rate at maximum 
capacity, q  
1054 sm /3  
Turbine peak efficiency68,  η  95 % 
Metric Specific speed 88 -  
Initial and boundary conditions  
Initial reservoir inventory 50% of reservoir capacity sm /3  
Initial Plant output 0 MW 







                                                     
68 The efficiency of hydroelectric turbines can be determined from manufacturer supplied efficiency curves or 
from empirical correlations. Gordon [100] derived and presented such correlations for different types of 




Table 8: Description of Illustrative Cases 
SCENARIO CASE # DESCRIPTION 
Scenario 1 Case 1a 
24 hour cycling operation, energy 
bid only, Season=Summer  
  Case 1b 
24 hour cycling operation, energy 
bid only Season=Spring 
Scenario 2 Case 2a 
5 day cycling operation , energy bid 
only Season= Summer 
  Case 2b 
5 day cycling operation, energy bid 
only Season=Spring 
Scenario 3 Case 3a 
5 day cycling operation, energy & 
OR bid, Season= Summer, 
5.0=ε , 0.1=γ  
  Case 3b 
5 day cycling operation, energy & 
OR bid, Season= Summer, 
5.0=ε , 5.0=γ  
 Case 3c 
5 day cycling operation, energy & 
OR bid, Season= Summer, 
5.0=ε , 0.1=γ  & average OR 





6.6.2 Solution to the Hypothetical Example 
The solution to the problem is obtained by first performing a forward-looking Monte Carlo simulation 
of the uncertain underlying value drivers i.e. energy price, operating reserve premiums and water 
inflow into reservoir. The price models are calibrated using 4 years of historical market data available 
on IESO’s website. The flow model is also calibrated to 4 years of historical water inflow data for a 
river system in Ontario.  
After simulating the stochastic factors as described, the dynamic optimization is then carried out 
recursively using a backward simulation starting from the final stage. For each possible reservoir state 
(the reservoir height is divided into small discrete states), the following were calculated: 
 
[ ]111,1,1 ,)()()( kVEdBV ttttttt ςςςς ++×+=       (6-26) 
[ ]2,11,2,2 )()()( kVEdBV ttttttt ςςςς ++×+=       (6-27) 
[ ]311,3 ,)()( kVEdV ttttt ςςς ++×=        (6-28) 
for ( 1−≤ Tt 0, where V69 represents the value. Subscripts 1, 2 and 3 represent the three available 
modes. For Tt = , )()( ,, TTkTTk BV ςς =  where 3,2,1=k . We assume water left in the reservoir 
beyond T is worth a constant value called the terminal value of water as indicated in Table 7.  
As stated earlier, the factor d is the discount factor but in this case, d is determined over t  and 1+t  
i.e. 
( )rd += 1
1
          (6-29) 
where the interest rate r is adjusted to be consistent with the chosen interval t∆  e.g. 1 hour. In 
reality, for an hourly granularity, the factor d  can be neglected in equations 6-26 to 6-28.  
To satisfy the capacity and operating constraints, we impose the following conditions on the available 
                                                     
69 Note that { })(),(),(max)( ,3,2,1 StVStVStVStV tttt =  
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           (6-30) 
The implications of these conditions are as follows: 
First condition – if the reservoir is currently filled to capacity or any change in water level within the 
current decision interval (due to production and water inflow) will result in spill, the only operating 
mode available is to “offer all available capacity into energy market”.  
Second condition – if the reservoir constraints are satisfied over the decision interval, all three 
operating modes are available.  
Third condition– if the reservoir is currently at minimum allowable capacity or any change in water 
level within the current decision interval (due to production and water inflow) will result violating the 
minimum reservoir level requirement, the only operating option available is to idle the plant.  
6.6.2.1 Solution Steps 
At each decision time step, the expressions 6-26 to 6-28 are calculated for each reservoir state space 
and all the feasible reservoir state transitions from that state space. The possible state transitions 
depend on the amount of water withdrawn at the current stage and the amounted of water inflow 
between the current stage and the next stage.  
To solve the problem recursively, at the last time step, the conditional expectation value can be set to 
either zero (i.e. no continuation value) or to some positive value to capture the value of water e.g. 
water rental charge. For this particular illustrative case study, we select a fixed and known water 
rental charge to represent the continuation value of residual water inventory. Either way, V simply 
equals the cash flow at that stage. The decision at this stage is easy since the immediate cash flows 
can be compared. Once the optimal decision is taken for each possible reservoir state, we step back 
one stage and calculate 6-26 to 6-28 again. This time the conditional expectation must be calculated. 
This is done by using the LSM algorithm. In this example, following suggestions by Longstaff and 
Schwarz [78] and Tsekrekos [81], we use the following simple basis 
functions orsorsore SSSSSS ,,,,









ς      (6-31) 
The coefficients a1, a2 and a3 are obtained by linear regression where the payoff from stage t+1 
(discounted to t) is used as the dependent variable and the values of the basis functions at t are as the 
independent variables. After obtaining the coefficients, the continuation values (second terms of 6-26 
to 6-28) are then determined. These calculations are done for each possible combination of reservoir 
state and state transition.  
Following the same procedure, we step back all the way to stage 1.  Now that the decision at every 
stage is known for each possible reservoir state, starting from a given initial reservoir state (level), the 
plant output can be determined by discounting all the future cash flows (based on the optimal 
decisions determined) to the present using the discount factor d .   
To model changes in turbine efficiency as reservoir head and flow rate changes, we use an empirical 
model presented by Gordon [100]. Gordon’s model, as presented in 6-32 to 6-34, for a “Francis” 
turbine was derived in his paper based on empirically observed relationships between turbine flows at 
peak efficiency and under “spin no load” conditions as well as turbine peak efficiency. With those 
information available, changes in efficiency (relative to the peak efficiency) can be determined for 
different turbine flow rates.  




























11ηη     (6-33) 
nk 0195.094.3 −=        (6-34) 
where  
)(qη is the turbine efficiency at flow rate q  
peakη  is the turbine peak efficiency  




SNLq  is the “spin no load” flow (m
3/s) 
peakq is the turbine flow at peak efficiency (m
3/s) 
n  is the metric specific speed 
For this hypothetical example, we assume a specific speed of 88 (Gordon [100]) and also a SNLq  of 
2% of peakq .  
6.6.3 Calibration of Underlying Variables 
For this illustrative problem, we make use of the calibrated parameters of the mean-reverting jump 
diffusion model used in Chapter 5 to model the required probability distributions of power prices.  
The other uncertain factors of relevance to the problem are (i) water inflow into reservoir and (ii) 
operating reserve prices. Figure 37 and Figure 38 show actual water inflow into an Ontario based 
hydroelectric facility for 2006 by seasons. As discussed earlier, the high flow seasons are fall and 
spring (with the highest being spring) while the low flow seasons are winter and summer. Similarly, 
Figure 39 and Figure 40 show the 30 minute operating reserve prices for Ontario in 2006. For this 
particular year, the highest prices were observed in the spring were summer and fall witnessed very 
low prices. The parameters of the mean-reverting jump diffusion models are calibrated for water 
inflow and operating reserve prices using the data provided. The calibrated parameters are provided in 
Appendix A. Figure 41 to Figure 44 show samples of simulated water inflow for spring and winter 
seasons using the parameters calibrated from the data presented. Similarly, Figure 45 to Figure 48 
show samples of simulated OR prices using the parameters calibrated from the 2006 Ontario 30 




Table 9: Calibrated Parameters of Mean Reverting Model from Daily Flow Data  
 
  Winter Spring  Summer Fall 
Parameter         
x  5.215 6.767 4.654 5.379
η  0.32 0.06 0.35 0.09






Table 10: Calibrated Parameters of Mean Reverting Model from IESO 10 Minute Spinning 
Operating Reserve Price Data (2006)   
  Winter Spring  Summer Fall 
Parameter         
x  0.952 1.075 1.078 1.078
η  0.68 0.19 0.44 0.42



























Figure 37: 2006 Winter and Summer Reservoir Water Inflow Data70  





















Spring Fall  
Figure 38: 2006 Spring and Fall Reservoir Water Inflow Data71 























































Winter Spring Summer Fall  





Figure 41: Sample Simulated Paths of Reservoir Water Inflow over a 5 Day Period Based on 





Figure 42: Sample Simulated Paths of Reservoir Water Inflow over a 5 Day Period Based on 












Figure 45: Sample Simulated Paths of 10 Minute Spinning OR Price over a 5 Day Period Based 




Figure 46: Sample Simulated Paths of 30 Minute OR Price over a 5 Day Period Based on 













Being an energy limited resource, the value of a peaking hydroelectric power plant lies in its ability to 
transfer (or time-shift) water from low price hours to high price hours. This fact is illustrated by 
Figure 49 which compares power price, production (in MW) and reservoir height from a sample path 
of case 1a. For this 24-hour reservoir cycling case, the objective of the power plant operator is to 
make use of its available water (initial reservoir content and inflow across 24 hours) in such a way 
that profit is maximized. During this period, the operator draws down the reservoir as indicated by   
Figure 50 which shows samples of reservoir level trends across the 24 hour operating horizon. It is 
clear from the figures that the plant operator will “pond” the reservoir (i.e. allow it to build up) during 
the periods when prices are low (usually off-peak hours) so that production can be maximized during 
the hours when prices are higher (typically on-peak hours). This time-shifting of water is carried out 
taking into consideration the current reservoir inventory and expected inflow and also the impact of 
reservoir elevation on production efficiency. The best value for water is achieved when production is 
as the maximum turbine efficiency point (in this case 95%), inefficient production below or above the 
maximum efficiency points translate indirectly into water loss through reduction in total produced 
energy.  
The flexibility to time-shift water is taken away when future water inflow exceeds the capacity of 
the power plant. This is the situation observed under most scenarios in case 1b as shown in Figure 51 
and Figure 52. As shown in Figure 52, because of the high inflow experienced (since the season 
chosen for this case is Spring), the reservoir level is relatively unchanged or increasing not because 
the operator wants to “pond” intentionally but because of high water inflow.  As shown in Figure 52, 
the power plant is producing power at its maximum capacity while the reservoir level is increasing. 
Under this scenario, operating decisions are insensitive to power prices which imply that the so called 
“value of flexibility” (i.e. real options) does not exist due to limited power plant capacity.  
Cases 2a and 2b are similar to cases 1a and 1b except that the simulation is carried out over a 5 
week day period72. For cases 2a and 2b, the objective of the power plant operator is to optimize the 
reservoir (initial inventory plus expected inflow) over the 5 day period with each day having 8 off-
                                                     
72 In Ontario, weekends are considered as off-peak 
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peak and 16 on-peak hours.  As shown in Figure 53 and Figure 54, the operator is able to take 
advantage of inter-day price differentials by drawing down the reservoir over the much longer period.  
The cases under scenario 3 incorporate the power plant operator’s option to offer both energy and 
operating reserve into the market. Intuitively, the expected increase in value with this option should 
be proportional to the ratio of operating reserve price to that of energy price. For instance for this 
illustration, the long-term average operating reserve price in the summer is $3 while that of energy 
price is $52. So if one is certain about the operating reserve being called by the ISO and given the fact 
that only half of the available energy can be offered as operating reserve, one can expect an increase 
of  0.5 ×  6%. This intuition is validated by the results shown in Table 11  which compares the results 
on an expected value basis.  This percentage increase would be less if the probability of the ISO 
calling the reserve is less than 1. Under this scenario, there may be less revenue from energy for 
example from having to produce reserved energy at a different hour which might be different from 
the optimal hour under an energy-only production strategy (see Figure 55). For a 50% probability of 
reserve activation, the result of case3b shows that the 3% incremental value reduces to 2%. If the 
long-term average operating reserve price in Ontario were double what it is in 2006 (the year on 
which model calibration was based), for instance as in 2004 spring (see Figure 36), one would expect 
a proportionately higher increase. Case 3c which was designed to capture this scenario shows an 
increase of 6 %.   
In conclusion, the value of a peaking hydroelectric power plant is influenced by operating flexibilities 
available to the plant operator and uncertain market factors. The valuation framework developed in 
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Figure 49: Comparison of Hourly Operation with Power Price and Reservoir Level based on a 










Figure 50: Samples of Simulated Hourly Reservoir Height Trend based on Production and 
Water Inflow across a 24 Hour Period (from Case 1a) 
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Figure 51: Comparison of Hourly Operation with Power Price and Reservoir Level based on a 

















Figure 52: Samples of Simulated Hourly Reservoir Height Trend based on Production and 
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Figure 53: Comparison of Hourly Operation with Power Price and Reservoir Level based on a 







Figure 54: Samples of Simulated Hourly Reservoir Height Trend based on Production and 






















Scenario 1  
Case1a 
$     
102,328 
$     
27,271 N/A 
Case1b 
$     
215,385 
$     
39,609 N/A 
Scenario 2  
Case2a 
$     
308,261 





$   
113,240 N/A 
Scenario 3  
Case3a 
$     
316,442 
$     
76,770 3% 
Case3b 
$     
315,690 
$     
76,847 2% 
Case3c 
$     
325,159 
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Production (MW) - energy & OR Reservoir Height (m) -energy only
Reservoir Height (m) - energy and OR  
 
Figure 55: Comparison of Hourly Operation with Power Price and Reservoir Level based on a 
Single Simulated Path (Energy Only strategy vs. Energy & OR strategy, 5 day cycling 
operation) 
 
6.7 Chapter Conclusions and Applications 
The focus of this section has been on the valuation of a hydroelectric power plant. The types of 
applications of the modeling framework discussed in Chapter 5 are also largely valid here except for 
the gas-fired power plant specific issue of gas imbalance. The model developed and presented here 
for peaking hydroelectric facilities considers all the key value drivers for these facilities, including the 
value of storage reservoir and the opportunity to derive value from an ancillary services market. To 
the best of the author’s knowledge, this work is the first to address in a robust fashion, the opportunity 
for a peaking hydroelectric facility to derive additional value from its storage capability by playing 
the operating reserve market in addition to a real-time energy market. From an applications 
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perspective, the following are realistic scenarios where the model developed in this work for a 
peaking hydroelectric facility can find value: 
1. Earnings at risk study for a hydroelectric power plant. Given that the model uses a Monte 
Carlo framework and it considers inflow variability as well as price uncertainty, low 
percentile earnings (from the resulting probability distribution of discounted earnings) 
represent a combination of low water inflow scenarios (i.e. low rainfall season or a generally 
poor precipitation year) and low power price scenarios. Knowledge of the impact on earnings 
of adverse water inflow and poor power price scenarios is valuable from risk hedging 
perspective, allowing the merchant energy producer to understand its hedging needs.  
2. Value of storage reservoir and peaking capability. A flexible hydroelectric power plant is 
considered more valuable than a similar plant without storage since scarce water can be 
shifted from low price periods to high price period by making use of reservoir storage.  The 
model developed in this work and the type of analysis presented can be used to determine the 
value of having storage and hence peaking capability. For instance, the valuation analysis can 
be repeated with the same set of inputs but different reservoir sizes. Any change in valuation 
observed should be as a result of reservoir size differences and the corresponding change in 
peaking capability.  
3. Value of ancillary services. The developed model combines the opportunity to sell energy 
into a real time power market with the opportunity to provide ancillary services. Similar to 
the illustration presented in this thesis, one can combine valuation results based on an energy-
only operating strategy with results from a combined operating reserve and energy strategy. 
The difference in valuation results should reflect the value of a combined strategy over an 
energy only strategy.  
4. Optimal market operation planning. Given that the valuation model developed optimizes the 
operation of a hydroelectric power plant subject to available information on all relevant value 






Flexibilities and Baseload Power Assets 
7.1 Introduction 
Existing applications of real options analysis to power plants assets have largely focused on peaking 
flexibilities. The premise of those applications is to account for the value of flexibility that a peaking 
power plant operator has with regards to his ability to revise operating decisions and switch operating 
modes as market-based uncertainties are resolved with time. Unlike peaking and mid-merit power 
plants, baseload power plants are always operated around the clock, including off-peak hours when 
power prices are low. Baseload power plants typically have one or more of the following 
characteristics: 
• Low marginal operating costs 
• Long start-up and or shutdown times 
• Inability to time shift energy  
For instance, all hydroelectric power plants generally have low marginal operating costs but for a 
hydroelectric power plant to be used as a peaking facility, it must have the capability to time-shift 
energy from one period to another by having storage reservoir to store water. A run-of the river 
hydroelectric scheme has no capability to reserve unneeded water and so is operated at all times with 
output only varying in response to upstream flow and direct precipitation. Unused water in a run-of 
the river hydroelectric facility has to be spilled, i.e. it has to bypass the turbines. Similarly, Nuclear 
Power Plants (NPPs) have long start-up procedures once they are shutdown and they also have 
relatively low marginal operating costs as most of their operating costs are fixed. Therefore, even in 
competitive wholesale power markets with volatile power prices, these power plants are operated 
around the clock.  
However, when the operations of a baseload power plant are considered over a much longer time 
frame, operating flexibilities exist and are typically considered by owners or operators of such assets 
for decision-making purposes. These flexibilities have to do with long-term Life Cycle Management 
(LCM) of power plants. As it typical with real options, LCM investment decisions can be optimized 
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with regards to timing of key activities, budget and order of activities. The underlying uncertainties 
driving such strategic optimization will include lost revenue during outages (due to uncertain future 
price of power), costs of components and technical uncertainties such as equipment degradation. 
Typically, regulatory uncertainties are also considered such as future environmental laws and safety 
requirements.  As these and other uncertainties are resolved, decisions can be revised or delayed 
resulting in value creation for the asset owner from costs savings. The flexibility to react to relevant 
conditions as they unravel constitutes optionalities on the part of power asset owners and the values 
of those options must be factored into valuation.  
Over the life of a power plant, the owner will typically be faced with several choices regarding 
equipment maintenance and upgrades. Naturally, the higher the budget spent for maintaining and 
upgrading equipments, the better the plant should perform in the future. Inadequate equipment 
maintenance will generally result in degradation and failure leading to increase in forced or 
unplanned outages. Similarly, lack of timely components and equipments inspections will prevent 
early discovery of degradation thereby contributing to future equipment failure and poor performance.  
However, the question of marginal benefits always arises and rational investors will make decisions 
accordingly.  
In reality, the relationship between LCM spending and future plant performance is complex and has 
been the subject of intensive engineering research.  Extensive literature exists in several engineering 
subject areas dealing with optimal component and equipment replacement in ageing manufacturing 
systems, including power plants. However, the fact remains that owners of such engineering assets 
take into consideration several uncertain factors including economic and technical issues before key 
decisions are made. Hence, while baseload power plants are not optimized in response to short-term 
movements of key value drivers, over a long-enough time frame, there are flexibilities and those 
flexibilities do have values that can be attached to them to value such power plants. The static NPV 
approach to valuing baseload power plants is to assume a capacity factor73 and known variable costs 
of future maintenance activities such that net revenue can be estimated and discounted. A more 
realistic valuation framework will capture ongoing management reactions to key uncertainties as they 
evolve resulting in “option values” from the ensuing cost minimization.  
                                                     
73 At best, sensitivity analyses are carried out around such an assumption to reflect impact of different scenarios.  
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7.2 Conceptual Framework 
Conceptually, the option to repeatedly shutdown a manufacturing system over the course of a 
planning horizon, either for maintenance or for other purposes can be likened to commodity “swing 
option”. Commodity delivery contracts with swing options are used in commodity markets, especially 
energy markets, to deal with uncertainty in the volume of a commodity required. For instance, the 
owner of a power plant may contract for fuel delivery (e.g. coal) with flexibility to “swing up” or 
“swing down” as its need for the fuel changes, given that it has a limited space for inventory. 
However to protect the seller, a swing contract will typically contains a penalty clause tied to the total 
volume of the commodity that the buyer takes during the life of the contract. Such a penalty clause 
will be activated if the cumulative volume taken by the buyer during the life of the contract is less or 
more than the agreed cumulative volume, hence they are called “take or pay” contracts.  
The objective of the holder of a swing contract is to determine the optimal set of stopping times and 
swing volumes such that the value of its rights is maximized. Hence, swing options are a type of 
“Bermudan” option, allowing multiple early exercise rights.  A number of authors have recently 
focused on the valuation of swing contracts, both in a continuous time and a discrete time framework. 
Examples include Jaillet et al. [50], Dahlgren [68], Ibanez [101] and Dorr [52].  
 
The real option decisions of a baseload power plant owner or any power plant over a long time frame 
are conceptually similar to those of a swing contract holder. The swing contract holder has to 
optimally time the exercise of its swing rights. In the case of the baseload power plant operator, one 
can consider the life-cycle outage rights as some type of swing rights that have to be optimally 
exercised. Also, the volume of swings can be conceptually likened to size of budget during each 
outage exercise. Again, if we consider plant degradation as constituting a penalty for not executing 
enough LCM outages or spending enough money on maintenance and inspection during the life of the 
power plant, one can imaging costs of plant degradation as penalty payments to be made at the end of 
the plant life or at the end of some finite investment time horizon.  
More specifically, consider the operation of a power plant over a time horizon [0, T] (where T is 
some finite time in the future) during which the owner has a finite number of key equipment 
maintenance and upgrade projects choices to be made. Each of those key project options can be 
characterized by (i) total costs/budget of implementation and (ii) length of plant outage required for 
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implementation. Given a set of discrete time windows in the valuation time interval at which the 
power plants can be shutdown for LCM purposes (i.e. exercise opportunities), a dynamic optimization 
model can be formulated to seek the set of optimal stopping times in such a way that the number of 
stopping times and the order of stopping times (i.e. which order of project execution) are optimized. 
In addition, the total amount of spending on maintenance and upgrades is also optimized taking into 
consideration penalty for inadequate spending which is plant degradation.     
In general, the valuation problem of a baseload power plant falls within the valuation framework 
presented earlier in Chapter 4. However in this case, the intervals between exercise opportunities are 
much longer and instead of directly maximizing value, the objective of the optimization in the context 
of LCM is to minimize total costs thereby indirectly maximizing value. In the following section, the 
key costs associated with life cycle management are discussed.  
7.3 Key Costs Parameters for Life Cycle Management 
7.3.1 Lost Revenue during Outage 
The revenue lost during a LCM outage depends on the contract structure under which the output 
energy of the specific baseload plant is sold. If the output energy of the plant has been pre-sold either 
through uninterruptible forward contract or a power purchase agreement (PPA), the asset owner may 
have to purchase replacement energy to meet its obligation during outages. Under this scenario, the 
lost revenue during a LCM outage is the cost of purchasing replacement energy.  
If no such contract exists and the output of the plant is simply sold to the spot market, there may be 
no need on the part of the generator to purchase replacement power. The lost revenue (during the 
outage) in this case is the revenue that could have been received if the plant were operating at its 
normal capacity. Since revenues are contingent on market prices, they are uncertain.  
 
7.3.2 Cost of Preventative Maintenance and Upgrades 
The activities performed during a LCM outage could include (i) scheduled replacement of ageing 
components and equipment (ii) maintenance of existing equipment (iii) plant addition or equipment 
upgrades and (iv) component inspections for reliability purposes among other things. For all these and 
other types of projects, one can assume that the costs have two components (i) costs of hardware 
(components, equipment, machinery etc) and (ii) costs of labour. Costs of hardware will vary from 
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one piece of equipment to another, so also are the costs related to labour. Both of these costs are 
largely uncertain. The costs of labour can be related to the length of outage, as labour rates are 
typically determined per unit of time.   
7.3.3 Penalty for Plant Degradation 
As mentioned earlier, too little maintenance spending can result in increased frequency of forced 
outages in the future due to equipment ageing and component failures. Other than the revenue lost 
during forced outages, the cost of corrective maintenance also increases and plant capacity may 
degrade forcing operators to derate output.  In the long term, the strategic flexibility to extend plant 
life and defer safe storage and decommissioning will also be impacted.   
Degradation of plant performance due to inadequate maintenance is probabilistic in nature. One 
cannot be certain how much the plant will degrade or how many forced outages will occur due to 
inadequate maintenance. One can estimate costs associated with forced outages and corrective 
maintenance from historical plant performance data and relate them to cumulative spending on 
maintenance and upgrades. Such costs (given average and volatility) can be estimated and used as 
proxies to model penalty costs due to inadequate spending.  
7.4 Valuation Model 
Consider a multi-year operation of a baseload power plant within the interval [ T,τ ]. Let the set Θ  
be the set of exercise opportunities in the interval [ T,τ ] at which the asset owner can exercise its 
right to shutdown the power plant for LCM purposes74 where 
{ }Njt j ,....,1== :Θ          (7-1) 
                                                     
74 Depending on the particular power market jurisdiction, this opportunity set can represent time periods that 
have been pre-approved by the Independent System Operator (ISO). For instance, in the Ontario wholesale 
power market, the IESO requires generators to request approval for any planned outages that are greater than 5 
days in duration. For the purpose of system reliability, the IESO can reject requests if necessary. Such requests 
are required to be submitted at least 3 months in advance and confirmation is given between 33 and 21 calendar 
days before the outage is to commence. It is also possible for the ISO to request a deferral of an already pre-
approved planned outage because of system reliability issues.  In the context of real options valuation, the set of 
exercise opportunity intervals considered in modelling will depend on the information available or projected at 




and TtN < .   
If the asset owner has the option to execute one LCM project within the interval, its objective is to 
find the optimal stopping time within the exercise opportunity set Θ . At each decision time (or 
exercise opportunity), one can define two possible operating modes (in the context of the framework 
presented in chapter 4)   1k  and 2k such that the alternatives of the asset owner is to either shutdown 
to execute the LCM project (mode 1k ) or keep the option alive (mode 2k ). That is, if jtB  is the 
immediate cost of executing the project at jt , then we have the following alternative specific cost 
functions: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1,11 11,, kCEdkBkC jjjjjjj ttttttt ςςςς ++×+=    Nj <    (7-2) 
( ) ( )[ ]2,2 11, kCEdkC jjjjj ttttt ςςς ++×=      Nj <    (7-3) 
where 
jt
C  is the total cost of executing the LCM project at the exercise opportunity jt  and the 
conditional expectation terms (in both 7-2 and 7-3) are the costs continuing beyond jt . In equation 7-
2, the conditional expectation term represents the LCM cost of the plant at 1+jt  when the project has 
already been executed at jt  while the same term in equation 7-3 is the LCM costs at  1+jt  if the 
option to execute the project is kept alive until 1+jt . jtς  encapsulates all the information available to 
the decision maker at jt  and d is the discount factor given by: 
( )rd += 1
1
          (7-4) 
where r is the risk-free rate or risk-adjusted discount rate.  
With multiple project alternatives available to the asset owner, the conditional expectation term in 
equation 7-2 is the total LCM cost for continuing at 1+jt  with one less project alternative while the 
same term in 7-3 is the total LCM cost of continuing with all the alternatives. If the project 
alternatives are unique (i.e. each project having different costs characteristics), the number of decision 
modes k will increase accordingly with the decision maker having to solve equations 7-2 and 7-3 for 
each of the mutually exclusive project alternatives.  
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If there are n project alternatives and z is the counter for executed projects (i.e. nz ,..,1= ), then at 
the final exercise opportunity Nt  (where N is the number of available exercise opportunities), the 
asset owner’s alternatives are as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( ))1(,1, +−++= znDzBC
NNNNNN tttttt
ςςς      (7-5) 
( ) ( )znDC
NNNN tttt
−= ,ςς         (7-6) 
where 
jt
D  represents the degradation penalty costs. The alternative specified by equation 7-5 implies 
that the asset owner can decide to execute one additional project and pay the corresponding 
degradation penalty for one less project. Alternatively, as specified by equation 7-6, the owner may 
decide not execute any further project and simply choose to pay the corresponding degradation 
penalty.         
In general, for each available exercise opportunity, the cost minimization is carried out as stated 
above to determine the optimal decision. After determining the optimal decisions for the entire 
valuation interval, the number of optimal projects selected for execution will vary from 0 (if there is 
no minimum requirement) to the maximum under consideration and their timing will be a subset of 
Θ . Given the optimal projects and their corresponding outage timing, the total costs of LCM outages 
can be determined after which the plant can then be valued as the sum of the discounted future cash 
flows.  






tSHB          (7-7) 
where tS is power price at t  and t∆  is the duration of the continuous operation. Similarly, if the asset 
is shutdown for a LCM project, the cash flow is as follows: 
( )( ) tRLM SLCCB ++−=       (7-8) 
where MC is the costs of materials or components,  LC  is the cost of labour and RL  is the lost 
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revenue or cost of replacement power during the LCM outage75 and it is a function of power price. 
The variable labour costs is a function of the number of outage man hours ( hr ) and total costs of 
labour per hour. Hence the cost of labour can be represented as follows: 
rtC d
L ×=          (7-9) 
where dt is outage duration and r is the aggregate labour rate per unit time
76. Naturally, jd tt ∆≤ , 
implying that the maximum project duration must not be greater than the interval between two 
allowable exercise opportunities.  
7.4.1 Solution Method  
Following the valuation framework presented in Chapter 4, the first step in the solution process 
involves a forward-looking modeling of the underlying uncertainty factor(s). It is possible to assume 
that both costs of materials and power prices are random. Both of these can be modeled using a mean 
reverting stochastic process as detailed in section 4.4. After simulating different paths for the 
underlying value drivers, the alternative specific cost functions at each decision node can be evaluated 
using the Least Squares Monte Carlo (LSM) algorithm as discussed earlier. With the optimal decision 
selected for each decision node, the power plant value over the valuation time frame can be 
determined using a forward looking Monte Carlo approach, taking into consideration the appropriate 
cash flows for each period, including market revenue (during operation) and costs of LCM (during 
planned outages) .  
Since each project is unique, we define the problem state variable as the subset of projects that has 
been carried out as at the start of opportunity jt  such that if there are n projects under consideration 
the number of such subsets is n2 . For instance, with 3 mutually exclusive projects under 
consideration by the asset owner, the relevant subsets are as 
follows:{ }0 ,{ }1 ,{ }2 ,{ }3 ,{ }2,1 ,{ }3,1 ,{ }3,2 ,{ }3,2,1 . To describe this in words, at the start of every 
exercise opportunity the following states are possible: (i) no project has been executed (ii) only 
project 1 has been executed (iii) only project 2 has been executed (iv) only project 3 has been 
                                                     
75 Assuming that the plant is shutdown only for life-cycle management outage.  
76 If the LCM outage costs X million dollars in labour charges and the outage duration is Y hours, then 
YXr /= .   
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executed etc. If the projects are not unique, then the elements of the subsets would be the number of 
projects. Figure 56 illustrates possible transitions when 3=n .  
 












Figure 56: Illustration of State Transitions between Exercise Opportunities 
The optimization procedure involves enumerating the alternative specific Bellman equations 7-2 and 
7-3 (for Nj tt < ) and 7-5 and 7-6 (at Nj tt = ) for each project state considering the possible state 
transition. One can easily introduce technical constraints such as a requirement to (i) execute certain 
projects back to back (ii) ensure two specific projects are not executed after one another or (iii)  
execute a certain project first by constraining the appropriate transitions.  
7.5 Model Summary 
A summary of the model is summarized in this section.  Given the capacity H of a baseload power 
plant, the plant operates at all times within the interval ],[ Tτ  except when it is shutdown for life 
cycle management (LCM) activities such as equipment maintenance and upgrades. During operation, 







tSHB          (7-7) 
where tS is power price
77 at t  and t∆ is the length of continuous operation. When the power plant is 
shutdown for a desired LCM project, the immediate future cash flow during the shutdown period can 
be expressed as follows: 
( )( ) SLCCB RLMt ++−=       (7-9) 
where MC is the costs of materials or components,  LC  is the cost of labour and RL  is the lost 
revenue/cost of replacement power during the decision stage. If dt is the LCM outage duration the 




R SHL         (7-10) 
i.e. as a function of future variable price of power. The variable labour cost can also be expressed as a 
function of the outage duration and labour rate per unit time such that: 
rtC d
L ×=          (7-9) 
where r is the aggregate labour rate per unit time.  If desired, MC can be modeled as a random 
variable following a specified stochastic process such as the mean-reverting process presented in 
Chapter 4.  
If the asset owner has n  mutually exclusive LCM projects under consideration within the interval 
],[ Tτ  whereby one project at a time can be executed starting at the beginning of specified exercise 
opportunities ) ∆t tand ,..,1( jd ≤= Njt j and also knows the associated penalty for inadequate 
maintenance of the power plant (in terms of total costs of degradation), its objective is to minimize 
the total costs associated with LCM during the interval ],[ Tτ .  
In order to do this, the owner has to solve the following minimization problem at each decision stage: 
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]( )2,1,1 1111   ,  , kCEdkStCEdkBmin jjjjjjjj tttttttt ςςςς ++++ ××+   Nj <   (7-11) 
                                                     
77 If one decides to consider non LCM variable operating cost in the modeling, these will be factored into tS . 
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( ) ( ) ( )( )znDznDzBmin
NNNN tttt
−+−++ ,   ,  )1(,1, ςςς    Nj =   (7-12) 
where max,dN ttT ≥− with max,dt being the outage time required to execute the largest project in 
terms of outage time required. The discount factor d is given as follows:     
( )rd += 1
1
         (7-4) 
The immediate LCM cost tB is as given in equation 7-8 and D  is a specified degradation penalty 
cost function. The variable z is the project counter such that nz ,....,1= . The power price tS  in 
equation 7-10 can be modeled using the discrete form of the mean reversion model as presented in 
Chapter 4, i.e78.  























ttt eeeSetSttS   (4-16) 
7.5.1 Hypothetical Example 
Consider the operation of a 550 MW capacity nuclear power plant over a five year horizon during 
which the owners have the flexibility to shutdown for three life-cycle management (LCM) projects. 
Suppose that costs of materials and labour are known and deterministic and that degradation penalty 
cost is an exponential function of aggregate LCM spending as follows79: 
BxAeD −=          (7-13) 
where A  and B  are constant coefficients, D  is the penalty degradation cost and x is total amount 
spent on LCM activities by the end of the 5 year horizon (unit of million $).  Assume monthly 
exercise opportunities.  
7.5.1.1 Price Model Calibration 
Since exercise opportunities are of monthly granularity, we model power price with the same 
granularity. This level of granularity is reasonable for a baseload power plant as operation is not 
                                                     
78 It should be noted that all the key model parameters are time dependent and are calibrated as such.  
79 This functional form is a reasonable assumption as it captures the concept of marginal LCM spending.  
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optimized to capture short-term price movements. Figure 34  compares monthly averages of power 
prices in Ontario between 2002 and 2006. It is obvious that the trends observed for all years show a 
level of mean reversion, however being monthly average prices, there are no jumps. As a result, a 
mean reversion price model should be sufficient to capture the observed trends.  
If a liquid power futures market were available, the proper way to calibrate the price model would be 
to use futures prices in which case price simulation will be carried out using the risk-neutral version 
of the discrete mean reversion model. Due to lack of futures data, we calibrate the model to historical 
data as discussed in Chapter 4. The long-term average monthly price turns out to be $53.2/MWh, the 
speed of mean reversion is 0.4 and volatility is 17.6 % (see Appendix C). A mean reversion rate of 
0.4 indicates that 50% of a volatility shock from the long-term mean will decay away in less than 2 
months. Figure 58 shows the time series of the monthly Ontario prices and the estimated long-term 
average price. Based on the estimated model parameters, Figure 59 shows two independent simulated 
sample paths of monthly average prices for 5 years while Figure 60 shows a hundred paths. In order 
to highlight the effect of mean reversion speed, we simulate another set of prices using a mean 
reversion speed of 0.1 which corresponds to a half-life of 7 months in this case. One can see by 
comparing Figure 61 and Figure 62 (which are based on a lower mean reversion speed of 0.1) with     
Figure 59 and Figure 60 (which are based on a mean reversion speed of 0.4) that a stronger mean 
reversion force (i.e. 4.0=η ) results in greater attenuation effect on volatility which leads to a tighter 
distribution around the mean.   
7.5.1.2 Valuation Cases  
The valuation parameters used are as shown in Table 12 and Table 13 . For the degradation penalty 
cost function, if we set A  to $ 1 billion and B  to $10 million, the relationship between degradation 
penalty cost and aggregate LCM spending is as shown in Figure 63 which is an approximately linear 
relationship. However, setting B  to $ 90 million instead results in a true exponential relationship 
(Figure 64) which indicates much lower penalty when more than 1 outage right is exercised.   
We examine 6 cases with the parameters as specified in Table 8 with the base case being case 1. The 
difference between cases 1 and 2 is the shape of the degradation penalty cost function. Cases 3 and 4 
compares the effects of mean reversion speed while cases 5 and 6 are designed to examine the effect 
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Table 12: Components and Labour Costs Data  
Item 
Costs of Components & 
Equipments  Required Down time (hours) Labour Rate ($/hr) 
1 $                        1,000,000 500 1500 
2 $                          2,000,000 480 1000 
3 $                          4,000,000 340 1200 
 
 
Table 13: Valuation Parameters 
Case  Parameter Value Description 
Base    
  A  $1 billion constant coefficient  
  B  90 (million $)-1 constant coefficient  
  η   0.4 mean reversion speed 
  σ   17.6% volatility 
  S   $53.2/MWh long-term average price 
  r   5% discount rate 
2   
  A  $1 billion constant coefficient  
  B  $10 million constant coefficient  
  η   0.4 mean reversion speed 
  σ   17.6% volatility 
  S   $53.2/MWh long-term average price 
  r   5% discount rate 
3   
  A  $1 billion constant coefficient  
  B  $90 million constant coefficient  
  η   0.01 mean reversion speed 
  σ   17.6% volatility 
 
 183 
Case  Parameter Value Description 
  S   $53.2/MWh long-term average price 
  r   5% discount rate 
4   
  A  $1 billion constant coefficient  
  B  $10 million constant coefficient  
  η   0.01 mean reversion speed 
  σ   17.6% volatility 
  S   $53.2/MWh long-term average price 
  r   5% discount rate 
5   
  A  $1 billion constant coefficient  
  B  $90 million constant coefficient  
  η   0.01 mean reversion speed 
  σ   17.6% volatility 
  S   $53.2/MWh long-term average price 
  r   1% discount rate 
6   
  A  $1 billion constant coefficient  
  B  $90 million constant coefficient  
  η   0.01 mean reversion speed 
  σ   17.6% volatility 
  S   $53.2/MWh long-term average price 







7.5.1.3 Results of Valuation 
For the base case, the use of an exponential degradation penalty cost function implies that the severity 
of the penalty disappears as more than one LCM outage project is executed. As indicated in Figure 65 
and Figure 66, given the currently available information, it is likely that the owner will wait before 
exercising any of its rights to shutdown temporarily and spend money for the maintenance of the 
power plant.   When one compares the total LCM costs including lost revenue during an outage with 
the potential penalty due to degradation, the plant owner is better off allowing at least one of the three 
rights to expire unexercised.  In this case, projects 2 and 3 are optimal and the right to execute project 
1 is left to expire unexercised.  This result can be explained by observing that the resulting penalty 
when projects 2 and 3 are executed is the least of the possible penalties for executing any two   
projects combination. Also, the immediate cost of exercising project 1 is the highest among the three 
project choices even though it has the lowest cost of materials. This observation is due to the length of 
outage time required to execute project 1 and the corresponding high labour rate compared to the 
other two available projects. Therefore the real option value in this case results from the money saved 
by not executing a third project within the valuation horizon.  
 
On the other hand, when we adjust the coefficients of the exponential degradation penalty costs 
function such that the relationship between total LCM spending and future degradation costs become 
almost linear, the reduction in penalty cost observed with the truly exponential relationship when 
more than two maintenance projects are executed disappears. The result is that the likelihood of 
leaving a project right to expire unexercised becomes much smaller. As indicated in Figure 67 and 
Figure 68, all three projects have high likelihood of being exercised within the 5 year time frame. In 
terms of order, the results indicate that the power plant owner will likely execute project 1 last. Up 
until about the 40th month, project 2 appears to be the optimal choice to be executed first but that may 
change toward the later months with project 3 having higher likelihood of exercise before project 2.  
 
The intent of cases 3 and 4 is to compare cases 1 and 2 but with a lesser effect of mean reversion on 
power prices. A low mean reversion speed allows the effect of price volatility to be stronger leading 
to higher uncertainty in future lost revenue during LCM outages. As indicated by the exercise 
probabilities in Figure 69 and Figure 70, the likelihood of waiting appears to increase with the 
increase in price uncertainty introduced by a lower force of mean reversion. With the truly 
exponential degradation penalty cost function, project 1 will still be let unexercised, however the 
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probability of waiting till the later months to exercise the other two projects increases, especially for 
project 3.  
With cases 5 and 6, one can see the effect of discount rate on the low mean reversion cases (i.e. cases 
3 and 4). If the discount rate is very low as in cases 5 and 6 (1% per annum), it becomes cheaper to 
borrow money in the short-term to execute projects. Also, future penalty costs are no longer heavily 
discounted from the point of view of the early months, so the likelihood of early exercise increases in 
both scenarios.   Table 14 give the mean and standard deviation for all the 6 cases studied. It can be 
seen the cases with the low mean reversion speed has higher uncertainty around the mean values, in 
terms of the standard deviation as expected.  
7.5.2 Chapter Conclusions and Model Application 
Since baseload power plants are not flexible with regards to short-term operation, the general belief 
has been that their valuation is not amenable to the real options way of thinking.  However, the 
modeling framework developed in this thesis has demonstrated that even baseload power plants can 
be valued from a real-options perspective when one considers their medium to long-term life cycle 
management and spending flexibilities. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first real-
options based modeling framework to consider the operations of a baseload power plant in a 
competitive power market as a parallel to the exercise of a commodity swing option. This type of 
thinking and the modeling framework developed in this thesis can be very useful not only from the 
perspective of outage planning but also when a baseload power plant refurbishment project (i.e. life 
extension) or a new build project is being considered. The ability to assign value to a decision to defer 
spending or to a decision to postpone a key maintenance activity can make a project that is initially 
considered uneconomical, an economically feasible one.    
Framing the valuation problem of a baseload power plant as a real options problem can show the 
value of different flexibilities with regards to (i) budgeting for life cycle management projects (ii) 
timing of planned outages and (iii) order of project execution. Since these flexibilities exist in reality, 
one would expect rational investors to optimally exercise them hence valuation exercises of such 
power plants should capture these real option values. This indicates that a baseload power plant is 
actually worth more in reality than it has traditionally been reflected in static NPV valuation. As a 
result, it will not be inappropriate to reflect the values of these additional flexibilities for instance 
when developing a business case for a power plant refurbishment, new build or when negotiating a 
power purchase agreement.  
 
 186 
Another benefit of this modeling framework is that it can be used to plan life cycle management such 
as outage cycles for a nuclear power plant. Given that the framework is based on dynamic 
optimization, it simultaneously finds the optimal life cycle management strategies, based on specified 
inputs, and values the plant outputs. For instance, the model can be used to develop a multi-year 
outage plan for a nuclear power plant. However, the penalty cost function will have to be derived 
from a rigorous analysis of the relationship between equipment failure and plant degradation. One 
way to achieve this is to combine a machine replacement model (an area that has been the focus of 
extensive engineering research) with a valuation framework of the kind developed here to realistically 
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Figure 66: Two Sample Paths showing Simulated Price Evolution and the Corresponding 
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Figure 68: Two Sample Paths showing Simulated Price Evolution and the Corresponding 
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Figure 72: Exercise Probabilities – Case 5 
Table 14: Mean and Standard Deviation of Net Present Values for all 6 Cases 
 
Case1 Case2 Case3 Case4 Case5 Case6
Mean 1,070,800,000$ 1,064,500,000$   1,076,600,000$  1,061,600,000$   1,186,100,000$  1,172,000,000$  
Standard 
Deviation 59,249,000$      57,632,000$        214,140,000$     201,860,000$      235,640,000$     223,350,000$      
 






The contributions of this thesis lie in the modeling and analysis of realistic physical energy assets 
given the complex nature of power markets and interactions with other commodity markets such as 
the natural gas market. The objective was to create a modeling framework, based on real options 
theory that can be easily adapted to various realistic valuation situations, given the constantly 
evolving nature of power markets and power trading. The focus therefore, was not on creating new 
stochastic processes for modeling uncertainty variables (such as power prices) or the creation of new 
optimization technique. Rather we have focused on the big picture of physical asset operations and 
valuation such as the impact of operating constraints, availability of market opportunities and inherent 
risk exposures.  
Through the models developed for specific power plants and the analyses carried out, we have 
extended the existing understanding of the applications of stochastic optimal control for the valuation 
of power generating assets. The developed models are flexible enough such that one can easily 
incorporate different market rules to tailor an analysis to a specific market jurisdiction. Also, in place 
of the standard stochastic processes employed for modeling relevant uncertainty variables, user-
generated scenarios (e.g. from a fundamental price model) can easily be incorporated into each of the 
developed model applications to tailor analysis as desired.  
The overall modeling framework has been adapted for the valuation of a gas-fired thermal power 
plant, a peaking hydroelectric power plant and a baseload power plant. The main concept involves 
representing operating decisions as inter-related “switching options” that are exercised or not, 
depending on the state of the market and equipment/operating constraints of the asset.  Given that the 
developed approach employs a simulation-based optimization, it is easily adaptable to different 
situations, including different energy markets (e.g. generation, gas and transmission), power asset 
types (e.g. nuclear, hydroelectric and thermal power plants), multiple underlying uncertainty factors, 
different asset operating constraints and different methods of modeling relevant uncertainty factors 




Specifically, three illustrative but realistic case studies were carried out to analyze the following: 
(i) operating flexibilities of the operator of a gas-fired power plant in the face of price 
uncertainties (i.e. gas and power prices), equipment and operating constraints  and 
uncertainty resulting from the mismatch of the operations of natural gas and electricity 
markets; 
(ii) operating flexibilities of a peaking hydroelectric power generation plant, including the option 
of the owner to participate in an operating reserve market in addition to an energy market; 
(iii) the flexibility of the owner of a baseload power generation plant to optimize life-cycle 
management spending and scheduling in the face of technical and market-based 
uncertainties.  
 
 For the operator of a gas-fired power generation plant, the mismatch between day-ahead operation of 
natural gas markets and real-time dispatch of power generators in electricity markets leaves a 
potential for gas supply/imbalance. This so called “gas imbalance” constitutes additional variable cost 
and source of uncertainty for the operator of a gas-fired power plant. By incorporating this source of 
uncertainty and its potential costs in our valuation model, we have shown that different optimal 
operating strategies may result for the gas-fired power plant, compared to when the plant’s valuation 
does not take gas-imbalance into consideration. For instance, when one considers daily cycling 
operation of a gas-fired plant, resulting optimal operating decisions for a day may be such that will 
result in a loss in the power market for that day, if it achieves an overall reduction of the loss that 
would have occurred otherwise from costs related to gas purchase and penalty charges. With the 
availability of a gas storage facility or a gas load balancing service for intra-day management of gas 
imbalance, penalties charges can be mitigated or eliminated entirely depending on the capacity of the 
gas storage or load balancing facilities. Overall, the daily net value of the power plant is bounded on 
the lower end by the maximum possible loss that can arise from penalty charges due to gas imbalance 
for the day. The issue of gas imbalance, which is yet to be addressed in detail in the context of real 
options valuation before now, is one that has a potential to impact significantly the potential value of 
a gas-fired power generation plant.     
 
For the operator of a peaking hydroelectric power plant, being able to participate in an ancillary 
services market, such as an operating reserve market has the potential to increase the value of the 
asset. As shown by the illustrative case study presented in chapter 6, the key source of flexibility for a 
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hydroelectric facility is its reservoir storage capacity, which makes it possible for the operator to store 
water and make use of it when price is highest. This ability to store water also makes it possible for 
the plant operator to sell the right to its reserve capacity (i.e. operating reserve) to the power market 
operator in exchange for a premium. Given that the operator will receive spot price for the energy 
reserved whether the reserve is called immediately or later, operating reserve premiums constitute 
additional source of revenue for a power generator. The more the available storage space, the more 
the operator of a hydroelectric asset can derive value from time-shifting water, including making use 
of operating reserve market. For a given reservoir storage size, the operator has more water time-
shifting flexibility when inflow is low (winter and summer) compared to high rainfall seasons (spring 
and fall). By considering operation in a joint operating reserve and energy market, this application of 
the developed valuation framework extends existing applications of real-options valuation of 
hydroelectric power plants currently available in the literature.   
 
We have also adapted the developed valuation framework to value the energy output of a baseload 
power generation asset such as a nuclear power plant. For the operator of a baseload asset, the key 
operating flexibility is not in short-term operation but rather in the long-term life-cycle management 
planning and spending. Most published applications of real-options valuation to power generation 
assets have focused on short-term operating flexibilities of peaking power plants. The illustrative case 
study developed and presented in this work has demonstrated the application of real-options thinking 
to the operation of a baseload power plant. The owner of a baseload power plant will strategically 
schedule life cycle shutdowns and optimize spending on preventative maintenance projects and 
inspections in such a way that overall costs are minimized. By strategically reacting to arrival of new 
information regarding market prices and equipment conditions, the owner may choose to delay 
planned life-cycle projects or reduce spending thereby maximizing net value of the asset in the 
planning horizon. What decisions are optimal in this case depend on the relationship between current 
life-cycle spending and future equipment degradation, and also on future evolution of key market 
factors.  
8.1 Applications 
The modeling framework developed, being a robust valuation framework can find application in 
capital budgeting for energy assets, business planning for asset owners, financial risk management, 
energy trading and valuation of new builds (e.g. design of power purchase agreements). For example, 
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the type of application developed here for a baseload power plant can be employed to assist in 
decision making regarding life-cycle management budgets and schedules.  Similarly, one can use the 
gas-fired power plant valuation modeling approach developed in this work to assist in hedging gas 
imbalance risk e.g. by studying the impacts of different capacities or types of gas load balancing 
services or storage. Given that the models produce the probability distribution of optimal decisions 
and net values, they can also be employed in making short-term trading decisions and market bidding.   
8.2 Further Development Opportunities 
Further development opportunities exist for adapting the developed framework to value other energy 
assets such as a cascading hydroelectric facility, a refinery and an oil well among others. For instance, 
one can model the operation of a refinery as switching between different operating modes where each 
possible operating mode represents a given combination of refining output constrained by feasible 
crack-spread ratios.  In addition, one can also study a situation where there is a portfolio of power 





Appendix A: LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AHR    Average Heat Rate 
AGC   Automatic Generation Control 
ARCH  Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
MW  Mega Watt 
MISO  Midwest Independent Electricity System Operator 
DAM   Day Ahead Market 
LDC   Load Distribution Company 
NAESB North American Energy Standards Board 
HRSG  Heat Recovery Steam Generator 
ROV  Real Options Value 
PV  Present Value 
MRJD  Mean Reverting Jump Diffusion 
OU  Ornstein Ulenbeck  
CfaR  Cash Flow at Risk 
EaR  Earnings at Risk 
VaR  Value at Risk 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
MWh  Mega Watt Hour 
MMBtu Million British Thermal Unit 
PDE  Partial Differential Equation 
GBM  Geometric Brownian Motion 
NYMEC New York Mercentile Exchange 
NPV  Net Present Value 
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IRR  Internal Rate of Return 
PBP   Pay Back Period 
SOP   Standard Offer Program 
GRC  Generation Rate Charge 
FABC  Flow Away from Bruce Complex 
EWTE  East West to East 
EWTW  East West to West 
CLAN  Clairwood North 
CLAS  Clairwood South 
QFW  Queeston Flow West 
FIO  Flow into Ottawa 
NBLIP  Negative Buchannan Lonwood Interphase 
BLIP  Buchannan Lonwood Interphase 
FN  Flow North 
FS  Flow South 
LMP  Locational Marginal Pricing 
CMSC  Congestion Management Settlement Credit 
UMP  Uniform Marginal Pricing 
MCP  Market Clearing Price 
DSO  Dispatch System Optimizer 
OR  Operating Reserve 
SGOL  Spare Generator Online  
DACP  Day Ahead Commitment Process 
UKPX  U K Power Exchange 
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EEX  European Energy Exchange 
AESO  Alberta Electricity System Operator 
OPA  Ontario Power Authority 
OEB  Ontario Energy Board 
IMO  Independent Market Operator 
OTC  Over the Counter 
IESO  Independent Electricity System Operator 
LCM  Life Cycle Management 
HOEP  Hourly Ontario Electricity Price 
TR  Transmission Right 
NPP  Nuclear Power Plant 
PPA  Power Purchase Agreement 
IPP  Independent Power Producer 
FRCC  Florida Reliability Coordinating Council 
NPCC  Northeast Power Coordinating Council 
SERC  SERC Reliability Corporation 
RFC  Reliability First Corporation 
WERC  Western Electricity Reliability Council 
MRO  Midwest Reliability Organization 
ISO  Independent System Operator 
NERC  North American Reliability Council 
ERCOT Electric Reliability Council of Texas 




Appendix B: LIST OF SYMBOLS 
V  Value ($) 
t  Time 
r  Interest rate, discount rate, risk-free rate 
S  Price, representative random variable 
σ  Standard deviation, volatility 
µ  Drift, average return, growth rate 
dz  Increment of the Wiener process 
][⋅E  Expectation  
HR  Heat Rate 
AHR  Average Heat Rate 
max  Maximum 
α  Drift, fraction 
x  Representative random variable 
δ  Dividend rate, convenience yield 
θ  Long-term average of a random variable 
η  Rate or speed of mean reversion, turbine efficiency  
S  Long-term average of S 
κ  Random jump size 
κ  Mean jump size 
φ  Intensity of Poisson counter 
q  Poisson counter, power output 
dq  Change in Poisson process 
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γ  Jump volatility, probability of Operating Reserve activation 
( )⋅⋅,N  Normal distribution 
B  Benefit, cash flow 
k  Operating mode, choice or control variable 
ξ  Fraction of energy offered into OR market 
τ  Current time  
ς  States of nature  
d  Discount factor 
ρ  Density 
K  Set of control elements 
][⋅E  Conditional expectation 
ψ  Basis function – for regression 
N  Number, counter 
t∆  Discrete time increment 
z  State variable, discrete output level 
y  State variable - time counter 
OM  Operations and Maintenance 
a  Correlation coefficient – for regression 
b  Correlation coefficient – for regression 
c  Correlation coefficient – for regression 
β  Ramp-down/ramp-up rate 
g  Gas flow rate, acceleration due to gravity 
I  Gas volume imbalance 
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R  Inventory of storage or load balance account, reservoir inventory (hydro) 
H  Energy  
f  Water flow rate  
F  Volume of water inflow  
Q  Volume of water withdrawal 
h  Height – reservoir water head 
ω  Volume of water in hydro reservoir 
A  Reservoir surface cross-sectional area 
v  Velocity 
a  Penstock cross-sectional area 
X  Independent variable for regression 
Θ  Set of exercise opportunities 
snl  Speed no load 
m  Number of exercise rights 
Cont  Continuation function 
hr  Hour 





Appendix C: SAMPLE CALIBRATION – MONTHLY POWER PRICES 
LINEST OUTPUTS
Dt 1 etha 0.400444 -0.400444 1.591707
X_bar 53.24$    0.09854 0.391221
S X DX DX/Dt sigma 17.6% 0.221624 0.177532
May-02 29.19 3.3738 0.1852 0.185229 53.24      16.51408 58
Jun-02 35.13 3.5591 0.5031 0.50311 53.24      0.520485 1.828023
Jul-02 58.1 4.0622 0.0995 0.099526 53.24      
Aug-02 64.18 4.1617 0.1583 0.158327 53.24      
Sep-02 75.19 4.3200 -0.4352 -0.435161 53.24      
Oct-02 48.66 3.8849 0.0147 0.014688 53.24      
Nov-02 49.38 3.8995 0.1306 0.130616 53.24      
Dec-02 56.27 4.0302 0.0578 0.05783 53.24      
Jan-03 59.62 4.0880 0.3717 0.371691 53.24      
Feb-03 86.46 4.4597 -0.0592 -0.059202 53.24      
Mar-03 81.49 4.4005 -0.3250 -0.324979 53.24      
Apr-03 58.88 4.0755 -0.3104 -0.310356 53.24      
May-03 43.17 3.7651 -0.0361 -0.036085 53.24      
Jun-03 41.64 3.7291 -0.0382 -0.038184 53.24      
Jul-03 40.08 3.6909 0.2003 0.20033 53.24      
Aug-03 48.97 3.8912 -0.0084 -0.008408 53.24      
Sep-03 48.56 3.8828 0.1618 0.161829 53.24      
Oct-03 57.09 4.0446 -0.3446 -0.344562 53.24      
Nov-03 40.45 3.7001 0.0936 0.093623 53.24      
Dec-03 44.42 3.7937 0.3993 0.399293 53.24      
Jan-04 66.22 4.1930 -0.2276 -0.227608 53.24      
Feb-04 52.74 3.9654 -0.0756 -0.075597 53.24      
Mar-04 48.9 3.8898 -0.0629 -0.062877 53.24      
Apr-04 45.92 3.8269 0.0455 0.045549 53.24      
May-04 48.06 3.8725 -0.0289 -0.02892 53.24      
Jun-04 46.69 3.8435 -0.0241 -0.024061 53.24      
Jul-04 45.58 3.8195 -0.0465 -0.046478 53.24      
Aug-04 43.51 3.7730 0.1304 0.130395 53.24      
Sep-04 49.57 3.9034 -0.0093 -0.009323 53.24      
Oct-04 49.11 3.8941 0.0626 0.062551 53.24      
Nov-04 52.28 3.9566 -0.0283 -0.028324 53.24      
Dec-04 50.82 3.9283 0.1304 0.130427 53.24      
Jan-05 57.9 4.0587 -0.1551 -0.15513 53.24      
Feb-05 49.58 3.9036 0.1886 0.188588 53.24      
Mar-05 59.87 4.0922 0.0338 0.033829 53.24      
Apr-05 61.93 4.1260 -0.1548 -0.15477 53.24      
May-05 53.05 3.9712 0.2183 0.218268 53.24      
Jun-05 65.99 4.1895 0.1419 0.141888 53.24      
Jul-05 76.05 4.3314 0.1487 0.148669 53.24      
Aug-05 88.24 4.4801 0.0600 0.060038 53.24      
Sep-05 93.7 4.5401 -0.2104 -0.210418 53.24      
Oct-05 75.92 4.3297 -0.2649 -0.264936 53.24      
Nov-05 58.25 4.0647 0.3144 0.314403 53.24      
Dec-05 79.77 4.3791 -0.3620 -0.362044 53.24      
Jan-06 55.54 4.0171 -0.1434 -0.143406 53.24      
Feb-06 48.12 3.8737 0.0183 0.018326 53.24      
Mar-06 49.01 3.8920 -0.1188 -0.118804 53.24      
Apr-06 43.52 3.7732 0.0624 0.062353 53.24      
May-06 46.32 3.8356 -0.0052 -0.005195 53.24      
Jun-06 46.08 3.8304 0.0920 0.09199 53.24      
Jul-06 50.52 3.9224 0.0426 0.042626 53.24      
Aug-06 52.72 3.9650 -0.3977 -0.397718 53.24      
Sep-06 35.42 3.5673 0.1266 0.12659 53.24      
Oct-06 40.2 3.6939 0.2123 0.212339 53.24      
Nov-06 49.71 3.9062 -0.2363 -0.236255 53.24      
Dec-06 39.25 3.6700 0.1251 0.125088 53.24      
Jan-07 44.48 3.7950 0.2845 0.28453 53.24      
Feb-07 59.12 4.0796 -0.0750 -0.074967 53.24      
Mar-07 54.85 4.0046 -0.1749 -0.174874 53.24      
Apr-07 46.05 3.8297 -0.1791 -0.17907 53.24      




Appendix D: Implementation Codes 
The models developed in this work are implemented in MATLAB. Input data and output results passing 
to and from MATLAB is done in VBA and Microsoft Excel. To request the codes for any of the models 




 [1] Weron, R. (2006), “Modelling and Forecasting Electricity Load and Prices: A Statistical 
Approach”, John Wiley and Sons Ltd, England.  
[2]  Bhattacharya, K., Bollen, M.H.J and Daalder, J.E. (2001), “Operation of Restructured Power 
Systems”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, USA. 
[3]  Shahidehpour, M., Yami, H. and Zuvi, L. (2002), “Market Operations in Electric Power Systems: 
Forecasting, Scheduling and Risk Management”, Wiley-IEEE Press, USA.  
[4]  Schwartz, E.S. (1997) “Stochastic Behavior of Commodity Prices: Implications for Pricing and 
Hedging”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, pp. 923-973. 
[5]  Schwartz, E. S and Trigeorgis, L. (2004), “Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty: 
Classical Readings and Recent Contributions”, the MIT Press, USA.  
[6]  Dixit, A. K. and Pindyck, R. S. (1994), “Investment under Uncertainty”, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey.  
[7]  Copeland, T. and Antikarov, V. (2001), “Real Options: A Practitioners Guide”, Texere 
Publishing, USA.  
[8]  Amram, M. and Kulatilaka, N. (2001), “Real Options: Managing Strategic Investment in an 
Uncertain World”, Financial Management Association Survey and Synthesis Series, Oxford 
University Press, USA.  
[9]  Zareipour, H. (2006), “Price Forecasting and Optimal Operations of Wholesale Customers in a 
Competitive Electricity Market”, PhD Thesis, University of Waterloo, Canada.  
[10] Eyedeland, A. and Wolyniec, K., (2003) “Energy and Power Risk Management: New 
Developments in Modeling, Pricing and Hedging”, John Wiley and Sons, New York.  
[11] Kaminski, V. (Ed.) (2004) “Managing Energy Price Risk: The New Challenges and Solutions”, 
V. Kaminski (Ed.), Third Edition, Risk Books, USA.   
[12] Ronn, E. (Ed.) (2002) “Real Options and Energy Management”, Risk Waters Group Ltd., USA. 
[13] Hull, J. C. (2002), “Options, Futures and Other Derivatives”, Fifth Edition, Prentice Hall, USA.  
[14] Larsen, E. R and Bunn, D. W. (1999), “Deregulation in Electricity: Understanding Strategic and 
 
 208 
Regulatory Risks”, Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 50, N0. 4.  
[15] Brealey, R. A and Myers, S. C. (2002), “Capital Investment and Valuation”, 1st Edition, McGraw-
Hill, USA.   
[16] Fraser, N.M, Bernhardt, J., and Jewkes, E.M. (2000), “Engineering Economics in Canada”, 
Second Edition, Prentice Hall, Toronto.  
[17] Hayes, R., H. and Garvin, D., A. (1982), “Managing as if Tomorrow Mattered”, Harvard 
Business Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (May-June), pp. 70-79.  
[18] Kester, W., C. (1984), “Today’s Options for Tomorrow’s Growth”, Harvard Business Review, 
March-April Edition.  
[19] Hertz, D., (1964), “Risk Analysis in Capital Investment”, Harvard Business Review, Vol. 42, 
January-February Edition.  
[20] Trigeorgis, L. (2004), “A Conceptual Options Framework for Capital Budgeting”, in “Real 
Options and Investment under Uncertainty: Classical Readings and Recent Contributions”, E. 
Schwartz and L. Trigeorgis (Eds.), MIT Press, USA. 
[21] Dixit, A.K. (2004), “Investment and Hysteresis”, in “Real Options and Investment under 
Uncertainty: Classical Readings and Recent Contributions”, E. Schwartz and L. Trigeorgis (Eds.), 
MIT Press, USA. 
[22] Myers, S. (1977), “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing”, Journal of Financial Economics, No. 
5, pp. 147.  
[23] Mason, S. P. and Merton, R. C. (1985), “The Role of Contingent Claims Analysis in Corporate 
Finance” in Recent Advances in Corporate Finance, E. I Altman and Subrahmanyam, M. G. (Eds.), 
Irwing, Homewood-IL, pp. 7-54.  
[24] Macdonald, R. and Siegel, D. (1985), “Investments and the Valuation of Firms When There is an 
Option to Shut Down”, International Economics Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1985, pp. 331-349.  
[25] Brennan, M.J and E.S. Schwartz, “Evaluating Natural Resource Investments”, Journal of 
Business, Vol. 58, No. 2, 1985, pp. 135-157.  
[26] Kulatilaka, N (1988), “Valuing the Flexibility of Flexible Manufacturing Systems,” IEEE 
Transactions in Engineering Management, Vol. 35, pp. 250-257.  
 
 209 
[27] Trigeorgis, L. (1995), “Real Options in Capital Investment: Models, Strategies and Applications”, 
Praeger Publishers, USA.  
[28] Trigeorgis, L. and Mason, S. P. (2004), “Valuing Managerial Flexibility”, in “Real Options and 
Investment under Uncertainty: Classical Readings and Recent Contributions”, E. Schwartz and L. 
Trigeorgis (Eds.), MIT Press, USA. 
[29] Kulatilaka, N. and Trigeorgis, L. (2004), “The General Flexibility to Switch: Real Options 
Revisited”, in “Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty: Classical Readings and Recent 
Contributions”, E. Schwartz and L. Trigeorgis (Eds.), MIT Press, USA. 
[30] Ingersoll, J. and Ross, S. (1992), “Waiting to Invest: Investment Under Uncertainty”, Journal of 
Business, Vol. 65, No. 1. pp. 1-29.  
[31] McDonald, R. and Siegel, R. (1985), “Investment and the Valuation of Firms When There is an 
Option to Shut Down”, International Economic Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 331-349. 
[32] Majd, S. and Pindyck, R., S. (2004), “Time to Build, Option Value and Investment Decisions”, in 
“Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty: Classical Readings and Recent Contributions”, E. 
Schwartz and L. Trigeorgis (Eds.), MIT Press, USA. 
[33] Ronn, E. (Ed.), (2002) “Real Options and Energy Management”, Risk Waters Group Ltd., pp. 
281-303. 
[34] Denton, M., Palmer, A., Masiello, R. and Skantze, P., (2003) “Managing market Risk in Energy”, 
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 18, No. 2. 
[35] Thompson, M., Davison, M. and Rasmussen, H., (2004) “Valuation and Optimal Operations of 
Electric Power Plants in Competitive Markets”, Operations Research, Vol. 52, Issue 4, pp. 546-562. 
[36] Tseng, C. and Barz, G., (2002) “Short-Term Generation Asset Valuation: A Real Options 
Approach”, Operations Research, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 297-310, March –April. 
[37] Li, F. S. and Chiu, W., (2002) “Valuing Generation Assets Using Real Option Competitive Price 
Analysis: A Step-by-Step Valuation Example for a Portfolio of Generating Assets ” in Real Options 
and Energy Management, E. Ronn (Ed.), Risk Waters Group Ltd., pp. 597-634. 
[38] Leppard, S., (2004), “Valuation and Risk Management of Physical Assets” in Managing Energy 
Price Risk: The New Challenges and Solutions”, V. Kaminski (Ed.), Third Edition, Risk Books.  
 
 210 
[39] Deng, S., Johnson, B. and Sogomonian, A., (2001), “Exotic Electricity Options and the Valuation 
of Electricity Generation and Transmission Assets”, Decision Support Systems, Elsevier Science, Vol. 
30, pp. 383-392.  
[40] Rosenberg, M., Bryngelson, J. D., Sidorenko, N. and Baron, M., (2002), “Price Spikes and Real 
Options: Transmission Valuation”, in Real Options and Energy Management, E. Ronn (Ed.), Risk 
Waters Group Ltd., pp. 323-369. 
[41] Weston, T. (2002), “Applying Stochastic Dynamic Programming to the Valuation of Gas Storage 
and Generation Assets”, in Real Options and Energy Management, E. Ronn (Ed.), Risk Waters Group 
Ltd., pp. 183 -216. 
[42] Thompson, M, Davison, M. and Rasmussen, H. (2003), “Natural Gas Storage Valuation and 
Optimization: A Real Options Application”, Working Paper, University of Western Ontario, Canada. 
[43] Maragos, S. (2002), “Valuation of the Operational Flexibility of Natural Gas Storage Reservoirs”, 
in Real Options and Energy Management, E. Ronn (Ed.), Risk Waters Group Ltd., pp. 431-456. 
[44] Clewlow, L. and Strickland, C., (2002), “Energy Derivatives: Pricing and Risk Management”, 
Lacima Group Publishers.   
[45] Skantze, P.L. and Ilic, M. D., (2001) “Valuation, Hedging and Speculation in Competitive 
Electricity Markets: A Fundamental Approach”, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Massachusetts.  
[46] Black, F. and Scholes, M., (1973), “The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities”, Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 81, pp. 637-659.  
[47] Merton, R. C., (1973), “The Theory of Rational Option Pricing”, Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Sciences, Vol. 4, pp. 141-183. 
[48] Kaminski, V., Gibner, S., Pinnamaneni, K. (2004), “Energy Exotic Options”, in “Managing 
Energy Price Risk: The New Challenges and Solutions”, V. Kaminski (Ed.), Third Edition, Risk 
Books, USA. 
[49] Margrabe, W. (1978), “The Value of an Option to Exchange One Asset for Another”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 33, pp. 177-186. 
[50] Jaillet, P., Ronn, E.I. and Tompaidis, S., (2004) “Valuation of Commodity-Based Swing 
Options”, Management Science, Vol. 50, No. 7, pp. 909-921. 
 
 211 
[51] Dahlgren, M., (2005), “A Continuous Time Model to Price Commodity Based Swing Option”, 
Review of Derivatives Research, Vol. 8, pp. 27-47. 
[52]  Dörr, U., (2003), “Valuation of Swing Options and Examination of Exercise Strategies by Monte 
Carlo Techniques”, MSc. Thesis, Oxford University, Trinity. 
[53] Carmona, R. and Durrleman, V., (2005), “Pricing and Hedging Spread Options”, SIAM 
Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 627-685. 
[54] Chao-An, L., Svoboda, A.J., Chung-Li, T., Johnson, R.B. and Hsu, E. (1997), “Hydro Unit 
Commitment in Hydro-Thermal Optimization”, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 12, Issue 
2.  
[55] Sherkat, V.R., Campo, R., Lo, E.O. and Moslehi, K. (1985), “Stochastic Long-Term 
Hydrothermal Optimization for a Multireservoir System”, IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and 
Systems, Vol. PAS 108, Issue 8. 
[56] International Atomic Energy Agency (1999), “Strategies for Competitive Nuclear Power Plants”, 
IAEA Publication # IAEA-TECDOC-1123.  
[57]  International Atomic Energy Agency (2001), “Risk Management: A Tool for improving Nuclear 
Power Plant Performance”, IAEA Publication # IAEA-TECDOC-1209.  
[58] Atomic Energy Agency (2002), “Nuclear Power Plant Outage Optimization Strategy”, IAEA 
Publication # IAEA-TECDOC-1315.   
[59] Pindyck, R. (2004), “Investments of Uncertain Cost: An Application to the Construction of 
Nuclear Power Plants”, in “Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty: Classical Readings and 
Recent Contributions”, E. Schwartz and L. Trigeorgis (Eds.), MIT Press, USA. 
[60] Kleindorfer, P. R. and Lide, L., (2004), “Multi-Period VaR-Constrained Portfolio Optimization 
with Applications to the Electric Power Sector”, University of Pennsylvania Wharton Business 
School, Working Paper.  
[61] Sen, S., Yu, L. and Genc, Talat, (2005), “A Stochastic Programming Approach to Power Portfolio 
Optimization”, Operations Research, Vol. 54, Issue 1.  
[62] Doege, J., Luthi, H., Schiltknecht, P.(2005), “Risk Management of Power Portfolios and 
Valuation of Flexibility”, Working Paper, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology. . 
 
 212 
[63] Dias, M.A and Teixeira, J. P. (2003), “Continuous-Time Option Games: Review of Models and 
Extensions Part 1: Duopoly Under Uncertainty”, Proceedings of the 2003 International Real Options 
Conference, George Town University, USA.  
[64] Senor, B., (2004), “VAR, Stress Testing and Supplementary Methodologies: Uses and 
Constraints in Power and Energy Portfolio Risk Management” in Managing Energy Price Risk: The New 
Challenges and Solutions”, V. Kaminski (Ed.), Third Edition, Risk Books. 
[65] Kehlhofer, R., Bachmann, R., Nielsen, H. and J. Warner, (1999) “Combined Cycle Gas and 
Steam Turbine Power Plants”, PennWell Publishing Company, Tulsa Oklahoma, 2nd Edition. 
[66] Klein, J. B, (1998), “The use of Heat Rates in Production Costs Modeling and Market Modeling”, 
A report produced by the Electricity Analysis Office, California Energy Commission. 
[67] Ojanen, O., Makkonen, S. and Salo, A. (2005), “A Multi-Criteria Framework for the Selection of 
Risk Analysis Methods at Energy Utilities”, International Journal of Risk Management, Vol. 5, No. 1, 
2005.  
[68] Dahlgren, R., Liu, C. and Lawarrée, J., (2003), “Risk Assessment in Energy Trading”, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 503-511. 
[69] Dahlgren, R., Liu, C. and Lawarrée, J., (2003), “Risk Assessment in Energy Trading”, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 503-511. 
[70] Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J-M., and Heath, D., (1999), “Coherent Risk Measures” 
Mathematical Finance, Vol. 9, pp. 203-228.   
[71] Clewlow, L. and Strickland, C. (2004), “Earnings at Risk”, Energy Risk, October Edition.  
[72] Cartea, A. and Figueroa, M.G., (2004), “Pricing in Electricity Markets: A Mean Reverting Jump 
Diffusion Model with Seasonality”, Applied Mathematical Finance, Vol. 12, Issue 4, pp. 313-335.   
[73] Li, F. S. and Chiu, W., (2002), “Valuing Generation Assets Using Real Option Competitive Price 
Analysis: A Step-by-Step Valuation Example for a Portfolio of Generating Assets”” in Real Options 
and Energy Management, E. Ronn (Ed.), Risk Waters Group Ltd., pp. 597-634. 
[74] Davison, M., Anderson C.L., Marcus, B. and Anderson, K., (2002), “Development of a Hybrid 
Model for Electrical Power Spot Prices” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 17, No. 2.  
[75] Brennan, M. and Schwartz, E. (1976), “The Pricing of Equity-Linked Life Insurance Policies with 
 
 213 
an Asset Value Guarantee”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, pp. 195-214.  
[76] Brennan, M. and Schwartz, E. (1976), “Convertible Bonds: Valuation and Optimal Strategies for 
Call and Conversion”, Journal of Finance.  
[77] Brennan, M. and Schwartz, E. (1976), “The Valuation of American Put Options”, Journal of 
Finance.  
[78] Longstaff, F. A. and Schwartz, E.S., (2001), “Valuing American Options by Simulation: A 
Simple Least-Squares Approach”, The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 14., No. 1, pp. 113-147.  
[79] Triantis, A. and Hodder, J. (1990), “Valuing Flexibility as a Complex Option”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 45, pp. 549-565.  
[80] Barraquand, J. and Martineau, D. (1995), “Numerical Valuation of High Dimensional 
Multivariate American Securities”, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 30, No. 3, 
pp. 383-405. 
[81] Tsekrekos, A.E, Shackleton, M.B and Wojakowski, R. (2003), “Evaluating Natural Resource 
Investments Using Least-Squares Monte Carlo Simulation Approach”, Proceedings of the Seventh 
Annual Real Options Conference, Washington D.C.  
[82] Sabour, S. A. and Poulin, R. (2006), “Valuing Real Capital Investments Using the Least-Squares 
Monte Carlo Method”, The Engineering Economist, Vol. 51, Issue 2, pp. 141-160.  
[83] Cortazar, G. (2004), “Simulation and Numerical Methods in Real Options Valuation”, in “Real 
Options and Investment under Uncertainty: Classical Readings and Recent Contributions”, E. 
Schwartz and L. Trigeorgis (Eds.), MIT Press, USA. 
[84] Cox, J., Ross, S., and Rubistein, M. (1979), “Options Pricing: A Simplified Approach”, Journal 
of Financial Economics, Vol. 7, October Edition, pp. 229-263. 
[85] Kamrad, B., and Ritchken, P. (1991), “Multinomial Approximating Models for Options with k 
State Variables”, Management Science, Vol. 37, No12, pp. 1640- 1652.  
[86] Boyle, P.P. (1977), “Options: A Monte Carlo Approach”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 4, 
pp. 323-338.  
[87] Glasserman, P. (2004), “Monte Carlo Methods in Financial Engineering”, Springer, 1st Edition.  
[88]  Moreno, M. and Navas, J. F. (2003), “On the Robustness of Least-Squares Monte Carlo (LSM) 
 
 214 
for Pricing American Derivatives”, Review of Derivatives Research, Vol. 6, N0. 2, pp. 107-128.  
[89]  Stentoft, L. (2004), “Assessing the Least-Squares Monte Carlo Approach to American Option 
Valuation”, Review of Derivatives Research, Vol. 7, N0. 2, pp. 129-168.  
[90]  Clement, E., Lamberton, D., and Protter, P.(2002), “An analysis of a Least Squares Regression 
Method for American Option Pricing” Finance and Stochastics, Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 449-471.   
[91] Dias, M, “Monte Carlo Simulation of Stochastic Processes”, Published on the web at 
http://www.puc-rio.br/marco.ind.  
[92] Devin, K, “Gas in Electricity Generation”, Energy Exploration and Exploitation, Vol. 13, pp. 
149-157, 1995.  
[93] Bopp, A. E, Kannan, V. R., Palocsdy, S. W and Stevens, S.P. “An Optimization Model for 
Planning Natural Gas Purchases, Transportation, Storage and Deliverability”, Omega, Vol. 24, pp. 
511-522, 1996.  
[ 94] Chen H. and Baldick, R., “Optimizing Short-term Natural Gas Supply Portfolio for Electric 
Utility Companies”, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. 22, No. 1, February 2007.  
[95] Pereira, M.V.F and Pinto, L.M.V.G, (1985), “Stochastic Optimization of a Multireservoir 
Hydroelectric System: A Decomposition Approach”, Water Resources Research, Vol. 21, Issue 6.  
[96] Georgakakos, A. P., Yao, H., and Yu, Y., (1997), “Control Models for Hydroelectric Energy 
Optimization”, Water Resources Research, Vol. 33, Issue 10, pp. 2367-2380. 
[97] Deb, R. (2000), “Operating Hydroelectric and Pumped Storage Units in a Competitive 
Environment”, Electricity Journal.  
[98] Eric Hirst (2005), “Estimating the Economic Value of Providing Ancillary Services” Hydro 
Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 46-55.  
[99] Jacobs, J. M., and Schultz, G. (2002), “ Opportunities for Stochastic and Probabilistic Modeling 
in the Deregulated Electricity Industry”, in Decision Making Under Uncertainty – Energy and Power, 
C. Greengard and A. Ruszczynski (Eds.), Springer, New York, Vol. 128. 
[100] Gordon, J.L. (2001), “Hydraulic Turbine Efficiency”, Canadian Journal of Civil Engineering, 
Vol. 28, pp. 238-253.  
[101] Ibanez, A. (2004), “Valuation by Simulation of Contingent Claims with Multiple Early Exercise 
 
 215 
Opportunities”, Mathematical Finance, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 223-248.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
